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The Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg

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11/12/1863

LESSONS IN THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

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THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG


From the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE CADETS OF THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY

BY

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The Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg.

Military Situation June 1, 1863.—The Civil War, begun in the spring of 1861, had been in progress two years. The United States had 500,000 troops actually in the field and 625,000 on the rolls.

In the Atlantic coastal plain, Union troops occupied West Point, Yorktown, Norfolk and Suffolk, Va., Plymouth, Washington, Newbern and Beaufort, N. C., the islands along the coast of South Carolina between Charleston and the Savannah River, and Fernandina and St. Augustine, Fla. To protect the railroad connecting Richmond, Wilmington, Charleston and Savannah and the important towns along the railroad from raids or more serious operations by these Union troops, the Confederate government was compelled to leave a considerable force in the South Atlantic States.

In northern Virginia, where active operations had temporarily ceased, the opposing armies, the Army of the Potomac under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker and the Army of Northern Virginia under Gen. Robert E. Lee, lay on opposite banks of the Rapahannock River midway between Washington and Richmond.

In West Virginia there were a number of Union garrisons to protect the State, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad which traversed it, from Confederate raids.

In Kentucky, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside was organizing the Army of the Ohio to advance against Knoxville, Tenn., held by Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner.

In Tennessee, the Confederate troops had complete possession of the Tennessee Valley in the eastern part of the State, and the Union troops had complete possession of the western part of the State between the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers. In middle Tennessee, between Murfreesboro and Shelbyville, the Army of the Cumberland under Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans was facing the Army of Tennessee under Gen. Braxton Bragg.

On the Mississippi River, the Army of the Tennessee under Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was investing a Confederate force of 30,000 men under Lieut. Gen. *John C. Pemberton* at Vicksburg, and at the same time holding off the *Army of Mississippi* under General *Joseph E. Johnston*, which was being organized at Jackson, Miss.

In *Louisiana*, the Army of the Gulf under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks was occupying New Orleans and the surrounding territory and also besieging Port Hudson, which was held by a Confederate garrison of 6,000 men under Maj. Gen. *Franklin Gardner*.

In *Arkansas*, the Union troops held that part of the State north of the Arkansas River.

The situation on the Mississippi River gave the Confederate government great anxiety as the fall of Vicksburg would be a serious blow to the Confederate States. Since *Johnston* believed his army too weak to relieve the garrison of Vicksburg without material reinforcements, two plans had been suggested to meet the situation. One was to send one or more divisions of the *Army of Northern Virginia* to *Johnston*, and the other was to send these divisions with *Johnston's* army to *Bragg* in Tennessee. It was thought that a Confederate victory in Tennessee would compel Grant to raise the siege of Vicksburg and to go to the assistance of Rosecrans.

In view of the time required to make these combinations and the uncertainty of the results, neither President *Jefferson Davis* nor his principal military adviser, Gen. *Lee*, was willing to assume the responsibility for either plan. By them it was deemed best to attempt to offset the probable disasters on the Mississippi River by a victorious campaign in the East by the *Army of Northern Virginia*, strengthened as much as the resources of the East would permit.

The Eastern Departments.—The total strength of the Union troops in the East on May 31, was approximately:

Troops Present.

Department of Army of the Potomac.....	122,000 W. R. 40 p. 574
Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker.	
Department of Washington.....	46,000 W. R. 40 p. 586
Maj. Gen. Samuel G. Heintzelman.	
Middle department (Maryland and West Virginia)...	37,000 W. R. 40 p. 589
Maj. Gen. Robert C. Schenck.	
Department of Virginia.....	37,000 W. R. 26 p. 733
Maj. Gen. John A. Dix.	
Department of North Carolina.....	19,000 W. R. 26 p. 736
Maj. Gen. John G. Foster.	
Department of the South.....	19,000 W. R. 20 p. 461
Maj. Gen. David Hunter.	
Total.....	280,000

The total strength of the Confederate troops in the East on May 31, was approximately:

Troops Present.

Department of Northern Virginia.....	89,000 W. R. 40 p. 846
Gen. Robert E. Lee.	
Department of Western Virginia.....	7,000 W. R. 40 p. 846
Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones.	
Department of Richmond.....	10,000 W. R. 26 p. 1087
Maj. Gen. Arnold Elzey.	
Department of North Carolina.....	27,000 W. R. 26 p. 1087
Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill.	
Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida..	22,000 W. R. 20 p. 964
Total.....	155,000

In the report for the *Army of Northern Virginia*, the Valley District and two battalions of artillery, about 3,000 men are omitted, which would make the total 158,000.

These territorial departments were under the War Departments of the United and Confederate States, and no transfer of troops from one to another was possible without an order from their respective Presidents or Secretaries of War.

Army of the Potomac.—After the Chancellorsville campaign, the infantry divisions of the army were partially reorganized due to the expiration of the term of service of 22 regiments which were sent to their States to be mustered out. These losses were made up in the course of the campaign by transfers from other departments. The artillery was reorganized by consolidating the corps and divisional batteries of each army corps into a single













brigade of corps artillery, and the artillery reserve of the army into five brigades of four batteries each. In the Chancellorsville campaign, the cavalry corps had been much reduced by its loss of horses. In the course of the Gettysburg campaign its strength was restored by the transfer of two brigades from another department.









On the battlefield of Gettysburg, the organization of the Army of the Potomac was as follows :

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, until June 28.

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, after June 28.

Corps.	Divisions.	Brigades.
Maj. Gens.	1 James S. Wadsworth, B. G. 	1 Soloman Meredith, B. G. 2 Lysander Cutler, B. G.
I		
John F. Reynolds	2 John C. Robinson, B. G. 	1 Gabriel R. Paul, B. G. 2 Henry Baxter, B. G.
John Newton	3 Abner Doubleday, M. G. 	1 Thomas A. Rowley, B. G. 2 Roy Stone, Col. 3 George J. Stannard, B. G.
	1 John C. Caldwell, B. G. 	1 Edward E. Cross, Col. 2 Patrick Kelly, Col. 3 Samuel K. Zook, B. G. 4 John R. Brooke, Col.
II		
Winfield S. Hancock	2 John Gibbon, B. G. 	1 William Harrow, B. G. 2 Alexander Webb, B. G. 3 Norman J. Hall, Col.
	3 Alexander Hays, B. G. 	1 Samuel S. Carroll, Col. 2 Thomas A. Smyth, Col. 3 George L. Willard, Col.
III		
Daniel E. Sickles	1 David D. Birney, M. G. 	1 Charles K. Graham, B. G. 2 J. H. Hobart Ward, B. G. 3 Regis de Trobriand, Col.
	2 Andrew A. Humphreys, B. G. 	1 Joseph B. Carr, B. G. 2 Wm. R. Brewster, Col. 3 George C. Burling, Col.
V		
George G. Meade	1 James Barnes, B. G. 	1 William S. Tilton, Col. 2 Jacob B. Sweitzer, Col. 3 Strong Vincent, Col.
George Sykes	2 George Sykes, M. G. 	1 Hannibal Day, Col. 2 Sidney Burbank, Col. 3 Stephen Weed, B. G.
	Romeyn B. Ayres, B. G.	
	3 Samuel W. Crawford, B. G. 	1 William McCandless, Col. 2 Joseph W. Fisher, Col.
	1 Horatio G. Wright, B. G.	1 Alfred T. A. Torbert, B. G. 2 Joseph J. Bartlett, B. G. 3 David A. Russell, B. G.
VI		
John Sedgwick	2 Albion P. Howe, B. G. 	1 Lewis A. Grant, Col. 2 Thomas H. Neill, B. G.

Corps. Maj. Gens.	Divisions.	Brigades.
XI Oliver O. Howard	3 John Newton, M. G. 	1 Alexander Shaler, B. G.
	Frank Wheaton, B. G.	2 Henry L. Eustis, Col.
		3 Frank Wheaton, B. G.
	1 Francis C. Barlow, B. G. 	1 Leopold von Gilsa, Col.
		2 Adelbert Ames, B. G.
	2 Adolph von Steinwehr, B. G. 	1 Charles Coster, Col.
XII Henry W. Slocum		2 Orlando Smith, Col.
	3 Carl Schurz, M. G. 	1 Alexander Schimmelfennig, B. G.
		2 W. Krzyzanowski, Col.
	1 Alpheus S. Williams, B. G. 	1 Archibald L. McDougall, Col.
		2 Henry H. Lockwood, B. G.
		3 Thomas H. Ruger, B. G.
Cavalry Alfred Pleasonton	2 John W. Geary, B. G. 	1 Charles Candy, Col.
		2 George A. Cobham, Col.
		3 George S. Greene, B. G.
	1 John Buford, B. G. 	1 William Gamble, Col.
		2 Thomas C. Devin, Col.
		3 Wesley Merritt, B. G.
	2 David McM. Gregg, B. G. 	1 John B. McIntosh, Col.
		2 Pennock Huey, Col.
		3 J. Irvin Gregg, Col.
	3 Judson Kilpatrick, B. G.	1 Elon J. Farnsworth, B. G.
		2 George A. Custer, B. G.

Chief of Artillery . . . Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt.

I corps	1 brigade	5 batteries	28 guns
II corps	1 brigade	5 batteries	24 guns
III corps	1 brigade	5 batteries	30 guns
V corps	1 brigade	5 batteries	26 guns
VI corps	1 brigade	8 batteries	48 guns
XI corps	1 brigade	5 batteries	26 guns
XII corps	1 brigade	4 batteries	20 guns

Artillery Reserve . . . Brig. Gen. Robert O. Tyler.

5 brigades 21 batteries 110 guns, of which two
batteries, eight 4½-
inch rifles, were not
at Gettysburg.

Cavalry Corps 2 brigades 9 batteries 50 guns

Total guns in the artillery, 362; total guns at Gettysburg, 354.

Note.—Stannard's infantry brigade joined the I corps at Gettysburg on the evening of July 1.

Hays' infantry brigade joined the II corps at Gum Spring on June 26.
Crawford's infantry division joined the V corps at Frederick June 28.
Lockwood's infantry brigade joined the XII corps at Gettysburg July 2.
Kilpatrick's cavalry division (formerly Stahel's) joined the cavalry corps at Frederick June 28.

Army of Northern Virginia.—Between the battle of Fredericksburg in December, 1862, and the battle of Chancellorsville in May, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia sent about 20,000 troops to southern Virginia and North Carolina to temporarily strengthen the Confederate forces threatened by Union movements from Suffolk, Va., and Newbern, N. C. In view of the importance of the campaign he was about to undertake, Lee did not deem it wise to move until these troops, or an equivalent number of others, had been sent him. This delayed the opening of the campaign until the first week in June. In the meantime the army was reorganized and as thoroughly armed and equipped as possible.

During the Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville campaigns, the army had been divided into two corps, commanded by *James E. Longstreet* and *Thomas J. Jackson*. When the latter died in May, *Lee* decided to reorganize his army into three corps. For the new corps commanders he recommended *Richard S. Ewell* and *Ambrose P. Hill*. *Ewell* was the senior division commander in the army and was the senior division commander of *Jackson's* corps in its operations in the Shenandoah Valley, around Richmond, and in the Manassas campaign. In the last campaign mentioned, he was severely wounded and lost a leg. He returned to duty the latter part of May, but was hampered in his field duties by his inability to move without crutches when dismounted. *A. P. Hill* had been a division commander in the operations around Richmond, and a division commander in *Jackson's* corps during the campaigns of Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. He was the senior division commander in that corps after *Ewell* was wounded, and the senior in the army with the exception of *Ewell* and *McLaws*. *Lee* had formed a high opinion of his abilities in the previous campaigns. He was somewhat handicapped for active service by ill health.

In forming the army into three corps, the eight infantry divisions were expanded to nine, thus giving three divisions to each corps. The artillery was reorganized by distributing the batteries of the artillery reserve among the three army corps so as to give each corps five battalions of four batteries each. As the regula-

tion battery contained four guns, the normal artillery armament of each corps was fixed at eighty guns. Although the five battalions were under the direction of the chief of artillery of the corps, one battalion was usually assigned to each infantry division and two were retained as a corps reserve. The cavalry division had a battalion of six batteries, and each of the brigades of the Valley District had one. In the Chancellorsville campaign, the Union cavalry had shown unusual boldness. This caused Lee to strengthen the cavalry of his own army by recalling one of its brigades, which had been sent to the Shenandoah Valley, and by adding a new one of two regiments, received from North Carolina. Under his cavalry commander, Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, the regular cavalry division was being recruited and equipped near Culpeper, Va.

The organization of the *Army of Northern Virginia* in the Gettysburg campaign was as follows:

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

General Robert E. Lee.

Corps. Lieut. Gens.	Divisions. Maj. Gens.	Brigades. Brig. Gens.
First James E. Longstreet	1 Lafayette McLaws	1 John B. Kershaw 2 William Barksdale 3 Paul J. Semmes 4 William T. Wofford
	2 George E. Pickett	1 Richard B. Garnett 2 James L. Kemper 3 Lewis A. Armistead
	3 John B. Hood	1 Evander Law 2 Jerome B. Robertson 3 George T. Anderson 4 Henry L. Benning
	1 Jubal A. Early	1 Harry T. Hays 2 Robert F. Hoke (Isaac E. Avery) 3 William Smith 4 John B. Gordon
	Second Richard S. Ewell	1 George H. Steuart 2 James A. Walker 3 Francis T. Nicholls (J. M. Williams) 4 John M. Jones
		3 Robert E. Rhodes
		1 Junius Daniel 2 Alfred Iverson 3 George Doles 4 Stephen D. Ramseur 5 Edward A. O'Neil

Corps. Lieut. Gens.	Divisions. Maj. Gens.	Brigades. Brig. Gens.
	1 Richard H. Anderson	1 Cadmus M. Wilcox 2 Ambrose R. Wright 3 William Mahone 4 Edward A. Perry (David Lang) 5 Carnot Posey
Third Ambrose P. Hill	2 Henry Heth	1 James J. Pettigrew 2 John M. Brockenbrough (Col.) 3 James J. Archer 4 Joseph R. Davis
	3 William D. Pender	1 James H. Lane 2 Edward L. Thomas 3 Alfred M. Scales 4 Samuel McGowan (Abner Perrin)
	James E. B. Stuart (Cavalry)	1 Wade Hampton 2 Beverly H. Robinson 3 Fitzhugh Lee 4 Wm. F. H. Lee (John R. Chambliss) 5 William E. Jones
Valley District and Department of Western Virginia (cavalry and mounted infantry)		1 Albert G. Jenkins 2 John D. Imboden
Chief of Artillery . . . William N. Pendleton.		
Longstreet's corps	5 battalions	84 guns
Ewell's corps	5 battalions	84 guns
A. P. Hill's corps	5 battalions	80 guns
Cavalry corps	1 battalion	24 guns
Total, 272		

Plans.—The object of the Gettysburg campaign is explained by *Lee* in his report.

The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fredericksburg being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this project embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac.

It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy, to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army then commanded by Gen. Hooker and that in any event that army would be compelled to leave Virginia and, possibly, to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country.

In this way it was supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up and part of the season of

active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations and the preparations they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success. Actuated by these and other important considerations, that may hereafter be presented, the movement began June 3.

Fredericksburg to Culpeper.—On June 3, the army corps of Ewell and A. P. Hill, with the division of McLaws of Longstreet's corps, occupied the line of hills on the south bank of the Rappahannock River above and below Fredericksburg; Hood's division was at Verdierville, and Pickett's division was near Hanover Junction, where it had been detained on its way from southern Virginia to observe a Union force that had been landed at West Point on the York River. With Pickett was Pettigrew's brigade of Hill's corps on its way to join him from North Carolina; Davis' brigade from the same State was expected by rail in a few days. Stuart had united his five regular cavalry brigades at Culpeper. Toltz

The Army of the Potomac was on the Falmouth side of the Rappahannock River opposite Fredericksburg. Toward the end of May, it was known that Stuart's cavalry was at Culpeper; fearing a raid, the Union cavalry corps was concentrated along the Alexandria-Gordonsville railroad and the V army corps was directed to relieve the cavalry pickets from Banks Ford as far up the Rappahannock as Kelly Ford.

The opening movement of the campaign is described by Lee in a letter to President Davis, dated June 7.

I commenced to draw the army from the vicinity of Fredericksburg on Wednesday morning, June 3. McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps moved on that day. It was followed Thursday morning by Rodes' division and on Friday by Early's and Johnson's, of Ewell's corps. Hood's division of Longstreet's corps, which had been previously advanced to the Rapidan, was directed, on the 3d instant to move to Culpeper Court-House.

On the afternoon of Friday, the 5th instant, the enemy made open preparations to cross the Rappahannock at the old position at the mouth of Deep Run. After driving back our sharpshooters, under a furious cannonade from their batteries, by a force of skirmishers, they crossed a small body of troops, and occupied the bank of the river. It was so devoid of concealment, that I supposed the intention was to ascertain what forces occupied the position of

Fredericksburg, or to fix our attention upon that place while they should accomplish some other object. I thought it prudent to send that night to Gen. Ewell to halt his march until I could see what the next day would develop, and placed A. P. Hill's corps in position to meet any attack that might be made the next morning.

After watching the enemy's operations Saturday (6th), and being unable to discover more troops than could be attended to by A. P. Hill, and no advance having been made by them, I sent forward to Gen. Ewell to resume his march and left Fredericksburg myself in the evening. My conclusion was that the enemy had discovered the withdrawal of our troops from Fredericksburg, and wished to detain us there while he made corresponding changes.

I have with me two divisions of Longstreet's corps and the three divisions of Ewell's. I desire to bring up the remaining division of Longstreet (Pickett's), and send you a dispatch in the morning, requesting that (J. R.) Cooke should be advanced to this place, and that (M.) Jenkins be brought from the Blackwater to replace Cooke. If it is true, as reported by Gen. Elzey, that only 1,500 of the enemy remain at Suffolk, Ransom's brigade will be more than sufficient for that line. West Point being evacuated, and the force at Yorktown reduced, there is nothing to be apprehended from that quarter and Cooke and Jenkins should be directed to follow me as soon as you think it safe for them to do so.

As far as I can learn, the enemy appears to be extending up the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg. The whole line of the Rappahannock is guarded closely, every ford defended and closely picketed to Beverly's above Rappahannock [railroad] bridge. His cavalry is massed from Catletts to Bealeton, Stoneman's headquarters being on Cedar Run.

I think if I create an apprehension for the safety of their right flank and the Potomac, more troops will be brought from their line of operations in the south. But to gain any material advantage I should, if possible, have a large force, as their army by all accounts, is represented as very large.

If it is true, as stated in the Northern papers, that Gen. Hunter's forces have been reduced by reinforcements being sent to the Gulf, it would be well for Gen. Beauregard, with the force made available by this withdrawal, to be sent to reinforce Johnston in the west, or be ordered to reinforce this army. If these troops remain where they are, their services will be lost to the country, and they will become a prey to disease.

Forseeing Lee's probable movement, Hooker had already decided that if Lee withdrew a part of his army, he would attack the part left at Fredericksburg; it was with this intent that he sent a division across the river as described by Lee. At the same

time, however, he requested authority for this attack in a telegram to President Lincoln, June 5.

Under instructions from the major general commanding the army, dated January 31, I am instructed to keep in view always the importance of covering Washington and Harpers Ferry, either directly or by so operating as to be able to punish any force of the enemy sent against them. In the event the enemy should move, as I almost anticipate he will, the head of his column will probably be headed for the Potomac, via Gordonsville or Culpeper, while the rear will rest at Fredericksburg.

After giving the subject my best reflection, I am of the opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I can return. Will it be within the spirit of my instructions to do so?

Replies were sent the same day both by the President and by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, commanding the army, disapproving his proposed movement. In the meantime, however, Hooker had sent a division of the VI corps across the river and intrenched it there. One division of this corps was kept on the south bank until the night of June 13.

En route to Culpeper, Lee dispatched the following orders, dated June 7, to the commanders of the two mounted brigades of the Valley District and the Department of Western Virginia.

Brig. Gen. *A. G. Jenkins*, via Staunton.

General:—I desire you to have your command ready to be concentrated at Strasburg or Front Royal, or any point in front of either, by Wednesday the 10th instant, with a view to cooperate with a force of infantry. Your pickets can be kept in advance as far as you deem best, toward Winchester. See to their arms, ammunition, and equipments, and make arrangements for provisions and forage. Send me all the information you have about the position and strength of the enemy at Winchester, Charlestown, Berryville and any other point where they may be. Keep your horses as fresh as you can, and have your whole command prepared for active service.

Brig. Gen. *John D. Imboden*, via Staunton.

General:—In view of the operations in the Shenandoah Valley, I desire you to attract the enemy's attention in Hampshire county, and to proceed down to Romney or such other point as you may consider best calculated for the purpose. After leaving a sufficient guard on the Shenandoah Mountain, you can use the rest of your command for the purpose specified. In attracting their attention and detaining whatever force they may have at New Creek,

Cumberland, Cacapon, etc., you will of course do them all the damage in your power by striking them a damaging blow at any point where opportunity offers, and where you deem most practicable.

It will be important, if you can accomplish it, to destroy some of the bridges, so as to prevent communication and the transfer of reinforcements to Martinsburg.

After accomplishing what you can in Hampshire, should you find it practicable or advantageous, you can cooperate with any troops you may find operating in the valley. Forward to the commanding officer of the force there, any information that you may deem important, and comply with any requisition on his part.

I desire you to move into Hampshire as soon as possible. Let me know the time of your departure and the time of your expected arrival. In connection with this purpose, it is important that you should obtain for the army, all the cattle that you can. I hope that you will also be able to collect recruits for your brigade, both cavalry and infantry, and bring them out with you.

Hampshire was the county of which Romney was the county seat. A demonstration there would divert attention from the Shenandoah Valley. The bridges were on the B. and O. Railroad.

From Culpeper on June 8, *Lee* wrote to the *Secretary of War* as follows:

As far as I can judge, there is nothing to be gained by this army remaining quietly on the defensive, which it must do unless it can be reinforced. I am aware that there is difficulty and hazard in taking the aggressive with so large an army in its front, intrenched behind a river, where it cannot be advantageously attacked. Unless it can be drawn out in a position to be assailed, it will take its own time to prepare and strengthen itself to renew its advance on Richmond, and force this army back within the intrenchments of that city. This may result in any event; still, I think it is worth a trial to prevent such a catastrophe. Still, if the department thinks it better to remain on the defensive, and guard as far as possible all the avenues of approach, and await the time of the enemy, I am ready to adopt that course. You have therefore only to inform me.

I think our southern coast might be held during the sickly season by local troops, aided by a small organized force, and predatory excursions of the enemy be repressed. This would give us an active force in the field with which we might hope to make some impression on the enemy both on our northern and western frontiers. Unless this can be done, I see little hope of accomplishing anything of importance. All our military preparations and

organizations should now be pressed forward with the greatest vigor, and every exertion made to obtain some material advantage in this campaign.

As *Pickett* was now on his way to join the army, the first sentence probably refers to the two brigades of *Pickett's* division, *Corse's* and *Micah Jenkins'*, that had been detained by the War Department for the protection of Richmond. Because of the importance of the campaign, *Lee* did not want to leave a single one of his brigades behind. If he could not get *Jenkins'* brigade, he wanted *Cooke's* in its place.

The *Secretary of War's* reply to this letter is dated June 10.

I concur entirely in your views of the importance of aggressive movements by your army. Indeed, in my present judgment, such action is indispensable to our safety and independence, and all attendant sacrifices and risks must be incurred. I steadily urge and sustain this view; at the same time, I am most anxious to assure your communications and supplies, and it is in this view I press upon your consideration some of the dangers to which our destitution of a covering force to this city and the railroad may expose us. I have not hesitated, in cooperating with your plans, to leave this city almost defenseless, and since my letter of yesterday, learning that you had ordered away the small brigade left by General *Pickett* [*Corse's*] at Hanover, I have readily concurred in sending *Cooke's* brigade to the Junction. The *President* has not been willing to order (*M.*) *Jenkins'* brigade from North Carolina, in view of the representations made by Generals *Hill* (*D. H.*) and *Whiting*, but has communicated your late telegrams to the former and submitted to his discretion the propriety of the removal.

On receipt of this letter, *Lee* directed that *Corse's* brigade return to Hanover Junction, and for the time being made no further call for troops.

Cavalry Engagement at Brandy Station.—On May 6, Hooker reported to Halleck:

As the accumulation of the heavy rebel force of cavalry at Culpeper may mean mischief, I am determined if practicable, to break it up in its incipency. I shall send all my cavalry against them stiffened by about 3,000 infantry. It will require until the morning of the 9th to gain their positions, and at daylight on that day it is my intention to attack them in their camps.

The day selected was a fortunate one, as the Confederate cavalry had been concentrated for a review by *Lee* the day before and was not guarding the river as carefully as usual.

In the fight at *Brandy Station* or *Fleetwood*, June 9, the Union troops employed were 7,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry; opposed to them was *Stuart's* cavalry division of "about 8,000 men", according to Confederate reports. The Union troops crossed the Rappahannock River at Beverly and Kelly fords early in the morning and an engagement soon began which lasted all day with varying success. The Union troops withdrew across the river late in the afternoon. Although the Union cavalry was aided by infantry and could not claim a real victory, still the men did not feel that they had been defeated, and the engagement gave them confidence in themselves and their commanders, Pleasonton, Buford and D. McM. Gregg.

From the Rappahannock to the Shenandoah Valley and Manassas Junction.—At Culpeper, *Lee* learned from *Imboden* that he was on his way to Romney, and from *A. G. Jenkins* that he had reached Strasburg in the Shenandoah Valley. As all his preparations were now complete and the Union cavalry had been temporarily disposed of, on the receipt of the *Secretary of War's* message given above, *Ewell* was directed to advance into the Shenandoah Valley; he left Culpeper on the 10th. On the same day *Hooker* sent the following message to President Lincoln:

Gen. Pleasonton reports that he had an affair with the rebel cavalry yesterday near Brandy Station, which resulted in crippling him so much that he will have to abandon his contemplated raid into Maryland, which was to have started this morning.

I am not so certain that the raid will be abandoned from this cause. It may delay the departure a few days. I shall leave the cavalry, which is all I have mounted, where they are, near Bealeton, with instructions to resist the passage of the river by the enemy's forces. If to effect this he should bring up a considerable force of infantry, that will so weaken him in my front that I have good reason to believe that I can throw a sufficient force over the river to compel the enemy to abandon his present position. If it should be the intention to send a heavy column of infantry to accompany the cavalry on the proposed raid, he can leave nothing behind to interpose any serious obstacle to my rapid advance on Richmond. I am not satisfied of his intention in this respect, but from certain movements in their corps I cannot regard it as altogether improbable.

If it should be found to be the case, will it not promote the true interest of the cause for me to march to Richmond at once? From there all the disposable part of this army can be thrown to any threatened point north of the Potomac at short notice, and, until they can reach their destination, a sufficiency of troops can be collected to check, if not stop, his invasion. If left to operate from my own judgment with my present information, I do not hesitate to say that I should adopt this course as being the most speedy and certain mode of giving the rebellion a mortal blow. I desire that you will give it your reflection. At present the enemy has one corps at Gordonsville, with the advance on Culpeper, with the manifest intention of the other corps to drift in that direction. I now have two bridges over the river below Fredericksburg, and it is this, I believe, that causes the enemy to hesitate to move forward.

That night he was informed by the President and by Halleck, that—

Lee's army and not Richmond is your sure objective point.

His plans for an offensive movement having been disapproved, on the 11th, Hooker began to shift his force to the west to cover the crossings of the upper Rappahannock. The III corps was ordered to Bealeton to relieve the cavalry and guard the river crossings above the V corps; the I corps, to Bealeton; and the XI corps, to Catlett's Station. The I, III and XI corps now constituted one wing of the army and were placed under the orders of Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, to whom the commanders of the V and the cavalry corps were also ordered to report temporarily.

It was not until the 13th, three days after *Ewell* had begun his march, that Hooker was informed that any Confederates had moved from Culpeper into the Shenandoah Valley. As his instructions required him to cover Harpers Ferry and Washington, he at once issued orders for the withdrawal of the army from the Rappahannock River. One wing under Reynolds was to follow the railroad to Manassas Junction, while the other wing, under his own supervision, was to follow the road parallel to the Potomac River to Fairfax Station.

On the 16th, Reynolds' wing was concentrated near Manassas Junction and the other wing was at or near Fairfax Station; on the same day *Lee's* army was stretched from Fredericksburg to Williamsport on the Potomac River.

Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac, June 11 to 16.

June	I Corps	III Corps	XI Corps	V Corps	XII Corps	II Corps	VI Corps	Cavalry Divisions
11	Falmouth	Hartwood Church	Falmouth	Rappahannock River	Stafford C. H.	Falmouth	Falmouth	Rappahannock River
12	Deep Run	Bealeton	Hartwood Church	Rappahannock River	Stafford C. H.	Falmouth	Falmouth	Rappahannock River
13	Bealeton	Bealeton	Catlett's Station	Morrisville	Toward Dumfries	Falmouth	Potomac Creek	Rappahannock River
14	Manassas Junction	Manassas Junction	Manassas Junction	Catlett's Station	Dumfries	Falmouth	Stafford C. H.	Rappahannock River
15	Manassas Junction	Manassas Junction	Center-ville	Manassas Junction	Fairfax C. H.	Aquia	Dumfries	Bristow Station
16	Manassas Junction	Manassas Junction	Center-ville	Manassas Junction	Fairfax C. H.	Wolf Run Shoals	Fairfax Station	Manassas Junction

On June 15, two of *Ewell's* divisions were near Winchester and one at Williamsport; *Longstreet's* three divisions started that day from Culpeper; one of *Hill's* divisions was at Germanna Ford, and the other two were at Fredericksburg. Of *Stuart's* cavalry, three brigades were with *Longstreet* and two were still along the Rappahannock River. In order to forestall any Union movement through the Loudoun Valley, between the Bull Run and Blue Ridge mountains, *Longstreet*, who marched at the head of his corps with *Hood's* division, turned off from the Chester Gap road at Washington and kept to the east of the Blue Ridge Mountains.

Lee remained at Culpeper until the 16th when he followed the route taken by *Longstreet*, and reached Markham on the Manassas Gap railroad on the 17th. Here he learned from *Ewell*, that *Early* was at Winchester, *Johnson* on his way to Shepherdstown, and *Rodes* at Williamsport; and from *Longstreet* that, on account of bad roads, he had crossed the Blue Ridge into the Valley through Ashby Gap. He sent them the following instructions:

To *Ewell*:—General: I have just received your letter, the first from you since your dispatch announcing the fall of Winchester. I think the reports you have of the forces at Harpers Ferry must be exaggerated. I wish you to move *Rodes'* division on as far as Hagerstown and operate in the enemy's country according to the plan proposed. Give out that your movement is for the purpose

of enveloping Harpers Ferry. Take what is necessary for the army and give citizens of Maryland Confederate money or certificates. Repress marauding. Do not expose yourself. Keep your own scouts.

To *Longstreet*.—General: Your note of 10 a. m. to-day just received. I have heard nothing of the movements of Gen. Hooker either from Gen. *Stuart* or yourself, and therefore can form no opinion of the best move against him. If a part of our force could have operated east of the mountains, it would have served more to confuse him, but as you have turned off into the Valley and I understand all of the trains have taken the same route, I hope it is for the best. At any rate it is too late to change from information I have. You had better, therefore, push on, relieve *Ewell's* division as soon as you can and let him advance into Maryland, at least as far as Hagerstown. Give out it is against Harpers Ferry. I will send back for *A. P. Hill* to move by Chester Gap. I wrote to you to-day and yesterday. I shall go from here to the Valley.

Ewell's Valley Operations.—As stated in *Lee's* report, one of the results of his plan of campaign would be to clear the Shenandoah Valley of the Union troops that had occupied it since the preceding winter. These Union forces were the division of Maj. Gen. Robert H. Milroy, 7,500 men, at Winchester and Berryville, and a brigade of 1,500 men at Martinsburg; both belonged to the Middle Department.

The commander of the Middle Department had been ordered to withdraw all his exposed posts to Harpers Ferry, but he delayed issuing positive orders to Milroy, on the representations of the latter who thought he would be exposed only to cavalry attack. Before Ewell entered the valley, Milroy had, however, sent some of his supplies back to Harpers Ferry, and had ordered his brigade at Berryville to unite with the other two at Winchester. A third of his force being cavalry employed on patrol duty, Milroy was informed of Ewell's advance on June 12, when Rodes, Johnson and Early reached Front Royal. Here Jenkins reported to Ewell and probably explained the position of the Union troops.

The next morning, *Rodes*, with *Jenkins'* cavalry, moved on Berryville with orders to dispose of the force there and then push on to Martinsburg. Ewell, with the divisions of Early and Johnson, moved on Winchester. On the 13th, Rodes engaged the rear-guard of the Union brigade at Berryville, which retired to

the railroad in its rear and followed the railroad to Winchester. Had his orders permitted *Rodes* to march on Winchester the next day, Milroy's division would have been captured. *Rodes'* orders however directed him to move on Martinsburg, which he reached on the evening of the 14th, where he captured five pieces of artillery and some stores, and Williamsport on the evening of the 15th. In the three days he had marched fifty miles. *Early* and *Johnson* drove Milroy's reconnoitering columns back on Winchester on the 13th, and caused him to take refuge in some closed works north of the town. Late in the afternoon of the 14th, *Early* captured a position which made these works untenable, and that night Milroy decided to retreat on Harpers Ferry along the railroad. Anticipating this, *Johnson* was ordered to make a night march and get on Milroy's line of retreat. A part of Milroy's division had already passed the junction point when the head of *Johnson's* division reached it, and before *Johnson* was there in force, about half of Milroy's division escaped.

Ewell reported the results of his valley operations as follows:

The fruits of this victory were 23 pieces of artillery (nearly all rifled), 4,000 prisoners, 300 loaded wagons, more than 300 horses, and quite a large amount of commissary and quartermaster stores. My loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded and 3 missing; aggregate, 269.

June 17 to 24.—After reaching the Alexandria-Gordonsville railroad, the Army of the Potomac was almost stationary for a week; Hooker was uncertain of *Lee's* intention. Under his orders to cover Washington, Hooker could not cross the Potomac until it was certain that *Lee* was crossing, and he did not want to move westward through the passes of the Bull Run Mountains and give *Lee* the opportunity of reaching Maryland before him. He sent the XII corps to secure a crossing near Leesburg, where two bridges were constructed near Edwards Ferry, and advanced Reynolds' three corps within supporting distance. The V corps was sent to guard the Aldie Gap and the II corps to guard the Thoroughfare Gap, of the Bull Run Mountains. The cavalry corps was sent into the Loudoun Valley to discover *Lee's* position.

Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac, June 17 to 24.

June	I Corps	III Corps	XI Corps	V Corps	XII Corps	II Corps	VI Corps	Cavalry divisions
17	Herndon Station (Leesburg R. R.)	Center-ville	Goose Creek	Gum Springs	Toward Dranesville	Sangster Station	Fairfax Station	1. Aldie 2. Aldie 3. Fairfax C.H.
18	Herndon Station (Leesburg R. R.)	Center-ville	Goose Creek	Gum Springs	Leesburg	Sangster Station	German-town	1. { Loudoun 2. { Valley 3. Fairfax
19	Guilford Station (Leesburg R. R.)	Gum Springs	Goose Creek	Aldie	Leesburg	Sangster Station	German-town	1. { Loudoun 2. { Valley 3. Fairfax
20	Guilford Station (Leesburg R. R.)	Gum Springs	Goose Creek	Aldie	Leesburg	Toward Thoroughfare Gap	Bristow (1 div.)	1. { Loudoun 2. { Valley 3. Fairfax
21	Guilford Station (Leesburg R. R.)	Gum Springs	Goose Creek	Aldie	Leesburg	Thoroughfare Gap	Bristow (1 div.)	1. { Loudoun 2. { Valley 3. Buckland Mills
22	Guilford Station (Leesburg R. R.)	Gum Springs	Goose Creek	Aldie	Leesburg	Thoroughfare Gap	Bristow (1 div.)	1. Aldie 2. Aldie 3. Warrenton
23	Guilford Station (Leesburg R. R.)	Gum Springs	Goose Creek	Aldie	Leesburg	Thoroughfare Gap	Bristow (1 div.)	1. Aldie 2. Aldie 3. Fairfax C.H.
24	Guilford Station (Leesburg R. R.)	Gum Springs	Edwards Ferry	Aldie	Leesburg	Thoroughfare Gap	Center-ville (1 div.)	1. Aldie 2. Aldie 3. Fairfax C.H.

During this week, *Longstreet's* three divisions were encamped along the Shenandoah River from Millwood to Berryville; *Hill's* three divisions marched from the Rappahannock to Shepherdstown on the Potomac; of *Ewell's* divisions, *Early* and *Johnson* moved from the vicinity of Winchester to Shepherdstown and Sharpsburg; and *Rodes* moved through Hagerstown toward Boonsboro; *Stuart's* cavalry was operating in the Loudoun Valley both to conceal the movements of Lee's army and to discover those of Hooker's.

Cavalry Engagements in the Loudoun Valley.—In his instructions to Gen. *Longstreet* on the 17th, *Lee* says:

I have heard nothing of the movements of Gen. Hooker, either from Gen. *Stuart* or from yourself.

Early on that same day, Hooker, who was at Fairfax Station, received a message from Halleck, containing the following order:

I want you to push out your cavalry to ascertain something definite about the enemy.

It would appear that the cavalry forces of the two armies had lost touch as soon as Pleasonton left the Rappahannock River.

On the 17th, *Stuart*, who had been with *Longstreet* with three brigades, sent one brigade through Middleburg to Aldie Gap of the Bull Run Mountains, one to reconnoiter Thoroughfare Gap, one to Rectortown, and went himself to Middleburg with a small escort. Pleasonton, who had concentrated his corps near Manassas for supplies, sent one regiment via Thoroughfare Gap to Middleburg and took a division to Aldie. At Aldie, there was a cavalry engagement that afternoon between a brigade of each army; that night the Confederate brigade retired. At Middleburg, *Stuart* surrounded the Union regiment with his other two brigades and captured a large part of it. When *Hill's* corps had passed beyond Culpeper, *Stuart* united his five brigades in the Loudoun Valley to dispute the reconnaissances being made by Pleasonton. The latter united his corps at Aldie, and after several skirmishes on the 18th, 19th and 20th, received a division of the V corps as a support. On the 21st, he drove *Stuart* through Middleburg and Upperville to Ashby Gap which was held by Confederate infantry. This established the fact that *Lee's* infantry was moving through the Shenandoah Valley and Pleasonton returned to Aldie Gap.

10/1/20
The Advance into Pennsylvania.—*Lee* established his headquarters at Berryville on the 19th and remained there until the 24th. On the 22d, he decided that Pleasonton's force, which he first thought might be the advance-guard of the Army of the Potomac, was only a reconnoitering party, and that day issued his orders for the advance into Pennsylvania.

To *Ewell*, June 22.

General: Your letter of 6 p. m. yesterday has been received. If you are ready to move, you can do so. I think your best course will be toward the Susquehanna, taking the routes by Emmitsburg, Chambersburg and McConnellsburg. Your trains had better be,

as far as possible, kept on the center route. You must get command of your cavalry, and use it in gathering supplies, obtaining information, and protecting your flanks. If necessary, send a staff officer to remain with Gen. *Jenkins*. It will depend upon the quantity of supplies obtained in that country whether the rest of the army can follow. Every exertion should therefore be made to locate and secure them. Beef we can drive with us, but bread we cannot carry and must get it in the country.

I send you copies of a general order on this subject, which I think is based on rectitude and sound policy, and the spirit which I wish you to see enforced in your command. I am much gratified at the success that has attended your movements and feel assured, if they are conducted with the same energy and circumspection, it will continue. Your progress and direction will, of course, depend upon the development of circumstances. If *Harrisburg* comes within your means, capture it.

General *A. P. Hill* arrived yesterday in the vicinity of *Berryville*. I shall move him on to-day if possible. Saturday (June 20), *Longstreet* withdrew from the Blue Ridge. Yesterday the enemy pressed our cavalry so hard with infantry and cavalry on the Upper-ville road that *McLaws'* division had to be sent back to hold *Ashby Gap*. I have not heard from there this morning. General *Stuart* could not ascertain whether it was intended as a real advance toward the Valley, or to ascertain our position.

The pontoons will reach Martinsburg to-day, and will be laid at the point you suggest, 4 or 5 miles below Williamsport, if found suitable. I have not countermanded your order withdrawing the cavalry from Charlestown. I will write you again if I receive further information affecting your movements.

The cavalry referred to in the last paragraph, was *White's* battalion of *Jones'* brigade, which accompanied *Early's* division in the campaign in Pennsylvania.

Another letter was written to *Ewell* the same day.

General: I have just received your letter of this morning from opposite Shepherdstown. Mine of to-day, authorizing you to move toward the Susquehanna, I hope has reached you ere this. After dispatching my letter, learning that the enemy had not renewed his attempts of yesterday to break through the Blue Ridge, I directed General *R. H. Anderson's* division to commence its march toward Shepherdstown. It will reach there to-morrow. I also directed General *Stuart*, should the enemy have so far retired from his front as to permit of the departure of a portion of the cavalry, to march with three brigades across the Potomac, and place himself on your right and in communication with you, keep you advised of the movements of the enemy, and assist in collecting supplies for the army. I have not heard from him since.

I also directed *Imboden*, if opportunity offered, to cross the Potomac and perform the same offices on your left. I shall endeavor to get General *Early's* regiments to him as soon as possible. I do not know what has become of the infantry of the Maryland Line. I had intended that to guard Winchester.

Early had been obliged to detach three regiments from his division to guard Winchester and to conduct the prisoners made from Milroy's command, back to Staunton.

To *Stuart* through *Longstreet*, June 22:

General:—I have just received your note of 7:45 this morning to General *Longstreet*. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and ascertain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us and get across the Potomac before we are aware. If you find he is moving northward and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland and take position on General *Ewell's* flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army.

One column of General *Ewell's* will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts of him last night said there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded the Monocacy bridge which was barricaded. You will of course take charge of (A. G.) *Jenkins'* brigade, and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Maryland must be by authorized staff officers for their respective departments—by no one else. They will be paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. I will send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with.

From *Longstreet* to *Stuart* forwarding the above, June 22:

General:—General *Lee* has inclosed to me this letter for you, to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided I think you can move across to Potomac without disclosing our plans. He speaks of your leaving via Hopewell Gap and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think it will be less likely to indicate what our plans are, than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the letter of instructions with these suggestions.

Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order General *Hampton*—whom I suppose you will leave here in command—to report to me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him.

N. B.—I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear, will in a measure disclose our plan. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy.

In *Stuart's* report, submitted in August, 1863, he says:

I submitted to the commanding general the plan of leaving a brigade or so in my present front, and passing the enemy's rear, passing through Hopewell or some other gap in Bull Run Mountains, attain the enemy's rear, passing between his main body and Washington, and cross into Maryland, joining our army north of the Potomac.

This plan is said to have been submitted by *Stuart* in person at Berryville on the night of the 21st.

Stuart did not receive his final instructions until the evening of the 23d, when he received the following letter from *Lee*, dated 5 p. m. the 23d:

If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountains to-morrow night, cross at Shepherdstown next day, and move over to Frederickstown.

You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of *Ewell's* troops, collecting information, provisions, etc.

Give instructions to the commanders of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front) retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the Valley, closing up on the rear of the army.

As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them, but I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the better.

As it was almost certain that the Army of the Potomac would move northward as soon as *A. P. Hill* crossed the Potomac, *Stuart* decided to follow the plan he had himself proposed. After leaving orders with *Robertson*, who was to remain behind with his own brigade and that of *W. E. Jones*, to guard the Shenandoah Valley as long as necessary and then to follow the army into

Pennsylvania, *Stuart* assembled the brigades of *Hampton* and the two *Lees* on the Manassas Gap railroad south of Rectortown. Before dawn on the 25th, he started on his raid and found the II corps just leaving Thoroughfare Gap and the VI corps moving through Centerville. He made a wide detour around these places, passed through Fairfax Station and Drainesville, and finally crossed the Potomac on the night of the 27th near Great Falls. The Union army was now north of the Potomac and shortly thereafter began to move toward Hanover, Pa. When he reached Westminster and Union Mills, Md., on the 29th, he found the roads to Emmitsburg and Gettysburg in the possession of the Union army. He therefore continued on to Hanover and finding the Union cavalry there, he turned eastward and reached Dover, Pa. He might now have turned westward and joined his army but he was in a hostile country and could get no accurate information. Feeling certain that *Ewell* had gone to Carlisle, he made a detour through that point and rejoined his army at Gettysburg only on July 3.

In his report, *Stuart* says:

The enemy retained one corps (Fifth) at Aldie, and kept his cavalry near enough to make attack upon the latter productive of no solid benefits, and I began to look for some other point at which to direct an effective blow.

It would seem from this that the thought uppermost in *Stuart's* mind was not to get information for his own army, but to strike a blow at the enemy's communications that should offset his defeat in the Loudoun Valley.

On the same day that he sent his final instructions to *Stuart*, June 23, *Lee* reported to President *Davis*:

Reports of movements of the enemy east of the Blue Ridge cause me to believe that he is preparing to cross the Potomac. A pontoon bridge is said to be laid at Edwards Ferry, and his army corps that he has advanced to Leesburg and the foot of the mountains, appear to be withdrawing. Their attempts to penetrate the mountains have been successfully repelled by General *Stuart* with his cavalry. General *Stuart* last night was within a few miles of Aldie, to which point the enemy had retired.

General *Ewell's* corps is in motion toward the Susquehanna. General *A. P. Hill's* corps is moving toward the Potomac; his

leading division will reach Shepherdstown to-day. I have withdrawn Longstreet west of the Shenandoah, and, if nothing prevents, he will follow to-morrow.

Lee still felt that there were more troops under Gens. *Elzey*, *D. H. Hill* and *Beauregard* than the critical situation of the government warranted. He had done his best to make some of them more useful by requesting them for his army, but having failed in this, he proposed a new plan which he thought might be acceptable to those commanders. This plan was submitted to President *Davis* in another letter, dated June 23.

Mr. President:—The season is now so far advanced as to render it improbable that the enemy will undertake active operations on the Carolina and Georgia coast before the return of frost. This impression is confirmed by the statements contained in Northern papers, that part of General Hunter's force had gone to re-enforce General Banks, and that Admiral Foote, the successor of Admiral DuPont in the command of the South Atlantic fleet, lies dangerously ill, a circumstance that will tend further to embarrass any designs the enemy may entertain of operating against the cities of the seaboard. Federal papers of the 19th, allude to the frequent arrival or departure of troops and munitions at Old Point, and those of the 20th, announce the arrival of General Peck and staff in Washington, without indicating the object of his visit, further than it may be connected with the movements just referred to.

At this distance, I can see no benefit to be derived from maintaining a large force on the southern coast during the unhealthy months of the summer and autumn, and I think that a part, at least, of the troops in North Carolina, and of those under General *Beauregard*, can be employed at this time to great advantage in Virginia.

If an army could be organized under the command of General *Beauregard* and pushed forward to Culpeper Court-House, threatening Washington from that direction, it would not only effect a diversion most favorable for this army, but would, I think, relieve us of any apprehension of an attack upon Richmond during our absence. The well known anxiety of the Northern Government for the safety of its capital would induce it to retain a large force for its defense, and thus sensibly relieve the opposition to our advance. Last summer, you will remember, that troops were recalled from Hilton Head, North Carolina, and Western Virginia for the protection of Washington, and there can be little doubt that if our present movements northward are accompanied by a demonstration on the south side of the Potomac, the coast would again be relieved, and the troops now on the Peninsula and south of the Potomac be withdrawn.

If success should attend the operations of this army, and what I now suggest would greatly increase the probability of the result, we might even hope to compel the recall of some of the enemy's troops from the west.

I think it most important that, whatever troops be used for the purpose I have named, General *Beauregard* be placed in command, and that his department be extended over North Carolina and Virginia. His presence would give magnitude to even a small demonstration, and tend greatly to perplex and confound the enemy. Of course, the larger the force that we can employ the better, but should you think it imprudent to withdraw a part of General *Beauregard's* army for the purpose indicated, I think good results would follow from sending forward, under General *Beauregard*, such of the troops about Richmond and in North Carolina as could be spared for a short time.

The good effects of beginning to assemble an army at Culpeper Court-House would, I think, soon become apparent, and the movement might be increased in importance as the result might appear to justify. Should you agree with me, I need not say that it is desirable that the execution of the plan proposed should immediately begin. The enemy will hear of it soon enough, and a proper reticence on the part of our papers will cause them to attribute greater importance to it. I need not mention the benefit that the troops themselves would derive from being transferred to a more healthy climate.

On June 24, *Hill's* corps began crossing the Potomac at Shepherdstown and on the following day, *Longstreet's* corps began crossing at Williamsport.

Lee accompanied *Longstreet's* corps and wrote to President *Davis* two letters from that town on June 25, further explaining his plan.

You will see that apprehension for the safety of Washington and their own territory has aroused the Federal Government and people to great exertions, and it is incumbent upon us to call forth all our energies. In addition to the 100,000 troops called for by President Lincoln to defend the frontier of Pennsylvania, you will see that he is concentrating other organized forces in Maryland. It is stated according to General *Buckner's* report, that Burnside and his corps are recalled from Kentucky. It is reasonable to suppose that this would be the case if their apprehensions were once aroused.

I think this should liberate troops in the Carolinas and enable Generals *Buckner* and *Bragg* to accomplish something in Ohio. It is plain that if all the Federal Army is concentrated upon this, it will result in our accomplishing nothing, and being compelled to

return to Virginia. If the plan I suggested the other day, of organizing an army, even in effigy, under General *Beauregard*, at Culpeper Court-House, can be carried into effect, much relief will be afforded. If even the brigades in Virginia and North Carolina, which Generals *Hill* and *Elzey* think cannot be spared, were ordered there at once, and General *Beauregard* were sent there, if he had to return to South Carolina, it would do more to protect both States from marauding expeditions of the enemy than anything else.

I have not sufficient troops to maintain my communications, and, therefore, have to abandon them. I think that I can throw General Hooker's army across the Potomac and draw troops from the south, embarrassing their plan of campaign in a measure, if I can do nothing more and have to return.

I still hope that all things will end well at Vicksburg. At any rate everything should be done to bring about that result.

And the same day—

So strong is my conviction of the necessity of activity on our part in military affairs, that you will excuse my adverting to the subject again, notwithstanding what I have said in my previous letter to-day.

It seems to me that we cannot afford to keep our troops awaiting possible movements of the enemy, but that our true policy is, as far as we can, so to employ our own forces as to give occupation to his at points of our selection.

I have observed that extracts from Northern journals, contained in Richmond papers of the 22d instant, state that the yellow fever has appeared at New Berne, and that, in consequence, the Federal troops are being moved back to Morehead City. If, in fact, the fever is in New Berne, it would tend in itself to prevent active operations from that point. But as I have never heard of the disease being in that city, and as it does not generally break out so early in the season, even in localities subject to it, I am disposed to doubt the truth of the statement, and regard it as a cover for the withdrawal of the enemy's forces for some other field. The attempt to conceal their movements, as in the case of the withdrawal of the troops from Suffolk, coupled with the fact that nothing has up to this time been undertaken on the North Carolina coast, convinces me that the enemy contemplates nothing important in that region, and that it is unnecessary to keep our troops to watch him.

If he has been waiting until this time for reinforcements, the probability of their being furnished is greatly diminished by the movements now in progress on our part, and they must at least await the result of our operations. The same course of reasoning is applicable to the question of the probability of the enemy assuming the offensive against Richmond, either on the Peninsula

or south of the James. I feel sure, therefore, that the best use that can be made of the troops in Carolina, and those in Virginia now guarding Richmond, would be the prompt assembling of the main body of them, leaving sufficient to prevent raids, together with as many as can be drawn from the army of General *Beauregard*, at Culpeper Court-House, under the command of that officer. I do not think they could more effectually prevent aggressive movements on the part of the enemy in any other way, while their assistance to this army in its operations would be very great.

If the report received from General *Buckner* of the withdrawal of General Burnside from Kentucky be correct, I think there is nothing to prevent a united movement of the commands of Generals *Buckner* and *Sam. Jones* into that State. They could render valuable service by collecting and bringing out supplies, if they did no more, and would embarrass the enemy and prevent troops now there from being sent to other points. If they are too weak to attempt this object, they need not be idle; and I think that if the enemy's forces have, in fact, been so far weakened as to render present active operations on his part against them improbable, they should go where they can be of immediate service, leaving only a sufficient guard to watch the lines they now hold. They might be sent with benefit to re-inforce General *Johnston* or General *Bragg*, to constitute a part of the proposed army of General *Beauregard* at Culpeper Court-House, or they might accomplish good results by going into Northwestern Virginia. It should never be forgotten that our concentration at any point compels that of the enemy, and, his numbers being limited, tends to relieve all other threatened localities.

I earnestly commend these considerations to the attention of Your Excellency, and trust that you will be at liberty, in your better judgement, and with the superior means of information you possess as to our own necessities and the enemy's movements in the distant regions I have mentioned, to give effect to them, either in the way I have suggested, or in such other manner as may seem to you more judicious.

No action was taken on these letters, although the plan seems to have been perfectly feasible and would have embarrassed the War Department at Washington. That Richmond was safe is evident from the following letter to Halleck from Dix, dated June 29:

I called to-day a council of my general officers. There were present Maj. Gen. Peck and Brig. Gens. Gordon, Terry, Harland and Foster. I submitted to them the proposition whether it would be advisable, with the force I have, to make an attack on Richmond. Their opinion, without knowing mine, was promptly and unanimously given in the negative. I have deemed it proper

to advise you of the result of my consultation with them, and with my concurrence with them.

From the Potomac River, *Anderson*, *Pickett*, *Hood* and *McLaws* marched to Chambersburg, via Hagerstown and Greencastle, while *Heth* and *Pender* followed the route taken by *Early* to Greenwood near Fayetteville. On reaching Chambersburg, *Anderson* turned off to Fayetteville to join the other divisions of *Hill's* corps, while *Longstreet's* divisions encamped near Chambersburg. *Lee* reached Chambersburg on the 27th but gave no orders for a movement of the corps of *Longstreet* and *A. P. Hill* on the 28th, as he probably intended to give the troops a day's rest and wait for information. From the position occupied by his troops, he could advance either to the north or to the east. In his report he says:

Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; but on the night of the 28th, information was received from a scout that the Federal Army having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly *Longstreet* and *Hill* were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General *Ewell* was also instructed to march from Carlisle.

After crossing the mountains to Cashtown, *Lee* had the option of advancing along the pike to Gettysburg, or turning southward, via Fairfield, towards Emmitsburg. Had he known the points to which the Union corps moved from Frederick, he would undoubtedly have selected the latter route. However, as it was not improbable that the entire Union army had moved up the east side of the mountains and was concentrated at Emmitsburg, he chose Gettysburg, as being better adapted for his purpose. It is probable that on the 27th or 28th, he notified *Ewell* of his intention to advance on Harrisburg if everything was favorable, and directed him to recall *Early's* division, which was then at York. He also sent couriers to *Robertson* and *Imboden*, to have them join the army. After learning that the Union army was moving through Frederick westward to the South Mountains, he probably at once sent a note to *Ewell* informing him of this fact and

directed him to return to Chambersburg; later, on reflection or from further information about the movements of the Union troops, who moved from the South Mountains eastward to Frederick that day, he sent the following instructions to *Ewell*:

I wrote you last night, stating that General Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac, and is advancing by way of Middletown, the head of the column being at that point in Frederick County. I directed you to move your forces to this point. If you have not already progressed on the road, and if you have no good reason against it, I desire you to move in the direction of Gettysburg, via Heidlersburg, where you will have turnpike most of the way, and you can thus join your other divisions to *Early's*, which is east of the mountains. I think it preferable to keep on the east side of the mountains. When you come to Heidlersburg, you can either move directly on Gettysburg or turn down on Cashtown. Your trains and heavy artillery you can send if you think proper, on the road to Chambersburg but if the roads which your troops take are good, they had better follow you.

In *Lee's* letter-book this letter is marked "copied from memory" and is dated June 28, 7:30 a. m. From the reports of *Lee* and *Ewell*, it was evidently sent on the 29th.

Ewell's Operations in Pennsylvania.—The movements of *Ewell's* corps in Pennsylvania is thus described in his report:

The same evening [June 15], General Rodes crossed at Williamsport with three brigades, sending Jenkins forward to Chambersburg, and on the 19th moved his division by my orders to Hagerstown, where he encamped on the road to Boonsboro, while Johnson crossed to Sharpsburg, and Early moved to Shepherdstown, to threaten Harpers Ferry. In these positions we waited until June 21, for the other two corps to close up, on the afternoon of which day I received orders from the general commanding to take Harrisburg, and next morning (22d) Rodes and Johnson marched toward Greencastle, Pa. Jenkins re-occupied Chambersburg, whence he had fallen back some days before, and *Early* moved by Boonsboro, to Cavetown, where the 17th Virginia cavalry (Col. *Wm. E. French*) reported and remained with him till the battle of Gettysburg. Continuing our march, we reached Carlisle on the 27th, halting one day at Chambersburg to secure supplies. The marching was as rapid as the weather and the detours made by Maj. Gen. *Early* and Brig. Gen. *Stuart* would admit. *Early* having marched parallel with us as far as Greenwood, then turned off toward Gettysburg and York. At Carlisle, Gen. *George H. Stuart*, who had been detached to McConnellsburg from Greencastle rejoined the corps, bringing some cattle and horses.

At Carlisle, Chambersburg and Shippenburg requisitions were made for supplies, and the shops were searched, many valuable stores being secured. Near 3,000 head of cattle were collected, and sent back by my corps, and my chief commissary of subsistence, Maj. W. J. Hawks, notified Col. R. G. Cole of the location of 5,000 barrels of flour along the route traveled by my corps.

From Carlisle I sent forward my engineer officer, Capt. H. B. Richardson, with Gen. Jenkins' cavalry, to reconnoiter the defenses of Harrisburg, and was starting on the 29th for that place when ordered by the general commanding to join the main body of the army at Cashtown near Gettysburg. On the night of June 30, Rodes' division, which I accompanied, was at Heidlersburg. [Here] I received orders from the general commanding to proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg as circumstances might dictate, and a note from Gen. A. P. Hill, saying he was in Cashtown. Next morning (July 1), I moved with Rodes' division toward Cashtown.

Ewell does not mention it in his report, but from the reports of the Union cavalry, it appears that on the afternoon of the 30th, *Jenkins'* cavalry encountered Union cavalry north of Gettysburg. It was this discovery that caused *Ewell* to leave the Carlisle-Gettysburg pike at Heidlersburg and move by a country road westward toward Cashtown.

Rodes reports—

On our arrival at Carlisle, *Jenkins'* cavalry advanced towards Harrisburg, and had on the 29th made a thorough reconnoissance of the defenses of that place, with a view to our advance upon it, a step which every man in the division contemplated with eagerness, and which was to have been executed on the 30th; but on the 30th, having received orders to be at or near Cashtown, we set out for that place, marching through Petersburg and bivouacking at Heidlersburg, after a march of 22 miles.

Johnson reports—

June 18, we crossed the Potomac at Botelers Ford, and encamped upon the battlefield of Sharpsburg. Thence marched, via Hagers-town and Chambersburg, to within three miles of Carlisle. From Greencastle, *Steuart's* brigade was ordered to McConnellsburg, to collect horses, cattle, and other supplies which the army needed. The brigade having accomplished its mission to my satisfaction, rejoined the division at our camp near Carlisle. On June 29, in obedience to orders, I countermarched my division to Greenville, thence easterly via Scotland to Gettysburg.

Early reports—

At this point [Greenwood, a village 9 miles east of Chambersburg], my division remained in camp on the 25th, and I visited

Gen. *Ewell* at Chambersburg, and received from him instructions to cross the South Mountain to Gettysburg, and proceed to York, and cut the Northern Central Railroad running from Baltimore to Harrisburg [this railroad runs northward through York to the Susquehanna River and along its south bank to Harrisburg], and also destroy the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville and Columbia on the branch road from York toward Philadelphia, if I could, and rejoin him at Carlisle by way of Dillsburg.

Col. E. V. White's battalion of cavalry was ordered to report to me for this expedition, and on the morning of the 26th, I moved towards Gettysburg, and on reaching the forks of the road, 11½ miles from Cashtown, I sent Gen. Gordon with his brigade and White's battalion of cavalry, on the pike through Cashtown towards Gettysburg, and moved with the rest of my command to Mummasburg. I had heard on the road that there was probably a force at Gettysburg, though I could get no definite information as to its size. The object of the movement was for Gordon to amuse and skirmish with the enemy while I should get on his flank and rear, so as to capture the whole force. On arriving at Mummasburg, I ascertained that the force was small, and while waiting here for the infantry to come up (whose march was considerably delayed by the muddy condition of the road), a company of French's cavalry that had been sent toward Gettysburg captured some prisoners, from whom it was ascertained that the advance of Gordon's force had encountered a regiment of militia [26th Pa.], which fled at the first approach, and I immediately sent forward Col. French to pursue this militia force. Hays' brigade on arriving was also dispatched toward Gettysburg, and the other brigades with the artillery halted and encamped around Mummasburg.

I then rode to Gettysburg and found Gordon just entering the town. I ordered Tanner's battery of Jones' Battalion to report to Gordon during the night, and also a company of French's cavalry, and directed him to move with them and his brigade on the turnpike toward York at daylight next morning, and I also directed Col. White to proceed with his cavalry to Hanover Junction, on the Northern Central road, destroying the railroad bridges on the way, and to destroy the junction and a bridge or two south of it, and then proceed to York, burning all the bridges up to that place. With the rest of the command, I moved next morning (the 27th) and encamped a few miles beyond Berlin; and I rode over to Gordon's camp on the York pike, which was about 4 miles distant, to arrange with him the manner of the approach to York, if it should be defended.

Next morning (the 28th), Gen. Gordon marched into the town of York without opposition. I here met with Gen. Gordon, and repeated to him my instructions to proceed to the Susquehanna and secure the Columbia bridge if possible. A short time before

night, I rode out in the direction of Columbia bridge, to ascertain the result of *Gordon's* expedition and had not proceeded far before I saw an immense smoke rising in the direction of the Susquehanna, which I subsequently discovered to be from the burning of the bridge in question. On the morning of the 29th, I received through Capt. *Elliott Johnston*, aide to Gen. *Ewell*, a copy of a note from Gen. *Lee*, and also verbal instructions, which required me to move back, so as to rejoin the rest of my corps, on the western side of South Mountain; and, accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 30th, I put my whole command in motion in the direction of Heidlersburg, from which I could move either to Shippensburg or to Greenwood, as circumstances might require. At the same time, I sent Col. *White's* cavalry on the pike toward Gettysburg, to ascertain whether there was any force on that road.

At Berlin, a courier from Gen. *Ewell* met me with a dispatch informing me of the fact that he was moving with *Rodes'* division by the way of Petersburg to Heidlersburg, and directing me to march in that direction. I encamped three miles from Heidlersburg, and rode to see Gen. *Ewell* at that point, and was informed by him that the object of the movement was to concentrate the corps at or near Cashtown, and received directions to move next day to that point. I was informed that *Rodes* would move by way of Middletown, but it was arranged that I should go by way of Hunterstown and Mummasburg. Having ascertained that the road to Hunterstown was a very rough one, I determined next morning (July 1), to march by way of Heidlersburg, and thence from that point to the Mummasburg road.

Early had camped at the intersection of the Carlisle-Hanover-Baltimore pike and the York-Heidlersburg road. A third road runs from the intersection to Hunterstown. The object of *Early's* movement from Greenwood to York is explained in *Lee's* report.

In order to retain it [Hooker's army] on the east side of the mountains, after it should enter Maryland, and thus leave open our communications with the Potomac through Hagerstown and Williamsport, Gen. *Ewell* had been instructed to send a division eastward to cross the South Mountain.

Hooker remained at Fairfax Court-House in Virginia awaiting developments before crossing the Potomac. On the 24th he received the following report from Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, then chief engineer of the army:

In accordance with your request, I present the following reasons for moving our army at once to the neighborhood of Harpers Ferry:

To H. H.

1. The whole of Lee's army is reported to be on the Potomac, above that place, part of it across the river, and threatening an advance upon Harrisburg.

2. There we can protect Washington as well, and Baltimore better than here, and preserve our communications and routes of supply.

3. It is the shortest line to reach Lee's army; will enable us to operate on his communications, if he advances; to throw overwhelming forces on either portion of his army that he allows the river to divide; and is too strong a position for him to attack us in, even if we make heavy detachments.

4. It will enable us to pass South Mountain without fighting for the passes, if we wish to move upon him, and will thus destroy any advantages these mountains would give as a protection to his right flank.

5. It will prevent Lee from detaching a corps to invade Pennsylvania with, as it would expose the rest of his army to our attack in superior force.

6. These opinions are based upon the idea that we are not to try and go around his army, and drive it out of Maryland, as we did last year, but to paralyse all its movements by threatening its flank and rear if it advances, and gain time to collect reinforcements sufficient to render us the stronger army of the two, if we are not so already.

This seems to have been the basis of the plan he adopted. Having learned from the signal officer on the mountains near Harpers Ferry that a large force was crossing the Potomac at Shepherdstown that day, he directed Reynolds to cross the Potomac on the 25th with the I, III and XI corps and move to Middletown, Md., and seize the passes of the South Mountains through which the army had moved in the Antietam campaign. Stahel's, later Kilpatrick's cavalry division, accompanied this force. All the other forces south of the Potomac were directed to move on Leesburg and cross the river. As soon as it crossed the river, the XII corps was to move in the direction of Harpers Ferry. It was after dark on the 27th before the entire army was on the north side of the Potomac.

Hooker himself crossed the river on the 26th to Poolesville, and on the following day established his headquarters at Frederick. Because his plan of operations did not meet with the approval of Halleck, on the following day he requested to be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac and on the night of the 27th, an officer arrived from the War Department with an order placing Maj. Gen. George G. Meade in command of the army.

Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac, June 25 to 27.

June	I Corps	III Corps	XI Corps	V Corps	II Corps	III Corps	VI Corps	Cavalry Divisions
25	Barnesville, Md.	Across Potomac	Jefferson, Md.	Aldie	Thoroughfare Gap	Gum Springs	Centerville	3d division crossed Potomac
26	Jefferson, Md.	Point of Rocks	Middletown, Md.	Across Potomac	Across Potomac	Across Potomac	Drainesville	3d division toward Frederick
27	Middletown, Md.	Middletown, Md.	Middletown, Md.	Near Frederick	Knoxville	Barnesville	Near Poolesville	1. Jefferson 2. Frederick 3. Frederick

With Meade's letter of appointment, he received the following instructions from Halleck:

You will not be hampered by any minute instructions from these headquarters. Your army is free to act as you may deem proper under the circumstances as they arise. You will, however, keep in view the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington as well as the army of operation against the invading forces of the rebels. You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him so as to give him battle.

All forces within the sphere of your operations will be held subject to your orders.

Harpers Ferry and its garrison are under your direct orders.

You are authorized to remove from command, and to send from your army, any officers or other persons you may deem proper, and to appoint to command as you may deem expedient.

In fine, general, you are intrusted with all the power and authority which the President, the Secretary of War, or the General in Chief can confer on you, and you may rely upon our full support.

In compliance with the desire of the authorities to cover Washington and Baltimore, on the 28th, Meade ordered the I, III, XI and XII corps from the west of Frederick to that place in preparation for a movement of the army in a northeasterly direction.

When Meade took command of the army, he believed that Lee's army was as large as his own, that Early occupied York, that Ewell was at Carlisle, that A. P. Hill and Longstreet were

in the vicinity of Chambersburg, and that *Stuart* with a part of his command was near Westminster. It appeared to him that Lee was intending to cross the Susquehanna River and that the Union army ought to go to the relief of the militia force which was assembled at Harrisburg. His plans are outlined in the following letters:

To Halleck, dated June 29, 11 a. m.:

Upon assuming command of the army, and after carefully considering the position of affairs and the movements of the enemy I have concluded as follows: to move to-day towards Westminster and Emmitsburg, and the army is now in motion for that line. If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his army and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely upon Gen. Couch, with his force, holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle. While I move forward I shall incline toward the right toward the Baltimore and Harrisburg road, to cover that and draw supplies from there, if circumstances permit it, my main objective being of course Lee's army, which I am satisfied has all passed on through Hagerstown to Chambersburg. My endeavor will be in my movements to hold my force well together, with the hope of falling upon some portion of Lee's army in detail.

To Halleck, dated June 30, 4:30 p. m.:

Our reports seem to place *Ewell* in the vicinity of York and Harrisburg. I shall push on to-morrow in the direction of Hanover Junction and Hanover when I hope by July 2, to open communication with Baltimore by telegraph and rail to renew supplies. I fear I shall break down the troops by pushing on much faster, and may have to rest a day. My movements of course will be governed by what I learn of the enemy. The information seems to place *Longstreet* at Chambersburg, and *A. P. Hill* moving between Chambersburg and York. Our cavalry drove a regiment out of Gettysburg this a. m. Our cavalry engaged with *Stuart* at Hanover this a. m. Result not yet known.

To Halleck, July 1, 7 a. m., on being notified that York and Carlisle were being evacuated and *Lee* was probably concentrating his army:

My positions to-day are, one corps at Emmitsburg, two at Gettysburg, one at Taneytown, one at Two Taverns, one at Manchester, one at Hanover. These movements were ordered yesterday before the receipt of the advices of *Lee's* movements. The point of *Lee's* concentration and the nature of the country will determine whether I will attack him or not. Shall advise

you further to-day when satisfied that the enemy are fully withdrawn from the Susquehanna.

To Halleck from Taneytown, July 1, 12 m.:

Ewell is massing at Heidlersburg. A. P. Hill is massed behind the mountains at Cashtown. Longstreet somewhere between Chambersburg and the mountains.

The news proves my advance has answered its purpose. I shall not advance any, but prepare to receive an attack in case Lee makes one. A battlefield is being selected to the rear on which an army can be rapidly concentrated, on Pike Creek, between Middleburg and Manchester, covering my depot at Westminster.

If I am not attacked, and I can from reliable intelligence have reason to believe I can attack with reasonable degree of success, I will do so; but at present, having relieved the pressure on the Susquehanna, I am now looking to the protection of Washington, and fighting my army to best advantage.

From these communications it appears that Meade's plan was—

1. To advance rapidly northward on a broad front until he compelled Lee to abandon all thought of crossing the Susquehanna.

2. To tempt Lee to attack the Union army in a position selected in advance by Meade or to attack Lee if he could do it to advantage.

Concentration of the Armies at Gettysburg.—The movement of the Army of Northern Virginia towards Gettysburg began on June 29. Robertson, who had been left by Stuart with his own brigade and that of W. E. Jones in the passes of the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia, assembled the cavalry brigades at Berryville. Had he been better informed by his scouts, he might have assembled on the 26th, when the Union cavalry left Aldie and started for Maryland. He would thus have gained three days and been with his army the day it marched to Gettysburg. Imboden prepared to leave Hancock, Md., where he was scouting the country. He had also remained stationary instead of pushing on to Chambersburg as Lee intended him to do. Heth's division crossed the South Mountains to Cashtown and established outposts in the direction of Gettysburg and Fairfield. Johnson's division started back from Carlisle with Ewell's trains and reached Shipensburg. Lee's headquarters remained at Chambersburg.

Stuart, who was moving northward through Maryland via Rockville and Cooksville, says:

Brig. Gen. *Fitz Lee* reached the railroad [B. and O.] soon after daylight [June 29], the march being continued during the night. The bridge at Sykesville was burned and the track torn up at Hood's Mills, where the main body crossed it. We remained in possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad nearly all day. The enemy was ascertained to be moving through Frederick northward, and it was important for me to reach our column with as little delay as possible, to acquaint the commanding general with the nature of the enemy's movements as well as to place with his column my cavalry force. The head of the column, following the ridge road, reached Westminster about 5 p. m. We encamped for the night a few miles beyond the town (*Fitz Lee's* brigade in advance), halting the head of the column at Union Mills, midway between Westminster and Littlestown, on the Gettysburg road. It was ascertained here that night by scouts that the enemy's cavalry had reached Littlestown during the night, and encamped.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac on the 29th was to better cover Washington and Baltimore, while the cavalry advanced to the front to locate the Confederate army. With two brigades of his cavalry division, Buford crossed the South Mountains to Boonsboro, skirted the base of the mountains as far north as Monterey Gap, recrossed the mountains and took the road to Gettysburg. He camped that night near Fairfield. Buford's third brigade was sent to Mechanicstown where it was left to watch the pass. Kilpatrick's two cavalry brigades moved from Frederick to Emmitsburg and Taneytown and then united at Littlestown. Gregg's cavalry division went in the direction of Westminster as *Stuart* was reported in that direction. The I and XI corps went to Emmitsburg; the III corps, followed by the XII corps, to Taneytown; the II corps, followed by the V corps, to Uniontown, and the VI corps to New Windsor. Meade established his headquarters at Middleburg, Md.

There was no contact between the opposing armies this day nor did either commanding general receive any important information.

On the 30th, therefore, the movement was continued without material change of plan. *Robertson* marched with his two brigades to Martinsburg; *Imboden* was still at Hancock where he was concentrating his command; *McLaws* and *Hood* moved to Green-

wood, *Pender* crossed the mountains and joined *Heth* near Cash-town; *Rodes* reached Heidlersburg; *Johnson* reached Scotland, and *Early* reached the Carlisle-Hanover pike east of Heidlersburg.

Stuart reports:

Early next morning [June 30], we resumed the march direct by a cross route for Hanover, Pa., *W. H. F. Lee's* brigade in advance, *Hampton* in rear of the wagon train, and *Fitz Lee's* brigade on the left flank, between Littlestown and our road. About 10 a. m. the head of the column reached Hanover, and found a large column of cavalry passing through going toward the gap in the mountains which I intended using. The enemy soon discovered our approach, and made a demonstration toward attacking us, which was promptly met by a gallant charge by *Chambliss'* leading regiment. If my command had been well closed up now, this cavalry column, which we had struck near its rear, would have been at our mercy; but, owing to the great elongation of the column by reason of the 200 wagons and hilly roads, *Hampton* was a long way behind and *Lee* was not yet heard from on our left. The delay in getting up reinforcements enabled the enemy to regain possession of the town.

Our wagon train was now a subject of serious embarrassment, but I thought by making a detour to the right by Jefferson, I could save it. I therefore had the train closed up in park, and *Hampton* [and *Fitz Lee*] arriving in the meantime, dislodged the enemy from the town. Gen. *Fitz Lee's* brigade was put at the head of the column, and he was instructed to push on with the train to Jefferson for York, Pa., and communicate as soon as practicable with our forces. We were not molested in our march, which, on account of the very exposed situation of our flank and the enemy's knowledge of it, was continued through the night. The night's march over a very dark road was one of peculiar hardship, owing to the loss of rest to both man and horse. After a series of exciting combats and night marches, it was a severe tax to their endurance. Whole regiments slept in the saddle, their faithful animals keeping the road unguided.

The train that embarrassed *Stuart* was one captured on the 28th at Rockville, Md., and referred to in the following report:

Twenty-five teams, without wagons, sent this a. m. to Edwards Ferry to haul down pontoons, were captured in addition to the 150 wagons started for Frederick.

On the morning of June 30, Buford discovered that part of *Davis'* brigade of *Heth's* division, formed an outpost near Fairfield; not wishing to bring on an engagement at that point which might disarrange Meade's plans, he took the road to Emmitsburg

and from there went to Gettysburg, to which point he had been ordered. In passing Emmitsburg, he probably informed Reynolds of his discovery. Kilpatrick marched from Littlestown to Hanover and as his rear brigade was passing through the town it was attacked by *Chambliss* as reported by *Stuart*. By turning *Stuart* from his direct road and causing him to march in the direction of York, Kilpatrick prevented him from uniting with *Early*, who was encamped that night on the Hanover-Carlisle road ten miles north of Hanover. Gregg's division moved from New Windsor to Manchester. The I corps moved to Marsh Creek, where the Emmitsburg-Gettysburg and the Fairfield-Bridgeport roads intersect; the XI corps remained at Emmitsburg; one division of the III corps moved to Emmitsburg and the other to Bridgeport; the XII corps moved to Littlestown; the V corps, to Hanover; and the VI corps, to Manchester. As the main body of the Confederate army was believed by Meade to be in the vicinity of Chambersburg, and after crossing the mountains could move either on Emmitsburg or on Gettysburg, he placed the I, XI and III corps under the orders of Reynolds to whom Buford was also to report. Meade established his headquarters at Taneytown, Md.

From Gettysburg, on June 30, Buford sent the following messages:

I entered this place to-day at 11 a. m. Found everybody in a terrible state of excitement on account of the enemy's advance upon this place. He had approached to within half a mile of the town when the head of my column entered. His force was terribly exaggerated by reasonable and truthful but inexperienced men. On pushing him back toward Cashtown, I learned from reliable men that (*R. H.*) *Anderson's* division was marching from Chambersburg by Mummasburg, Hunterstown, Abbottstown, on toward York. I have sent parties to the two first-named places, toward Cashtown, and a strong force toward Littlestown. Col. Gamble has just sent me word that *Lee* signed a pass for a citizen this morning at Chambersburg. I can't do much just now. My men and horses are fagged out. The troops that are coming here were the same I found early this morning at Fairfield. Gen. Reynolds has been informed of all I know.

The hour of the above message is not given, but it was probably early in the afternoon. It is addressed to Pleasanton.

The enemy has increased his forces considerably. His strong position is just behind Cashtown. My party toward Mummasburg met a superior force strongly posted. Another party that went up the road due north, three miles out, met a strong picket; had a skirmish and captured one [man] of *Rodes'* division. Another party that went toward Littlestown heard that Gregg or Kilpatrick had a fight with *Stuart*, and drove him to Hanover.

The above message to Pleasonton is marked 5:30 a. m., but must be p. m.

I am satisfied that *A. P. Hill's* corps is massed just back of Cashtown, about nine miles from this place. *Pender's* division, of this (*Hill's*) corps, came up to-day—of which I advised you, saying, "The enemy in my front is increased." The enemy's pickets (infantry and artillery), are within four miles of this place on the Cashtown road. My parties have returned that went north, northwest and northeast, after crossing the road from Cashtown to Oxford [via Mummasburg] in several places. They heard nothing of any force having passed over it lately. The road, however, is terribly infested with prowling cavalry parties. Near Heidlersburg, to-day, one of my parties captured a courier of *Lee's*. Nothing was found on him. He says *Ewell's* corps is crossing the mountains from Carlisle, *Rodes'* division being at Petersburg in advance. *Longstreet*, from all I can learn, is still behind *Hill*. I have many rumors and reports of the enemy advancing on me from York. I have to pay attention to some of them which causes me to overwork my horses and men. I can get no forage nor rations; and am out of both. The people give and sell the men something to eat, but I can't stand that way of subsisting; it causes dreadful straggling. Should I have to fall back, advise me by what route.

The above is addressed to Reynolds and dated 10:30 p. m., June 30.

I have the honor to state the following facts: *A. P. Hill's* corps, composed of *Anderson*, *Heth* and *Pender*, is massed back of Cashtown, nine miles from this place [Gettysburg]. His pickets, composed of infantry and artillery, are in sight of mine. There is a road from Cashtown running through Mummasburg and Hunters-town to the York pike, which is terribly infested with roving detachments of cavalry. Rumor says *Ewell* is coming over the mountains from Carlisle. One of his escort was captured to-day near Heidlersburg. He says *Rodes*, commanding a division of *Ewell's*, has already crossed the mountains from Carlisle. When will the reserve [brigade at Mechanicstown] be relieved and where are my wagons? I have no need of them as I can find no forage. I have kept Gen. Reynolds informed of all that has transpired.

The above is to Pleasonton and is dated 10:40 p. m., June 30.

It is apparent from the above communications that Buford had done his duty thoroughly; and at midnight, army headquarters, which was at Taneytown only thirteen miles from Gettysburg, should have had a clear idea of the military situation. That the orders for July 1 were not modified to conform to this information was due to the fact that Meade did not see either of the last messages until "pretty late on the morning of the 1st of July," as he stated in his testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. The courier service of the army was not very efficient as is indicated by the time required to deliver this and other messages and orders in this campaign.

It is useless to speculate upon what Meade would have done had Buford's information been received by him about midnight June 30, but it is quite certain that the orders for July 1 would have been modified. These orders were based on the information received before Meade's letter to Halleck, sent at 4:30 p. m. June 30 (p. 36).

A circular, of which the following is an extract, was sent by Meade to the corps commanders on the morning of June 30:

The commanding general has received information that the enemy is advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg. It is the intention to hold this army pretty nearly in the position it now occupies until the plans of the enemy have been more fully developed.

Three corps, I, III and XI, are under the command of Maj. Gen. Reynolds in the vicinity of Emmitsburg, the III corps being ordered up to that point. The XII corps is at Littlestown. Gen. Gregg's division of cavalry is believed to be now engaged with the cavalry of the enemy near Hanover Junction.

The order for July 1, of which the following are extracts, conforms to the idea expressed in the circular:

III corps to Emmitsburg; II corps to Taneytown; V corps to Hanover; XII corps to Two Taverns; I corps to Gettysburg; XI corps to Gettysburg (or supporting distance); VI corps to Manchester.

Cavalry to the front and flanks, well out in all directions, giving timely notice of positions and movements of the enemy.

The commanding general desires you to be informed, from present information, that *Longstreet* and *Hill* are at Chambers-

burg, partly toward Gettysburg; *Ewell* at Carlisle and York. Movements indicate a disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg.

For the I, II, XI and XII corps this order contemplated an advance of only five miles; for the III and VI corps, only the closing up of the corps, as their advance units were already at Emmitsburg and Manchester; for the V corps, an advance of ten miles to reach the railroad.

July 1.—On the morning of July 1, *A. P. Hill*, with the divisions of *Heth* and *Pender*, was near Cashtown eight miles from Gettysburg. In explaining his movement that day, *Hill* says in his report:

On the morning of June 29, the Third corps, composed of the divisions of Maj. Gens. *Anderson*, *Heth* and *Pender* and five battalions of artillery under command of Col. *R. L. Walker* was encamped on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, near the village of Fayetteville. I was directed to move on this road in the direction of York, and to cross the Susquehanna, menacing the communications of Harrisburg with Philadelphia and to co-operate with Gen. *Ewell*, acting as circumstances might require.

Accordingly on the 29th, I moved Gen. *Heth's* division to Cashtown some eight miles from Gettysburg, following on the morning of the 30th with the division of Gen. *Pender*, and directing Gen. *Anderson* to move in the same direction on the morning of July 1. On arriving at Cashtown Gen. *Heth*, who had sent forward *Pettigrew's* brigade to Gettysburg, reported that *Pettigrew* had encountered the enemy at Gettysburg (principally cavalry) but in what force he could not determine. A courier was despatched with this information to the general commanding, and with orders to start *Anderson* early; also to Gen. *Ewell* informing him, and that I intended to advance the next morning to discover what was in my front.

On July 1, at 5 a. m., *Heth* took up the line of march with *Pegram's* battalion of artillery, followed by *Pender* with *McIntosh's* battalion of artillery, Col. *Walker* with the remainder of the artillery being with Gen. *Anderson*.

Gen. *Ewell*, who was marching with *Rodes's* division that morning from Heidlersburg toward Cashtown, says in his report:

Before reaching Middletown, I received notice from Gen. *Hill* that he was advancing on Gettysburg, and turned the head of *Rodes's* column toward that place by the Middletown road, sending word to *Early* to advance directly by the Heidlersburg road.

Longstreet says in his report:

On the next day [June 30], the troops set out for Gettysburg, except *Pickett's* division, not yet relieved from duty at Chambersburg, and *Law's* brigade left by *Hood* on picket at New Guilford.

It is evident from all the Confederate reports that no specific orders were given for a concentration either at Cashtown or at Gettysburg, and the alternative was left to *Hill* and *Ewell* to unite at either place. *Ewell*, finding that there was an unknown force of Union troops at Gettysburg, naturally turned his two divisions toward Cashtown. *Hill*, however, knowing that *Longstreet* was following *Anderson* through the mountains and that his own force must clear the way, naturally continued his march toward Gettysburg where *Ewell* could unite with him. There was nothing to indicate that Gettysburg was occupied by anything but a cavalry force.

All the Union troops made the short marches indicated by the orders for the day and went into camp. While there, some of them received a copy of a circular sent from Taneytown that morning, of which the following is an extract:

Taneytown July 1, 1863.

From information received, the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished, viz., the relief of Harrisburg and the prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Philadelphia, etc., beyond the Susquehanna. It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive, until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success.

If the enemy assume the offensive and attack, it is his intention after holding them in check sufficiently long to withdraw the trains and other impedimenta, to withdraw the army from its present position and form line of battle with the left resting in the neighborhood of Middleburg, and the right at Manchester, the general direction being that of Pipe Creek.

The remainder of the circular covers the instructions to the various corps commanders as to the manner of carrying out the concentration on the Pipe Creek line.

The situation at Gettysburg this day caused a complete change in the plans of Meade; during the day every corps commander, who was not already there, received orders to march to Gettysburg at once.

Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac, June 28 to July 1.

June	I Corps	III Corps	XI Corps	V Corps	XII Corps	II Corps	VI Corps	Cavalry divisions
28	Frederick	Woodburg	Near Frederick	Near Frederick	Frederick	Monocacy Junction	Hyattstown	1 Middletown 2 Ridgeville 3 Frederick
29	Emmitsburg	Taneytown	Emmitsburg	Liberty	Bruceville	Uniontown	New Windsor	1 Near Fairfield 2 New Windsor 3 Littlestown
30	Marsh Run	Taneytown	Bridgeport	Union Mills	Littlestown	Uniontown	Manchester	1 Gettysburg 2 Manchester 3 Hanover
July 1	Gettysburg	Gettysburg	Gettysburg	Hanover and road to Gettysburg	Two Taverns and Gettysburg	Taneytown and road to Gettysburg	Manchester and road to Gettysburg	1 Taneytown 2 Hanover Junction 3 Abbottstown

Topography of the Battlefield.—The town of Gettysburg lies in the northern part of the basin of the Monocacy River, of which Marsh and Rock creeks are the principal tributaries in Pennsylvania. The country about Gettysburg is a diversified farming country with woods and fields easily traversed by troops. It has no unfordable streams and the only features of military value were its ridges and its woods. The ridges, which separate the drainage areas of the battlefield, played an important part in the battle as they were the positions occupied by the opposing lines to secure command and a view over the foreground, as well as to conceal the reserves and trains in their rear. The topography is made complicated by the fact that the ridges intersect and are cut through by the streams.

The principal ridges which traverse the field are:

1. Herr Ridge limits the valley of Willoughby Run on the west and has about the same elevation as Seminary Ridge. From its southern end there is an unobstructed view of Big Round Top and the Emmitsburg road near Marsh Creek. A cross-road, connecting the Cashtown and Fairfield roads, runs along this ridge.

2. Seminary Ridge separates the basins of Willoughby Run and Rock Creek and conceals the valley of Rock Creek from observers on Herr Ridge. North of the Mummasburg road this ridge is

called Oak Ridge of which the southern end is called Oak Hill. Doubleday Avenue now follows the crest of Seminary Ridge between the Mummasburg road and the railroad and West Confederate Avenue follows its crest south of the Fairfield road.

3. Snyder Ridge limits the valley of Willoughby Run on the east, south of Seminary Ridge; its extension intersects Herr Ridge near the Cashtown road. It conceals the valley of Willoughby Run from observers on the Round Tops. West Confederate Avenue now follows its crest.

4. A ridge runs from Rock Creek via Culp Hill, Cemetery Hill, Little Round Top and Big Round Top to Plum Run; south of Cemetery Hill it is called Cemetery Ridge. This is the highest of the ridges and commands both Seminary and Snyder ridges. Big Round Top commands Snyder Ridge by 200 feet and Little Round Top commands it by nearly 100 feet. Cemetery Hill commands Seminary Ridge by about 75 feet.

A number of minor ridges also figured in the battle.

1. A short ridge overlooking Willoughby Run near the Cashtown road and now the site of Stone Avenue.

2. A ridge midway between Willoughby Run and Seminary Ridge which forms the divide between Willoughby Run and Pitzer Run. It is now the site of Reynolds Avenue.

3. A ridge followed by the Emmitsburg road for a short distance north of the Peach Orchard. It separates the basins of Plum and Pitzer runs.

The principal woods mentioned in the accounts of the battle are McPherson's woods, a small grove which extended from Willoughby Run to Reynolds Avenue about 400 yards south of the Cashtown road, and Spangler's woods near the south end of Seminary Ridge. Nearly all the ridges were more or less covered by woods, and of the hills, Culp Hill, Wolf Hill and Big Round Top were almost completely covered. These hills were also covered with boulders.

Engagement at Gettysburg, July 1, a. m.—The troops that took part in this preliminary engagement were:

Confederate Brigades.

Archer, Heth's division
Davis, Heth's division
Artillery battalion, 16 guns

Union Brigades.

Gamble, Buford's cavalry division
Cutler, Wadsworth's division, I corps
Meredith, Wadsworth's division, I corps
2 batteries, 12 guns

When Buford reached Gettysburg on June 30, he assigned to Gamble's brigade the task of watching the Fairfield and Cash-town roads, and to Devin he assigned the roads running to Mummasburg, Middletown, Heidlersburg, etc. Gamble posted his pickets well out on the two roads assigned him where they could overlook the valley of Marsh Creek; his main body was encamped east of Willoughby Run.

At 5 a. m. July 1, *Heth's* division moved from Cashtown with *Archer's* brigade in advance. When *Heth* reached Herr Ridge, between 10 and 10:30 a. m., he saw a part of Gamble's brigade, dismounted, along what is now Stone Avenue, with two guns of the horse artillery on either side of the Cashtown road. The rest of Gamble's brigade, with two guns, was south of McPherson's woods and not visible from the vicinity of Herr's Tavern. The Union force in his front did not seem formidable and after a few shots by the leading artillery platoon, *Archer* and *Davis* were directed to deploy their brigades and move to the attack.

The report of *Archer's* brigade, which was south of the Cash-town road, says:

We had advanced about three miles when we came upon the enemy's pickets, who gradually fell back before us for about three miles, which brought us in sight of the enemy upon a slight eminence [Stone Avenue ridge], in our front and to the right of the road. Gen. *Archer* halted for a short time while a section of a battery opened fire on them. He then deployed the brigade in line, and advanced directly upon the enemy through an open field. At the extreme side of the field there was a small creek [Willoughby Run], with a fence and undergrowth, which was some disadvantage to our line in crossing, but the brigade rushed across with a cheer, and met the enemy just beyond.

We had encountered the enemy but a short time, when he made his appearance suddenly upon our right flank with a heavy force and opened upon us a crossfire. Our position was at once rendered untenable, and the right of our line was forced back. He made also a demonstration upon our left, and our lines commenced falling back, but owing to the obstructions in our rear (the creek, etc.) some 75 of the brigade were unable to make their escape, Gen. *Archer* among the rest.

The report of *Davis'* brigade says:

When within about two miles from town, our artillery was put in position [on Herr Ridge] and opened fire. I was ordered to take position on the left [north] of the turnpike, and, with the

right resting on it, press forward toward the town. About 10:30 a line of battle was formed, skirmishers thrown forward and the brigade moved forward to the attack. Between us and the town, and very near it, was a commanding hill in wood [Seminary Ridge], the intervening space being inclosed fields of grass and grain, and was very broken. On our right was the turnpike and a railroad, with deep cuts and heavy embankments, diverging from the turnpike as it approached the town. On the high hill the enemy had artillery, with infantry supports.

The line of skirmishers advanced, and the brigade moved forward about a mile, driving the enemy's skirmishers, and came within range of his main line of battle which was drawn up on a high hill [Reynolds Avenue ridge] in a field a short distance in front of the railroad cut. The engagement soon became very warm. The enemy made a stubborn resistance, and after desperate fighting, with heavy losses on both sides, he fled in great disorder toward the town. After a short interval, he again returned in great numbers and our men gave way under the first shock of his attack, many of the officers and men having been killed or wounded and all much exhausted by the excessive heat; but the line was promptly formed and while there engaged, a heavy force was observed moving rapidly toward our right, and soon after opened fire on our right flank and rear.

In this critical condition, I gave the order to retire, which was done in good order, leaving some officers and men in the railroad cut, who were captured, although every effort was made to withdraw all the commands.

Buford, who was notified of the advance of the Confederate forces, sent the following message to Meade:

Gettysburg, July 1, 1863, 10:10 a. m.

The enemy's force (*A. P. Hill's*) are advancing on me at this point, and driving my pickets and skirmishers very rapidly. There is also a large force at Heidlersburg that is driving my pickets at that point from that direction. Gen. Reynolds is advancing and is within three miles of this point with his leading division. I am positive that the whole of *A. P. Hill's* force is advancing.

Thus, while the brigades of *Archer* and *Davis* were deploying and preparing to advance on Gamble's brigade, Wadsworth's division, Cutler and Meredith, was marching on Gettysburg by the Emmitsburg road. When a mile from Gettysburg, Reynolds heard the sound of Buford's guns and the column turned off the road and started across the fields for the battlefield. When Cutler's brigade arrived, it was put in position by Reynolds; two regiments were deployed along Stone Avenue to check *Archer*,

who was coming up the slope and through McPherson's woods, and three regiments were sent across the railroad to hold *Davis*. The battery which accompanied this division was placed just north of the Cashtown road on the prolongation of Stone Avenue. All these troops became engaged as soon as they reached their positions. It was while *Archer's* brigade was engaged with Cutler's ~~left~~ ^{right} regiments that Meredith's brigade came up and struck its left flank, as described in the report of *Archer's* brigade, and caused it to retreat.

Davis attacked the three regiments of Cutler's right wing and was forcing them back on Seminary Ridge when the two regiments of Cutler's left wing were released by *Archer's* retreat. These regiments with a reserve regiment of Meredith's brigade now attacked *Davis* in flank, captured half a regiment in the railroad cut at Reynolds Avenue, and compelled him to retreat. It was noon when *Davis* began to retire.

Reynolds was killed in McPherson's woods shortly after the battle began and Doubleday assumed command of the corps. Buford withdrew Gamble from Stone Avenue on the arrival of Wadsworth's division, and Gamble moved toward the Fairfield road to protect that flank of the line.

At the end of this engagement, *Heth* says:

The enemy had now been felt, and found in heavy force in and around Gettysburg. The division was now formed in line of battle on the right of the road; *Archer's* brigade on the right, *Pettigrew's* in the center, and *Brockenbrough's* on the left. *Davis's* brigade was kept on the left of the road, that it might collect its stragglers, and from its shattered condition it was not deemed advisable to bring it again into action that day.

In this preliminary action, the Confederates were defeated because they expected to attack only a brigade of dismounted cavalry and found themselves suddenly confronted by two brigades of infantry. Each Confederate brigade was attacked by superior numbers, and each was defeated by an attack on its left flank.

Engagement at Gettysburg, July 1, p. m.—The troops that took part in this engagement were:

<i>Confederate Divisions.</i>		<i>Infantry.</i>		<i>Union Divisions.</i>	
Heth	4 brigades infantry			Wadsworth	2 brigades infantry
Pender	4 brigades infantry			Robinson	2 brigades infantry
Rodes	5 brigades infantry			Doubleday	2 brigades infantry
Early	4 brigades infantry			Barlow	2 brigades infantry
—	—			Schurz	2 brigades infantry
Total,	17			Steinwehr	2 brigades infantry
				Total, 12	

The strength of these brigades was sufficiently uniform to give a fair estimate of the relative strength of the infantry engaged.

<i>Artillery.</i>			
4 battalions	64 guns	2 artillery brigades	60 guns
<i>Cavalry.</i>			
2 cavalry brigades with 6 guns			

When Reynolds left Marsh Creek about 8 a. m. with Wadsworth's division, orders were left for the other two divisions of the I corps and for the XI corps to follow as soon as possible. In executing this march, two divisions of the XI corps took a branch road to the Taneytown road and came into Gettysburg over Cemetery Hill.

When Doubleday's division reached Gettysburg about noon, the morning engagement was over. Meredith's brigade was in and south of McPherson's woods and Cutler's brigade was united along Reynolds Avenue north of the railroad. Stone's brigade was therefore sent to close the gap between Meredith and Cutler and Rowley's brigade was sent to extend Meredith's line southward towards the Fairfield road. Robinson's division which arrived next was placed in reserve in a grove just west of the Lutheran Seminary.

About 1 p. m. the divisions of Schurz and Barlow of the XI corps reached Gettysburg and were sent to the plain north of the town; Steinwehr's division which arrived an hour later was retained as a reserve on Cemetery Hill. The XI corps was posted by Howard who reached Gettysburg just after the death of Reynolds and assumed command of the two corps.

In his report Howard states, that after inspecting the field:

I at once established my headquarters near the cemetery, and on the highest point north of the Baltimore pike. Here Gen. Schurz joined me before 12 m., when I instructed him to make the following dispositions of the XI corps. Learning from Gen. Doubleday, commanding the I corps, that his right was hard pressed [by *Davis*] and receiving continued assurance that his left was safe and pushing the enemy [*Archer*] back, I ordered the 1st and 3d divisions of the XI corps to seize and hold a prominent height on the right of the Cashtown road and on the prolongation of Seminary Ridge [Oak Hill], each division to have a battery of artillery, the other three batteries supported by Steinwehr's division, to be put in position near me on Cemetery Hill.

About 12:30 Gen. Buford sent me word that the enemy was massing between the York and Harrisburg roads, to the north of Gettysburg, some three or four miles from the town. The news of *Ewell's* advance from York was confirmed. I therefore ordered Gen. Schurz to halt his command to prevent his right flank being turned, but to push forward a thick line of skirmishers to seize the point first indicated.

At 2:45 p. m. the enemy showed himself in force in front of the XI corps. His batteries could be distinctly seen on a prominent slope between the Mummasburg and Harrisburg roads [Oak Hill].

At this time Devin's cavalry brigade formed a thin line between Oak Hill and Rock Creek.

The afternoon engagement was begun by *Rodes'* division. That morning *Ewell* was marching with *Rodes'* division from Heidlersburg to Cashtown via Middletown, now Biglerville. His report states:

Before reaching Middletown, I received notice from Gen. *Hill* that he was advancing upon Gettysburg and turned the head of *Rodes'* column toward that place by the Middletown road, sending word to *Early* to advance directly on the Heidlersburg road. I notified the general commanding of my movements and was informed by him that in case we found the enemy's force very large he did not want a general engagement brought on till the rest of the army came up.

By the time this message reached me, Gen. *A. P. Hill* had already been warmly engaged with a large body of the enemy in his front, and *Carter's* artillery battalion, of *Rodes'* division, had opened with fine effect on the flank of the same body which was rapidly preparing to attack me, while fresh masses were moving into position in my front. It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up, and I determined to push the attack vigorously.

It was Cutler's brigade deployed in the open along Reynolds Avenue, north of the railroad, which was made the target of *Rodes'* artillery; Cutler withdrew into the woods in his rear.

Rodes' report says:

On arriving on the field, I found that by keeping along the wooded ridge [Oak Ridge], on the left side of which the town of Gettysburg is situated, I could strike the force of the enemy, with which Gen. *Hill's* troops were engaged, upon the flank, and that, besides moving under cover, whenever we struck the enemy we could engage him with the advantage in ground.

The division was therefore moved along the summit of the ridge, with only one brigade deployed at first, and finally, as the enemy's cavalry had discovered us, and the ground was of such a character as to admit of cover for a large opposing force, with three brigades deployed; *Doles* on the left, *O'Neal* in the center and *Iverson* on the right; the artillery and the other brigades moved up closely to the line of battle. The division had moved nearly a mile before coming in view of the enemy's forces, excepting a few mounted men, and finally arrived at a point, a prominent hill on the ridge [Oak Hill], whence the whole of the force opposing Gen. *Hill's* troops could be seen. To get at these troops properly, which were still over half a mile from us, it was necessary to move the whole of my command by the right flank, and to change direction to the right.

While this was being done, *Carter's* [artillery] battalion was ordered forward, and soon opened fire upon the enemy who at this moment, as far as I could see, had no troops facing me at all. He had apparently been surprised; only a desultory fire of artillery was going on between his troops and Gen. *Hill's*; but before my dispositions were made, the enemy began to show large bodies of men in front of the town, most of which were directed upon the position I held, and almost at the same time a portion of the force opposed to Gen. *Hill* changed position so as to occupy the woods on the summit of the same ridge I occupied (I refer to the forest touching the railroad and extending along the summit of the ridge to my position as far as the Mummasburg road, which crossed the ridge at the base of the hill I held). Either these last troops, or others which had hitherto been unobserved behind the same body of woods, soon made their appearance directly opposite my center.

Being thus threatened from two directions, I determined to attack with my center and right, holding at bay still another force then emerging from the town (apparently with the intention of turning my left) with *Doles'* brigade, which was moved somewhat to the left for this purpose, and trusting to this gallant brigade thus holding them until Gen. *Early's* division arrived, which I knew would be soon and would strike this portion of the enemy's force on the flank before it could overpower *Doles*.

At this moment *Doles'* brigade occupied the open plain between the Middletown road and the foot of the ridge. The Alabama brigade [*O'Neal's*] with a wide interval between it and *Doles* extended from this plain up the slope of the ridge; *Daniel's* brigade supported *Iverson's* and extended some distance to the right of it; *Ramseur* was in reserve.

Cutler's brigade which had been facing *Hill* now turned its attention to *Rodes*. Cutler's force being deemed too weak to meet this new attack, Baxter's brigade of Robinson's division in reserve at the Seminary was sent to the Mummasburg road and faced *O'Neal*. This is the body of troops referred to as having been "hitherto unobserved". The troops in front of the town were Barlow's and Schurz' divisions of the XI corps.

When A. P. Hill observed *Rodes'* preparations for the attack, he moved *Pender's* division, which had come on the field while *Archer* and *Davis* were engaged and had been deployed a mile in rear of *Heth*, within close supporting distance of the latter.

The afternoon engagement really consisted of three distinct encounters.

1. South of the Cashtown road, A. P. Hill, with the divisions of *Heth* and *Pender* attacked the left wing of the I corps consisting of the brigades of Rowley and Meredith which were deployed along Reynolds Avenue and through McPherson's woods and a part of Stone's brigade which was deployed along Stone Avenue. The Union brigades were under the personal supervision of Doubleday and were assisted by Gamble's brigade of cavalry which was on the left flank of the line.

2. North of the Cashtown Road, the brigades of *O'Neal*, *Iverson*, *Daniel* and *Ramseur* of *Rodes'* division attacked the brigades of Cutler, Baxter and Paul, and also a part of Stone's brigade of the I corps. The right wing of the I corps was under the personal supervision of Wadsworth.

3. In the valley north of the town, *Early's* division and *Doles'* brigade of *Rodes'* division attacked the divisions of Barlow and Schurz of the XI corps. The Union forces were under the personal supervision of Schurz.

The first attacks were those of *O'Neal*, *Iverson* and *Daniel*, which occurred before *Heth* advanced across Willoughby Run or *Early* appeared on the field.

Three regiments of O'Neal's brigade advanced along the east slope of Oak Hill to attack a part of Baxter's brigade, which had reached the Mummasburg road, while Iverson's brigade made a wheel to the left to attack the remaining regiments of Baxter's brigade which were behind a stone wall that ran along the crest of the ridge.

According to *Rodes'* report:

The three regiments [O'Neal's], moved with alacrity (but not in accordance with my orders as to direction) and in confusion into the action. The result was that the brigade was repulsed quickly and with loss. Iverson's left being thus exposed, heavy loss was inflicted on his brigade. His dead lay in a distinctly marked line of battle. His left was overpowered and many of his men, being surrounded, were captured.

Daniel's gallant brigade, by a slight change in the direction of Iverson's attack, had been left too far to his right to assist him directly and had already become engaged. The right of this brigade, coming upon the enemy strongly posted in a railroad cut, was thrown back skilfully and the position of the whole brigade was altered so as to enable him to throw a portion of his force across the railroad, enfilade it, and attack to advantage.

Stone, who was between Meredith and the Cashtown road, seeing his brigade threatened both from the direction of Willoughby Run and from the north, deployed one regiment along Stone Avenue and the other two along the Cashtown road. One of the latter regiments advanced to the railroad cut and broke up *Daniel's* first attack.

When *Daniel* made his second attack, the divisions of *Heth* and *Pender* were also ordered to attack. *Heth's* line was formed of the brigades of *Brockenbrough*, *Pettigrew* and *Archer*, and extended southward from the Cashtown road. *Archer's* brigade was not actually engaged in the afternoon, as it took up a position near the Fairfield road to protect the remainder of the division from a threatened flank attack by *Gamble's* cavalry brigade.

The attack of *Hill's* two divisions is described in the report of *Pender's* division:

About 3 o'clock, the troops of the corps of Lieut. Gen. *Ewell* appearing on the left, and the enemy making a strong demonstration on the right with infantry and cavalry, the brigade of Gen. *Lane* was ordered to the extreme right of the division, and Gen.

Thomas was directed to close upon the left of *Gen. Scales*. Simultaneous with the appearance of *Lieut. Gen. Ewell* on the left, a general advance was ordered on the right. *Gen. Heth* moved quickly forward and soon became vigorously engaged with the enemy. *Pender's* division moved forward to his support, with the exception of the brigade of *Gen. Thomas*, which was retained by *Lieut. Gen. Hill* to meet a threatened advance from the left. The division continued to move forward until it came close upon the command of *Gen. Heth*, pressing the enemy successfully within a short distance in front. *Gen. Pender* sent his assistant adjutant general forward to *Gen. Heth* to know if that officer was in need of assistance. On being informed that he was pressing the enemy from one position to another, the division advanced slowly, keeping within close supporting distance of the troops in front.

About 4 o'clock, *Gen. Pender* ordered an advance of the three brigades with instructions to pass *Gen. Heth's* division, if found at a halt, and charge the enemy's position, which was on a prominent ridge [Seminary Ridge] between a quarter and a half mile from Gettysburg. The division moved rapidly forward and passed the division of *Gen. Heth*, then under the command of *Gen. Pettigrew*, which seemed much exhausted and greatly reduced by several hours' hard and successful fighting.

Gen. Lane, on the extreme right, being annoyed by a heavy force of dismounted cavalry on his right flank, which kept up a severe enfilade fire, was so much delayed thereby, that he was unable to attack the enemy in front.

Gen. Scales on the left, with his left resting on the turnpike, after passing the troops of *Gen. Heth*, advanced at a charge which soon caused the enemy to fall back. The brigade continued to advance rapidly, and as it commenced to descend the hill [Reynolds Avenue ridge] opposite the ridge upon which the enemy was posted [Seminary Ridge], it encountered a most terrific fire of grape and shell on the left flank and grape and musketry in front, but it still pressed on at a double-quick until the bottom was reached, a distance of 75 yards from the enemy's fortified position. Here the fire was most severe. The brigade halted to return the fire of the enemy, throwing the line somewhat in confusion. *Maj. Gen. Pender*, with portions of his staff and *Gen. Scales* succeeded in rallying the brigade which immediately pushed forward again and joined in the pursuit of the enemy, driving him through Gettysburg.

Col. Perrin [McGowan's brigade], after passing *Gen. Heth's* division, moved rapidly forward preserving an alignment with *Gen. Scales*. Upon ascending a hill in front [Reynolds Avenue ridge], the brigade was met by a furious storm of musketry and shell from infantry posted behind temporary breastworks, and artillery from batteries to the left of the road near Gettysburg. The brigade advanced steadily at a charge, reserving its fire as ordered,

easily dislodging the enemy from several positions, and meeting with but little opposition until it came within 200 yards of his last position, the ridge upon which is situated the theological college. The brigade, in crossing a line of fencing, received a most withering and destructive fire, but continued to charge without returning the fire of the enemy, until reaching the edge of the grove which crowns the crest of the ridge. Col. *Perrin*, here finding himself alone, attacked the enemy determinedly in his immediate front with success, suffering greatly from enfilade fire on both flanks, and then dividing his command by ordering two regiments to change front to the right and two to change front to the left, he attacked the enemy posted on the right behind a stone wall and on the left behind a breastwork of rails, in flank, easily routing them and driving them through the town on Cemetery Hill. This caused the artillery on the left, which had continued to keep up a constant and destructive fire upon the advancing lines of the division, to limber up and move to the rear.

In this engagement, the brigades of Meredith and Rowley sustained a desperate attack from the brigades of *Pettigrew* and *Brockenbrough*, but were finally compelled to withdraw to the Seminary when *McGowan's* and *Scales'* brigades entered the engagement. Stone's brigade between *McPherson's* woods and the turnpike was engaged with the right regiments of *Daniel's* brigade reinforced by some of *Davis'* troops, when *Scales* advanced to the attack and compelled the Union brigade to fall back to Seminary Ridge.

After the repulse of the brigades of *O'Neal* and *Iverson*, Paul's brigade of the I corps replaced Baxter's and the latter moved to the left of Cutler's brigade, between Cutler and the railroad.

When *Pender's* division moved to the attack, the brigades of *Daniel* and *Ramseur* of *Rodes'* division with a part of *O'Neal's* brigade participated in the advance and attacked the brigades of Paul, Cutler and Baxter along Seminary Ridge north of the railroad. By this time, however, Wadsworth had begun to draw back these troops toward Cemetery Hill and the Confederates took possession of the ridge without much opposition. *Ramseur* followed the Union troops into the town; *Daniel* remained in the suburbs.

Early describes the operations in the valley north of Gettysburg after his arrival:

On arriving in sight of that place [Gettysburg], on the direct road from Heidlersburg, I discovered that Gen. *Rodes'* division was engaged with the enemy to the right of me, the enemy occupying a position in front of Gettysburg, and the troops constituting his right being engaged in an effort to drive back the left of Gen. *Rodes'* line.

I immediately ordered my troops to the front, and formed my line across the Heidlersburg road, with *Gordon's* brigade on the right, *Hoke's* brigade under Col. *Avery* on the left, *Hay's* brigade in the center and *Smith's* brigade in the rear of *Hoke's*. *Jones'* battalion of artillery was posted in a field on the left of the Heidlersburg road, immediately in front of *Hoke's* brigade, so as to fire on the enemy's flank, and, as soon as these dispositions could be made, a fire was opened upon the enemy's infantry and artillery by my artillery with considerable effect.

Gordon's brigade was then ordered forward to the support of *Dole's* brigade, which was on *Rodes'* left, and was being pressed by a considerable force of the enemy, which had advanced from the direction of the town to a wooded hill [Barlow Knoll] on the west side of Rock Creek, the stream which runs northeast of the town, and as soon as *Gordon* was fairly engaged with this force, *Hay's* and *Hoke's* brigades were ordered forward in line, and the artillery, supported by *Smith's* brigade, was ordered to follow.

After a short but hot contest, *Gordon* succeeded in routing the force opposed to him, consisting of a division of the XI corps, commanded by Brig. Gen. Barlow, and drove it back with great slaughter, capturing among a number of prisoners Gen. Barlow himself, who was severely wounded. *Gordon* advanced across the creek, over the hill on which Barlow had been posted, and across the fields toward the town, until he came to a low ridge, behind which the enemy had another line of battle, extending beyond his left. I directed him to halt here, and then ordered *Hays* and *Avery*, who had been halted on the east side of Rock Creek while I rode forward to where *Gordon* had been engaged, to advance toward the town, on *Gordon's* left, which they did in fine style, encountering and driving back into the town in great confusion the second line of the enemy.

Hays' brigade entered the town, fighting its way, and *Avery* moved to the left of it across the railroad, and took his position in the fields on the left and facing Cemetery Hill, which here presented a very rugged ascent.

This movement was made under the fire of artillery from this hill, which had previously opened when my artillery had first opened its fire, but *Avery* succeeded in placing his men under the cover of a low ridge which here runs through the fields from the town. *Hays'* brigade was formed in line in the street running through the middle of the town.

A very large number of prisoners were captured in the town, and before reaching it, their number being so great as really to embarrass us. Two pieces of artillery [Napoleons] were also captured outside of the town, the capture being claimed by both brigades.

While these operations were going on with my division, I saw, farther to the right, the enemy's force on that part of the line falling back and moving in comparatively good order on the right of the town toward the range of hills in the rear, and I sent back for a battery of artillery to be brought up to open on this force and the town, from which a fire was opened on my brigades, but before it got up, my men had entered the town, and the force on the right had retired beyond reach.

The pursuit was not carried beyond the town, for the following reasons given by *Ewell* and *A. P. Hill*:

The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town, I received a message from the commanding general to attack this hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it, and all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that Gen. *Johnson's* division (the only one of my corps that had not been engaged) was close to town.

Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined with *Johnson's* division to take possession of a wooded hill [Culp Hill] to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before *Johnson* got up, the enemy was reported moving to outflank our extreme left. Before this report could be investigated and *Johnson* placed in position the night was far advanced.—*Ewell's* report.

Under the impression that the enemy were entirely routed, my own two divisions exhausted by some six hours' hard fighting, prudence led me to be content with what had been gained, and not push forward troops exhausted and necessarily disordered, probably to encounter fresh troops of the enemy.—*Hill's* report.

It is uncertain at what time the Union troops began to retreat to Cemetery Hill, where Howard had established his reserves, but it is evident that the retreat began on the right of the XI corps, and was taken up in order by the troops toward the left, the last to fall back being those near the Seminary. To check the advance of the brigades of *Hoke* and *Hays*, Howard dispatched one of his reserve brigades, Coster's, to the edge of the town on the Heidlersburg road. The battle was over about 4:30 p. m., three hours before sunset.

Col. Freemantle, of the British army who was a guest of Gen. Longstreet, in his "*Three Months in the Southern States*", says:

At 4:30 p. m. we came in sight of Gettysburg and joined Gen. Lee and Gen. Hill, who were on top of one of those ridges which form the peculiar feature of the country around Gettysburg. We could see the enemy retreating up one of the opposite ridges, pursued by the Confederates with loud yells. The position into which the enemy had been driven was evidently a strong one. His right appeared to rest upon a cemetery, on the top of a high ridge to the right of Gettysburg as we looked at it.

Lee had left Fayetteville that morning, after the divisions of Anderson and Johnson had started through the mountains. He probably reached Seminary Ridge about the time the Confederate troops occupied it and sent word to Ewell to attack Cemetery Hill, if he could do so with advantage. He was evidently impressed by Hill's reasons for not following up the attack, since in his report it is stated:

The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy and find the most favorable point of attack.

The engagement on the afternoon of July 1 resulted from the message sent by Hill to Ewell that the former intended to advance to Gettysburg. It is not probable that Hill would have renewed the engagement until Lee arrived had he not felt it necessary to support Ewell's attack. Ewell's sudden appearance on the field was perhaps more of a surprise to Hill than to Howard who had been informed by Buford of the approach of a large body of Confederates from the north. Had Hill known that Ewell was coming, it is probable that he would have ridden over to Oak Hill to consult with him after the morning engagement was over. The failure to consult, made the results of the afternoon engagement, in which the Confederates had the advantage both of numbers and position, much less decisive than they should have been.

Though the Union forces had been defeated, the honors of the day belonged to the I corps, which had been attacked by double its numbers and had severely punished the brigades of Archer,

Davis, Pettigrew, Brockenbrough and *Scales* of *Hill's* corps, and the brigades of *O' Neal* and *Iverson* of *Rodes'* division. The artillery of the I corps ably supported the infantry in its engagements, particularly with *Hill's* corps. *Gamble's* brigade of cavalry also played an important part, especially in the afternoon, when it prevented the advance of the brigades of *Archer* and *Lane*. The casualties of the I corps were naturally heavy, and numbered about one-third of the command.

During the afternoon, the III and XII corps marched toward Gettysburg at the request of Howard, whose adjutant general sent the following message to Sickles and Slocum, when he learned that *Ewell* was approaching the field:

July 1, 1863, 1 p. m.

The general commanding [Howard] directs me to inform you that *Ewell's* corps is approaching from York. The left wing of the Army of the Potomac is engaged with *A. P. Hill's* corps.

The head of the XII corps reached Rock Creek about the time *Early* appeared, and in order to protect the right flank of the XI corps started up the east side of Rock Creek to seize Wolf Hill and reach the Hanover road. Its advance-guard had barely driven *Jenkins'* cavalry from the hill, when the order was suspended, as the XI corps was falling back on Cemetery Hill. It was this movement of the XII corps that was reported to *Ewell* as an attempt to turn his left flank. *Williams'* division encamped that night near Rock Creek, on the Baltimore pike; *Geary's* division was sent by the Schoolhouse road to the vicinity of Little Round Top, to guard the ^(left)right flank of the line on Cemetery Ridge. *Slocum* reached Cemetery Hill about 6 p. m., and assumed command of the I and XI corps.

In addition to the message given above, a staff officer was sent by Howard to Sickles at Emmitsburg requesting him to move at once to Gettysburg; this message was not received until after 3 p. m. Knowing the importance attached to Emmitsburg by Reynolds, Sickles left two brigades at that point and ordered the other four to Gettysburg.

Birney's two brigades took the direct road and reached the field about dark.

The command arrived at Gettysburg about dark by a forced march over horrible roads, and bivouacked for the night.—Ward's report.

Humphrey's two brigades took the road from Emmitsburg to Black Horse Tavern and did not reach the corps encampment until after midnight.

Meade spent the day at Taneytown, where late in the morning he saw Buford's message of the night before. His chief of staff at once sent the following message to Sedgwick, who was at Manchester:

I am directed by the commanding general to state that it would appear from reports just received that the enemy is moving in heavy force on Gettysburg (*Ewell*, from Heidlersburg and *Hill* from Cashtown Pass), and it is not improbable he will reach that place before the command under Maj. Gen. Reynolds (the I and XI corps) now on the way can arrive there.

Should such be the case, and Gen. Reynolds find himself in the presence of a superior force, he is instructed to hold the enemy in check and fall slowly back. If he is able to do this, the line indicated in the circular to-day (Pipe Creek) will be occupied to-night. Should circumstances render it necessary for the commanding general to fight to-day the troops are posted as follows for the support of Reynolds' command, viz.: on the right at Two Taverns, the XII corps; at Hanover, the V corps; the II corps is on the road between Taneytown and Gettysburg; the III corps is at Emmitsburg.

This information is conveyed to you that you may have your corps in readiness to move in such direction as may be required at a moment's notice.

About this time Hancock reached Taneytown at the head of the II corps and on reporting to Meade, the latter explained to him his general plan of operations both for attack and defense. Shortly thereafter Meade was informed that Reynolds had been either killed or severely wounded, and as Howard, who was senior to Hancock, was not conversant with his plans, he issued the following order to the latter:

The major general commanding has just been informed that Gen. Reynolds has been killed or badly wounded. He directs that you turn over the command of your corps to Gen. Gibbon; that you proceed to the front, and, by virtue of this order, in case of the truth of Gen. Reynolds' death, you assume command of the corps there assembled, viz.: the XI, I and III at Emmitsburg.

If you think the ground and position there a better one to fight a battle under the existing circumstances, you will so advise the general, and he will order all the troops up. You know the general's views, and Gen. Warren, who is fully aware of them, has gone out to see Gen. Reynolds. 1:10 p. m.

Later 1:15 p. m.—Reynolds has possession of Gettysburg, and the enemy are reported as falling back from the front of Gettysburg. Hold your column ready to move.

The II corps under Gibbon proceeded on toward Gettysburg and encamped that night just south of Big Round Top. Hancock went straight through to Cemetery Hill, and reached it as the Union troops were falling back. With the aid of Howard, Warren and Buford the troops were put in position. Hancock then sent the following report:

5:25 p. m.—When I arrived here an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, and cannot well be taken. It is a position, however, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right which will protect the right. But we have as yet no troops on the left, the III corps not having yet reported; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, its flank march will in a degree protect our left flank. In the meantime Gibbon had better march on so as to take position on our right or left, to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. Gen. G. will see this dispatch. The battle is quiet now. I think we will be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes, it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can retire; if not we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops. I will communicate in a few moments with Gen. Slocum and transfer the command to him.

Howard says that Doubleday's command gave way.

Gen. Warren is here.

At 4:30 p. m. a message was sent to Sedgwick to bring the VI corps to Taneytown.

Upon the receipt of Hancock's message, Meade decided to concentrate his army at Gettysburg, and at 7:30 p. m. sent orders to the commanders of the V and VI corps and of the two brigades at Emmitsburg, to proceed to Gettysburg at once.

The Confederate forces had been marching on Gettysburg all day through the pass in the South Mountains. *Anderson's* division arrived about the middle of the afternoon. He states:

Upon approaching Gettysburg, I was directed to occupy the position in line of battle which had just been vacated by *Pender's* division [Herr Ridge].

Johnson was next to arrive having made a march of 25 miles that day. He says:

Late on the night of July 1, I moved along the Gettysburg and York Railroad to the northeast of the town. Pickets were thrown well to the front and the troops slept on their arms.

McLaws and *Hood* probably encamped near Marsh Run along the Cashtown road. *Pickett* remained at Chambersburg.

Battle of July 2.—In his report of the battle, *Lee* says:

It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of Gen. Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack. The remainder of *Ewell's* and *Hill's* corps having arrived and two divisions of *Longstreet's*, our preparations were made accordingly.

On the night of July 1, *Lee* and his three corps commanders had been on the field for several hours. Eight of the nine infantry divisions of the Army of Northern Virginia were either on the field or close to it. As the I and XI corps had received no assistance during the day, it was evident to *Lee* that the Army of the Potomac was not yet concentrated. That these two corps boldly took up a position on Cemetery Hill after their defeat, indicated that help was not far off and that the other corps were marching to their support. If *Lee* intended to take the offensive, these circumstances seemed to demand an early morning attack utilizing as many of his troops as possible at the point of attack. No doubt this was *Lee's* desire, but the attack was not made for various reasons, which are indicated in the reports of *Ewell* and *Longstreet*.

Ewell states in his report:

I received orders soon after dark [probably at *Lee's* headquarters on Herr Ridge] to draw my corps to the right, in case it could not be used to advantage where it was; that the commanding general thought from the nature of the ground that the position for attack was a good one on that side. I represented to the commanding general that the hill above referred to [Culp Hill] was unoccupied by the enemy, as reported by Lieuts. *Turner* and *Early*, who had gone upon it, and that it commanded their position and made it untenable, so far as I could judge. He decided to let me remain, and on my return to my headquarters, after 12 o'clock at night, I sent orders to *Johnson* by Lieut. *T. T. Turner*, aide-de-camp, to take possession of this hill if he had not already done so. Gen. *Johnson* stated [to Lieut. *Turner*] in reply to this order, that after forming his line of battle this side of the wooded hill in question he had sent a reconnoitering party to the hill with orders to report as to the position of the enemy in reference to it. This party, on nearing the summit, was met by a superior force of the enemy which succeeded in capturing a portion of the reconnoitering party, the rest of it making its escape. During this conversation with Gen. *Johnson*, a man arrived bringing a despatch dated 12 midnight, and taken from a Federal courier making his way from Gen. Sykes to Gen. Slocum, in which the former stated that his corps was then halted four miles from Gettysburg and he would resume his march at 4 a. m. Lieut. *Turner* brought this despatch to my headquarters, and at the same time stated that Gen. *Johnson* would refrain from attacking the position until I had received notice of the fact that the enemy were in possession of the hill and had sent him further orders. Day was now breaking, and it was too late for any change of place.

It was a regiment of Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division which was encountered on Culp Hill. Its commander reports:

On the afternoon of July 1, I joined the brigade at Gettysburg, having been previously detached at Emmitsburg by order of Gen. Reynolds. By command of Gen. Wadsworth we took up a position on a hill east of Gettysburg, forming at that time the extreme right of our line. We immediately commenced the construction of a temporary breastwork. During the succeeding night a force of the enemy attempted to penetrate our lines, but were easily driven off, supposing themselves confronted by a heavy force.

When Slocum moved to Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 1, he sent an order to Sykes at Hanover, who had been placed under his orders that day, to move to that place. The V corps halted about midnight at Bonneauville on the Hanover-Gettysburg road. The courier was sent by Sykes at that time.

Longstreet says in his report:

On the next day [July 1], the troops set out for Gettysburg, excepting Pickett's division, not yet relieved from duty at Chambersburg, and Law's brigade left by Hood on picket duty at New Guilford [on the road leading to Emmitsburg]. Our march was greatly delayed on this day by Johnson's division of the Second corps, which came into the road from Shippensburg and the long wagon trains that followed him. McLaws' division however reached Marsh Creek four miles from Gettysburg a little after dark and Hood's division got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o'clock at night. Law's brigade was ordered forward to its division during the day and joined about noon on the 2d. Previous to his joining, I received instructions from the commanding general to move with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmitsburg road, on the enemy's left.

Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until Gen. Law's brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement was begun.

Not anticipating a battle so soon, Pickett's entire division was left at Chambersburg to guard the trains until Imboden, who was slow in moving up from Hancock, should relieve him. Had Lee known that a battle was imminent, he would probably have left but a brigade. Law's brigade also might have joined Longstreet before he crossed the mountains had Lee known that it would be needed on the following day.

Ewell's report indicates that Lee intended to employ Ewell's corps in making the attack on the Union left on July 2, but that he yielded to Ewell's representations that he could easily capture Culp Hill. That the Union commander would leave Culp Hill unoccupied must have seemed improbable to Lee, and it is difficult to understand why he yielded to Ewell, since he had inspected the line Cemetery Hill—Culp Hill that evening and decided that it was a difficult one to attack.

This left the attack, on the Confederate right, to be made by the divisions of Anderson of Hill's corps and those of McLaws and Hood of Longstreet's corps. Had Ewell participated in this attack, Longstreet would not have hesitated to enter it without Law's brigade; however, when the main attack was to be made by his own two divisions, he did not care to enter the fight without

this brigade. Thus the force, that might possibly have struck a crushing blow, was reduced to one-half its strength, and the attack that might have been made early in the day was delayed until the afternoon, giving time for Meade to bring up most of his troops.

Meade broke up his headquarters at Taneytown at 10:00 p. m. on the 1st and established them near Gettysburg on the Taneytown road, a half-mile from its junction with the Emmitsburg road. When the morning light revealed the position of the Confederate troops to Meade, he saw only the divisions of *Pender*, *Rodes*, *Early* and *Johnson*. *Pender* was on Seminary Ridge with his left on the Fairfield road and his right in a grove due west of Cemetery Hill; *Rodes* was between Seminary Ridge and the town square; *Early* was between the town square and Rock Creek; *Johnson* was behind the Hanover road, his line extended from Rock Creek eastward out of view. Early in the morning Meade examined his own lines and gave orders to his corps commanders as to the disposition of the I, II, III, XI and XII corps which were on the ground.

The XI corps, which was on Cemetery Hill facing Seminary Ridge, the town, and Rock Creek, was left in position. The division facing Rock Creek was at the foot of the slope along a stone wall. The two divisions of the I corps that had prolonged the line of the XI corps along Cemetery Ridge on the evening of the 1st were moved from this position and placed in reserve behind the XI corps. The 1st division of the I corps that was on Culp Hill facing the town was left in position. Both of these corps were much reduced in strength.

The II corps came up on the field early in the morning. It was posted facing west with the right resting on the XI corps near the Taneytown road and the left on Cemetery Ridge near its intersection with the Schoolhouse road prolonged.

The commander of the III corps, whose divisions were massed by brigades on the east side of Plum Run between the II corps and the Wheatfield road, was directed to prolong the line of the II corps to the Round Tops.

The XII corps was directed to connect with the I corps on Culp Hill and prolong the line along the crest overlooking Rock Creek as far south as the Baltimore pike.

Two divisions of the V corps reached the vicinity of Wolf Hill on the Hanover road in the morning and formed line of battle. As it was isolated from the rest of the army, when the third division came up, it moved along a road east of Wolf Hill to the Baltimore pike and about noon took position near the junction of the Baltimore pike and Schoolhouse road. As the infantry of the six corps now on the field was the equivalent of the infantry of *Lee's* nine divisions, Meade was now stronger than *Lee* in infantry as well as in artillery and cavalry.

The VI corps was marching on the Baltimore pike for Gettysburg but would not reach Rock Creek until the afternoon.

As Meade looked westward across the valley to Seminary Ridge, the Confederates on that side gave him little concern; the Confederate right flank was opposite the XI corps, while the II and III corps had troops enough to extend the Union lines to the Round Tops. There seemed to be little probability of an attack by the Confederate right wing. Furthermore, Buford's cavalry was on that flank to give warning of any Confederate movement. Looking northeast from Cemetery Hill, however, the Confederates outflanked the Union line and threatened Meade's communications with his base at Westminster. The situation on his right therefore gave him much concern, and he directed his chief engineer and the commander of the XII corps to make plans for an attack on this flank of the Confederate line as soon as the V and VI corps became available.

Gen. Slocum reports as follows:

10:30 a. m.—Your note of 9:30 a. m. is received. I have already made a better examination of the position in my front than I am able to now that we have taken up a new line. If it is true that the enemy are massing troops on our right, I do not think that we could detach enough troops for an attack to insure success. I do not think the ground in my front, held by the enemy, possesses any peculiar advantages for him.

About the same time Pleasonton sent this order to Gregg, who was marching from Hanover that morning on the Hanover-Gettysburg road:

You will hold your force well in hand in your present position, with pickets and scouts well out. The enemy are in heavy force on the road from Heidlersburg to Gettysburg and toward Berlin. You will see that our flank and rear are not turned without giving timely information.

It is probable that the following message had given Meade some concern:

Littlestown, June 30, 1863, 6 p. m.—A messenger has just come in from Kilpatrick, asking for re-enforcements. I sent him every cavalryman that I could get hold of. I also informed him of the infantry at this place. I think there is no doubt but there is a heavy infantry force at Berlin and Gettysburg. Kilpatrick has information that *Lee's* headquarters are at Berlin. The enemy struck the rear of his column just as it entered Hanover, creating some confusion in one regiment. A charge was, however, immediately made, which resulted in the repulse of the enemy and the capture of about fifty prisoners, one lieutenant colonel among them. As soon as my horse rests a little I will come to headquarters.—A. J. Alexander, Ass't Adj. Gen.

As far as could be seen from Cemetery Hill the only movements in the Confederate lines during the morning were in *Johnson's* division east of Rock Creek. It was the left of the Confederate line therefore that riveted the attention of Meade all the morning, and he sent messenger after messenger along the Baltimore pike to request Sedgwick to bring up the VI corps as rapidly as possible to strengthen it.

As previously stated, *Lee* had made up his mind to attack the Union left on the 2d with the corps of *Ewell* and *Longstreet*, and when *Longstreet* returned to his headquarters at Cashtown on the night of the 1st he gave orders to *McLaws* and *Hood* to move up to the field at daylight. During the night, *Lee* changed his mind with respect to *Ewell* and at a conference the next morning, it was decided to employ *Longstreet's* two divisions assisted by *Anderson's* division of *Hill's* corps for the attack on the Union left; at the same time *Ewell* was to attack the Union right with his corps.

Col. Freemantle describes this conference which took place at *Lee's* headquarters on Herr Ridge near the Cashtown road:

I arrived at 5 a. m. on the same commanding position we were on yesterday, and I climbed up a tree with Capt. Shreibert of the

Prussian army. Just below us were seated Gens. *Lee*, *Hill*, *Longstreet* and *Hood* in consultation, the two latter assisting their deliberations by the truly American custom of whittling sticks. Gen. *Heth* was also present; he was wounded in the head yesterday, and although not allowed to command his brigade [division], he insists upon coming to the field.

Longstreet mentions *McLaws* at this conference and it is probable that both *McLaws* and *Anderson* were there but are not mentioned by *Freemantle* as he did not know them.

At this time, *Heth's* division was encamped in the woods along the east slope of Herr Ridge, *Anderson's* division was behind *Heth* with its left on the Cashtown road and one brigade with a battery at the southern extremity of the ridge at the Fairfield road. *McLaws' division* was moving up from the Marsh Creek bridge on the Cashtown road to take position on Herr Ridge on the right of *Anderson*. *Hood's* division was moving up on the Cashtown road to take position behind Herr Ridge in rear of *McLaws*.

At the conference, which probably lasted an hour or more, it was decided to deploy *Anderson's* division on Seminary Ridge to the right of *Pender*, and the divisions of *McLaws* and *Hood* to the right of *Anderson*. An attack was to be made by these three divisions on the Union left and a simultaneous attack by *Ewell* on the Union right. *Heth's* division was not to be employed that day and *Pender's* only as a support.

Anderson's report says:

We continued in this position [on Herr Ridge] until the morning of the 2d, when I received orders to take up a new line of battle on the right of *Pender's* division about a mile and a half further forward. In taking up the new position, *Wilcox's* brigade had a sharp skirmish with a body of the enemy who had occupied a wooded hill on the extreme right of my line.

The wooded hill referred to was the northern end of Snyder Ridge, overlooking Pitzer Run. This encounter was reported from the Round Top signal station:

11:45 a. m., enemy's skirmishers are advancing from the west, one mile from here.

11:55 a. m., the rebels are in force and our skirmishers give way. One mile west of Round Top signal station, the woods are full of them.

It is evident from these quotations that *Anderson* was not in position much before noon. It was a very hot July day and, as the column was so marched and deployed through the fields of the valley of Willoughby Run as to keep out of sight of the Union position, it may have taken several hours to move from Herr Ridge and deploy along Seminary Ridge. *Wilcox*, being on the extreme right, was probably the last of *Anderson's* brigades to move into position.

From the reports, it does not appear that *Lee* authorized *Longstreet* to wait for the arrival of *Law's* brigade. It is probable that he expected *Longstreet* to move at the same time that *Anderson* did, by a different route. Had *Longstreet* done so, he might have gotten into position on Snyder Ridge shortly after *Anderson* reached Seminary Ridge.

Col. Freemantle says:

At 7 a. m. I rode over part of the ground with Gen. *Longstreet* and saw him disposing *McLaws'* division for to-day's fight, etc.

As the whole morning was evidently to be occupied in disposing the troops for attack, I rode to the extreme right, etc.

It is evident that at 7 a. m. no battle was expected to take place before noon. *McLaws'* division was at this time on Herr Ridge.

During the morning various staff officers had been examining the country over which the movement was to be made.

From the farthest occupied point on the right and front [of *Pender's* division], in company with Cols. *Long* and *Walker* and Capt. *Johnston* (engineer), soon after sunrise I surveyed the enemy's position toward some estimate of the ground and the best mode of attack. So far as judgment could be formed, from such a view, assault on the enemy's left by our extreme right might succeed, should the mountain there offer no insuperable obstacle. To attack on that side, if practicable, I understood to be the purpose of the commanding general. Returning from this position more to the right and rear, for the sake of tracing more exactly the mode of approach, I proceeded some distance along the ravine road noticed the previous evening [along Willoughby Run], and was made aware of having entered the enemy's lines by meeting two armed dismounted cavalymen. Apparently surprised, they immediately surrendered and were disarmed and sent to the rear with two of three members of my staff present.

Having satisfied myself of the course and character of this road, I returned to an elevated point on the Fairfield road [Herr Ridge],

which furnished a very extensive view and despatched messengers to Gen. *Longstreet* and the commanding general. Between this point and the Emmitsburg road, the enemy's cavalry were seen in considerable force and moving up along that road towards the enemy's main position, bodies of infantry and artillery, accompanied by their trains [the brigades of the III corps coming from Emmitsburg].

This front was after some time examined by Col. *Smith* and Capt. *Johnston* (engineers), and about midday Gen. *Longstreet* arrived and viewed the ground.

He desired Col. *Alexander* to obtain the best view he then could from the front. I therefore conducted the Colonel to the advanced point of observation previously visited. Its approach was now more hazardous from the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, so that special caution was necessary in making the desired observation. Just then a sharp contest occurred in the woods to the right and rear of this forward point. *Anderson's* division, Third corps, had moved up and was driving the enemy from these woods [Snyder Ridge]. These woods having been thus cleared of the enemy, some view of the ground beyond them and much further to the right than had yet been examined seemed practicable. I therefore rode in that direction and when about to enter the woods met the commanding general, en route himself for a survey of the ground.

There being here still a good deal of sharpshooting, the front had to be examined with caution. Gen. *Wilcox*, commanding on the right of *Anderson's* division, had already seen beyond the farther edge of the woods, and under his guidance I accompanied Col. *Long* to the farmhouse at the summit, where the crossroad from Fairfield, etc. [Pitzer's schoolhouse] emerges. Having noticed the field and the enemy's batteries, etc., I returned to Gen. *Longstreet* for the purpose of conducting his column to this point, and supervising as might be necessary the disposition of his artillery. He was advancing by the ravine road (as most out of view), time having been already lost in attempting another which proved objectionable because exposed to observation. On learning the state of facts ahead, the general halted and sent back to hasten his artillery. Members of my staff were also dispatched to remedy as far as practicable the delay. *Cabell's*, *Alexander's* and *Henry's* [artillery] battalions at length arrived, and the whole column moved toward the enemy's left. Col. *Alexander*, by Gen. *Longstreet's* direction, proceeded to explore the ground still farther to the right and *Henry's* battalion, accompanying *Hood's* division, was thrown in that direction. Upon these as soon as observed the enemy opened a furious cannonade, the course of which rendered necessary a change in the main artillery column. The fire on the crossroad through the woods having after a time

slackened, I reconnoitered that front again. As before, the enemy was only a few hundred yards off awaiting attack.—Report of *W. N. Pendleton*, chief of artillery.

About noon *Law's* brigade of *McLaws' division* joined its division and *Longstreet* prepared to move into position to the right of *Anderson*. In his report, *Longstreet* says:

As soon after his arrival [*Law*] as we could make our preparations the movement was begun. Engineers, sent out by the commanding general and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route.

The engineers mentioned had selected the road that ran from Black Horse Tavern southeasterly to Willoughby Run. This road runs over the end of Herr Ridge from which point Big Round Top is clearly visible and it was desired to make the movement out of sight of this prominent peak in the Union position.

Kershaw of *McLaws' division* reports:

Arriving at the hill [Herr Ridge] beyond the hotel at the stone bridge on the Fairfield road [Black Horse Tavern], the column was halted while Gens. *Longstreet* and *McLaws* reconnoitered the route. After some little delay the major general commanding returned, and directed a countermarch and the command was marched to the left [along Herr Ridge] beyond the point at which we had before halted, and thence under cover of the woods [to and along Willoughby Run] to the right of our line of battle. Arriving at the schoolhouse [Pitzer's] on the road leading across the Emmitsburg road by the peach orchard, then in possession of the enemy, the lieutenant general commanding directed me to advance my brigade and attack the enemy at that point, turn his flank, and extend along the crossroad [Wheatfield road], with my left resting toward the Emmitsburg road.

The approach of *Longstreet's* troops to the new position is described in *Pendleton's* report given above. *McLaws' division* was deployed in two lines astride the Pitzer schoolhouse road, and *Hood's division*, in two lines astride the Emmitsburg road. Of *Longstreet's* artillery there were 62 guns on the ground; 18 with each division and 26 [*Alexander's battalion*] in reserve.

As has been previously stated, Meade's attention had been riveted on his right wing and he had given little attention to the wing that was about to be attacked. Probably because his horses and men were worn out by previous scouting and because he ex-

pected to be relieved that day, Buford had not pushed to the front that morning with his accustomed energy and had not discovered the large Confederate force that was threatening Meade's left wing. Through some misunderstanding, just as *R. H. Anderson's* division deployed and *Longstreet* began to move from Herr Ridge, Buford was sent to Taneytown en route to Winchester for supplies, etc. Meade discovered this too late to have him recalled; it left the III corps on that flank without cavalry.

In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Meade says:

I had sent instructions in the morning to Gen. Sickles, directing him to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the II corps, and I had indicated to him in general terms that his right was to rest upon Gen. Hancock's left and his left was to extend to the Round Top Mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it. During the morning I sent a staff officer to Gen. Sickles to inquire whether he was in position. The reply was returned to me that Gen. Sickles said there was no position there. I then sent back to him my general instructions, which had been previously given. A short time afterwards Gen. Sickles came to my headquarters and I told him what my general views were, and intimated that he was to occupy the position that I understood Gen. Hancock had put Gen. Geary in the night previous. Gen. Sickles replied that Gen. Geary had no position, as far as he could understand. He then said to me that there was in the neighborhood of where his corps was some very good ground for artillery, and he should like to have some staff officer of mine go out there and see as to the posting of the artillery. He also asked me whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such manner as in his judgment he should deem the most suitable. I answered Gen. Sickles, "Certainly, within the limits of the general instructions I have given you; any ground within those limits you choose to occupy I leave to you". And I directed Gen. Hunt, my chief of artillery, to accompany Gen. Sickles and examine and inspect such positions as Gen. Sickles thought good for artillery, and to give Gen. Sickles the benefit of his judgment.

It was about 11 a. m. when Gen. Sickles visited Meade, at which time no Confederates had appeared in force on Seminary Ridge south of *Pender's* division. Two things are apparent from Meade's testimony, viz.: Meade was not expecting an attack to be made on Sickles' corps, and Sickles felt himself incompetent to post his troops properly on the line that had been indicated to him by Meade's orders.

As Sickles' corps was only a mile from Meade's headquarters, Meade would certainly have gone over there himself or would have sent his chief engineer to mark the line, had he thought the matter of great importance. Hunt was only to advise Sickles as to the disposition of his artillery and had no authority beyond that. Furthermore, since Meade had fixed the flanks of Sickles' line he did not think that Sickles had much of a problem, especially as the commander of his 2d division was an accomplished engineer in whom Meade had great confidence.

Birney's division of Sickles' corps encamped in the open ground between two branches of Plum Run, north of the Wheatfield road on the evening of the 1st, and on the morning of the 2d, this division was deployed on this ground.

Birney reports:

At 7:00 a. m., under orders from Maj. Gen. Sickles, I relieved Geary's division and formed a line, resting its left on the Sugar Loaf Mountain and the right thrown in a direct line toward the cemetery, connecting on the right with the 2d division of this corps. My picket line was in the Emmitsburg road, with sharpshooters some 300 yards in advance.

The chief of artillery of the III corps says of this position:

Early in the morning of July 2, Randolph's and Clark's batteries were placed in position on the line held by Gen. Birney's division, running from near the left of the II corps to the base of Signal or Round Top Mountain. The positions of both were low, unprotected and commanded by the ridge along which runs the road from Emmitsburg to Gettysburg. Seeley's battery remained in the field where it had encamped and as there were no desirable positions on our part of the line, Smith's and Winslow's batteries on their arrival from Emmitsburg [with the brigades of de Trobriand and Burling at 9 a. m.] were parked near Seeley's until some better disposition could be made.

Humphreys reports:

At an early hour of the morning, my division was massed in the vicinity of its bivouac, facing the Emmitsburg road near the crest of the ridge running from the cemetery of Gettysburg in a southerly direction to a rugged conical-shaped hill, which I find goes by the name of Round Top, about two miles from Gettysburg.

At 9:00 a. m., the 3rd brigade with Smith's battery joined the division, having been ordered up by Maj. Gen. Meade, commanding the army.

Had Sickles been experienced in the art of intrenching a position, he would have moved Birney's division back to the ridge occupied by Humphreys, thus connecting the II corps with Little Round Top, and would have organized his position as Slocum did the more difficult one of the XII corps. A brigade could have been assigned to Big Round Top.

As soon as the corps was established on its new line, a strong force was detailed for the construction of breastworks and abatis, which subsequently proved of great value.—Slocum's report.

In looking for good positions for his artillery, Sickles ascended the western slope of Plum Run valley, and found himself on the Emmitsburg road, where he had an outpost line. It was this line that he later showed to Hunt. Hunt pointed out some of its defects but did not advise him to remain behind Plum Run. He seems to have left Sickles under the impression that the line had its good points, but that Hunt could not authorize him to occupy it; Sickles must wait for orders from Meade. In the meantime, at Hunt's suggestion, Sickles sent forward a detachment to reconnoiter the woods on Snyder Ridge.

The commander of the reconnoitering detachment reports:

I moved down the Emmitsburg road some distance beyond our extreme left and deployed in a line running nearly east and west, and moved forward in a northerly direction parallel with the Emmitsburg road. We soon came upon the enemy and drove them sufficiently to discover three columns in motion in rear of the woods, changing direction, as it were, by the right flank. We attacked them vigorously on the flank, and from our having come upon them very unexpectedly and getting close upon them, we were enabled to do great execution and threw them for a time into confusion. They [*Wilcox's* brigade] soon rallied however and attacked us, when having accomplished the object of the reconnaissance, I withdrew under cover of the woods [on Snyder Ridge] and reported to Maj. Gen. Birney the result of our operations.

When Birney reported to Sickles that Confederate troops were in Spangler's woods and were moving into the woods on Snyder Ridge, the latter decided that the position he then occupied in the low ground near Plum Run was wholly untenable. The enemy might at any moment drive the outposts off the Emmitsburg road and establish his guns there. Having failed to dis-

cover and intrench the line that Meade had intended him to occupy farther to the rear, Sickles saw no other way out of his dilemma than to move forward to within supporting distance of his outpost line on the Emmitsburg road, and protect his left flank by occupying the wood along the west branch of Plum Run, between Devil's Den and what is now the Loop.

Birney reports:

Communicating this important information to Maj. Gen. Sickles, I was ordered by that officer to change my front to meet the attack. I did this by advancing my left 500 yards and swinging around the right so as to rest on the Emmitsburg road at the peach orchard. My line was formed with Ward on the left, de Trobriand in the center and Graham on my right, in the peach orchard, with his right on the Emmitsburg road.

Humphreys reports:

Shortly after midday I was ordered to form my division in line of battle, my left joining the right of the 1st division of the III corps, and my right resting opposite the left of Gen. Caldwell's division of the II corps, which was massed on the crest near my place of bivouac. The line I was directed to occupy was near the foot of the westerly slope of the ridge I have already mentioned, from which foot-slope the ground rose to the Emmitsburg road which runs on the crest of a ridge nearly parallel to the Round Top ridge. This second ridge declines again immediately west of the road at the distance of 200 or 300 yards from which the edge of a wood runs parallel to it. This wood (Spangler's) was occupied by the enemy, whose pickets were exchanging shots from an early hour in the morning with our pickets thrown out beyond the road on the westerly slope.

The front allotted to me admitted my forming the 1st brigade in line of battle; the 2d brigade was formed in line of battalions in mass, 200 yards in rear of the first; the 3d was massed 200 yards in rear of the second, opposite the center. Seeley's battery, 4th U. S. Art'y, was placed at my disposal.

Shortly after these dispositions were made, I was directed to move my 3d brigade to the rear of the right of Gen. Birney's division, and make it subject to his order for support, which was accordingly done.

It will be observed that Humphreys' division was not as far advanced as Graham's brigade at the Peach Orchard.

The chief of artillery of the III corps reports:

Between 1 and 2 p. m., Maj. Gen. Sickles notified me that he was about to change his line, throwing his right forward to the high ground, running his line from Round Top Mountain on

his left, to a peach orchard on the Emmitsburg road and thence along the road toward Gettysburg to a second orchard.

I placed Smith's battery near the extreme left on a rocky hill [Devil's Den] commanding a long valley running toward Emmitsburg. On the right of Smith's, after passing a belt of woods, was an opening [the Wheatfield] in which I placed Winslow's battery. This position was surrounded by woods, but in my opinion, the line was materially strengthened by this battery of short range guns. In the open field with his left resting near the woods, I placed Biglow's battery from the Artillery Reserve; on his right, Clark's, and next, in the peach orchard, Ames of the Artillery Reserve. These three batteries fronted toward Emmitsburg, or in the direction from which the attack of the enemy was expected and afterward received. Randolph's battery was placed on the Emmitsburg road fronting nearly perpendicular to those before mentioned; and still farther to the right and near the extreme right of the line held by the corps, was Seeley's.

The defects of the position were: its length was too great for the number of troops in the III corps; both flanks were in the air; there was a gap of a quarter of a mile of open ground between the brigades along the Emmitsburg road and those in the woods facing the west branch of Plum Run; and Snyder Ridge offered an excellent position for the development of an artillery line for attacking the brigade in the Peach Orchard, since it was but 600 yards from it.

It was perhaps 3 p. m., and while he was still adjusting his line, that Sickles was called to a conference of the corps commanders at Meade's headquarters. Just as he arrived there, guns were heard on his front. This was probably an artillery duel between one of *Anderson's* and one of Sickles' batteries. The conference was adjourned, Sickles returned to his corps, and Sykes, who had been ordered to move the V corps from Rock Creek to the rear of Sickles to make room for the VI corps, joined his corps and started with his 1st division.

It was now that Meade, for the first time, rode out to Sickles' position and discovered that he was far in front of the line he was directed to occupy. Although it was more than an hour before the actual battle began, the artillery was already engaged; Meade therefore decided that it would be better to attempt to hold the new position of Sickles' corps than to attempt to with-

draw it in the presence of the enemy. He notified Sickles that he would direct Sykes to support him with the entire V corps as soon as it arrived, and that Hancock would be directed to send Caldwell's division to report to Sykes.

It was probably about this time that Humphreys was directed to send his 3d brigade to reinforce Birney; a little later, about 4 p. m., Humphreys was directed to advance his division to the Emmitsburg road.

In his inspection of Sickles' position, Meade was accompanied by Hunt, his chief of artillery, and by Warren, his chief engineer. When Meade left to confer with his other corps commanders, these remained.

Hunt inspected the line with the chief of artillery of the III corps, and sent to the Reserve Artillery for a brigade to assist the batteries of that corps.

Warren rode up on Little Round Top, and looking across the valley of Plum Run saw the fringe of trees on Snyder Ridge. He sent an orderly down to the battery on Devil's Den and requested that some shots be fired into the woods. This caused a commotion in Hood's division and disclosed its presence. As there were no Union troops on Little Round Top, save some signal troops, Warren sent one of his staff officers to ask Sickles for a brigade for this point. Sickles had none to send; about this time, however, Sykes reached the Wheatfield with Barnes' division and upon learning of Warren's request sent the officer to Barnes with instructions to send Warren a brigade. Barnes was inspecting the front and could not be found, but Vincent, who happened to be the senior officer present, at once started with his brigade for Little Round Top and passing around its eastern slope reached its west end.

Finding de Trobriand's position the weakest part of Sickles' line, Sykes placed the other two brigades of Barnes' division in the woods near the Loop. While these changes were being effected, Longstreet's two divisions were coming into position on Snyder Ridge, the Union batteries were firing on any target which presented itself and the Confederate batteries replied as

they got into position. Hood's division was in position long enough to send patrols to the top of Big Round Top before the battle began.

Attack of the Confederate Right.—The general orders given to Longstreet for his attack, were to make a wheel with his corps from Snyder Ridge to the Wheatfield road, and sweep up the valley of Plum Run. Anderson was to join in the attack when the fight reached him. The Confederate infantry attack naturally developed into a number of more or less separate engagements, as different brigades took different objectives. 107-22

The extreme right of Hood's division struck Little Round Top; Hood's center and left and McLaws' right and center were engaged in the woods that connect Devil's Den with the Peach Orchard; McLaws' left attacked Graham's brigade at the Peach Orchard.

Hood's division, on the extreme right of the Confederate line, was first to move; part of the division marched for the signal station on Little Round Top and part for the Union battery on Devil's Den, both of which were conspicuous objects. In crossing the valley and through the woods, the brigades of Law and Robertson combined in such a manner that one-half of Robertson's brigade inclosed by halves of Law's brigade advanced on Little Round Top, while the other half of Robertson's brigade attacked Ward's brigade in the woods to the front and west of Devil's Den. Hood was wounded early in the battle and the command of the division fell to Law.

The Confederates approached Little Round Top from the south and southeast and were met by Vincent's brigade, which Vincent had skilfully posted near the base of the knoll. Being repulsed by Vincent in a first assault, the Confederates withdrew and prepared to outflank Vincent's brigade. Warren had remained on Little Round Top, but his attention being attracted to other points of the field, he was not aware that Vincent was engaged. When the Confederates made their second attack and he saw them making their way along the west slope of Little Round Top, he rode away in search of troops and found his old brigade (Weed's), of the 2d division of the V corps, just passing westward

across the ridge north of Little Round Top. He requested one of the colonels to bring his regiment up at once. With the assistance of this regiment, Vincent's brigade warded off the last attack made on Little Round Top. About the same time Hazlett's battery of the V corps was brought up on the knoll, and later in the day the rest of Weed's brigade. Little Round Top was, however, a conspicuous point for Confederate sharpshooters around Devil's Den, and both Weed and Hazlett were killed there. Vincent was mortally wounded in the fighting of his brigade.

When Hood's division moved to the attack some time after 4 p. m., the Union line from Devil's Den to the Loop consisted of Ward's brigade with part of de Trobriand's, behind a stone wall in the woods along the west branch of Plum Run, and Barnes' two brigades near the Loop with the remainder of de Trobriand's brigade in support.

A part of Robertson's brigade with the brigades of Benning and Anderson advanced on Devil's Den, encountering Ward. After making a stubborn resistance, Ward was driven back up the slope and the guns on Devil's Den were captured by the Confederates. Caldwell's division of the II corps had now reached the Wheatfield, and Ayres' division of the V corps was just west of Plum Run on the Wheatfield road. The three brigades of Hood's division were therefore checked by Caldwell and Ayres, while Barnes attacked their left flank.

At this stage of the battle, Kershaw's brigade attacked Barnes and was repulsed. He was then reinforced by Semmes and later by Wofford, while Barnes received support from Caldwell and de Trobriand.

The Union troops in this part of the field did not retire from the woods near the Loop nor from the Wheatfield, until all the Union troops north of the Wheatfield road were falling back to the ridge east of Plum Run.

Graham's brigade on the Emmitsburg road was posted on open ground and was exposed to the fire of 36 pieces of artillery from front and flanks. After suffering from this fire for a long time, it gave way about 6 p. m. when assaulted by Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division supported by Wofford's brigade, and could not be

reformed. There was now a gap in the Union line between Barnes' division of the V corps and Humphreys' division of the III corps, which widened as Humphreys swung back his left flank. While Barksdale was pressing on through this gap, the brigades of Wilcox, Perry and Wright attacked Humphreys' front.

All of the Union troops south of the gap now began to fall back behind Plum Run, pursued by the brigades of Wofford, Kershaw, Semmes, G. T. Anderson, Benning and Robertson; the 3d division of the V corps had in the meantime come up and the pursuit was stopped at Plum Run.

About this time Sickles was seriously wounded and Meade, who was on the field, directed Hancock to assume command of the III corps in addition to his own, and check the retreat. Hancock moved the reserve brigades of the divisions of Gibbon and Hays to the left and Newton sent him Doubleday's division. With these troops Hancock checked the advance of the Confederate brigades of Barksdale, Wilcox, Perry and Wright, while Sykes checked the advance of the divisions of Hood and McLaws. Brigades of the VI and XII corps also reached the field towards the close of the engagement.

Most of the Confederate brigades got no farther than Plum Run, but Wright's brigade actually reached the batteries of the line of the II corps; it was driven back by Doubleday. In repelling the attack on his front, Hancock was wounded.

The battle on the Union left closed about dark and during the night the Union line was intrenched and extended to the top of Big Round Top. The Confederates remained west of Plum Run except at Big Round Top where they intrenched along its western slope.

In this engagement, the infantry force actually engaged in making the attack and the infantry force employed in defending the line of the III corps, were about equal. The other Union forces came to the aid of the defenders only when the latter reached Plum Run.

The Attack by Ewell's Corps.—In his report, *Ewell* says—

Early in the morning I received a communication from the commanding general, the tenor of which was that he intended the

main attack to be made by the First corps on our right, and wished me as soon as our guns opened to make a diversion in their favor, to be converted into a real attack, if opportunity offered.

As the three divisions of *Ewell's* corps were separated from each other by the town and by Rock Creek, each division selected a different objective. *Johnson's* division selected Culp Hill, *Early's* division selected east Cemetery Hill, and *Rodes'* division selected west Cemetery Hill.

Johnson reports:

Early next morning, skirmishers from *Walker's* and *Jones'* brigades were advanced for the purpose of feeling the enemy, and desultory firing was maintained with their skirmishers until 4 p. m., at which hour I ordered *Major Latimer* to open fire with all his pieces from the only eligible hill within range, *Jones'* brigade being properly disposed as a support. The hill [Benner Hill] was directly in front of the wooded mountain [Culp Hill] and a little to the left of the Cemetery Hill; consequently exposed to the concentrated fire from both, and also to an enfilade fire from a battery near the Baltimore road. The unequal contest was maintained for two hours with considerable damage to the enemy, as will appear from the accompanying report of Lieut. Col. *Andrews*. Maj. *Latimer* having reported to me that the exhausted condition of his horses and men, together with the terrible fire of the enemy's artillery, rendered his position untenable, he was ordered to cease firing and withdraw all of his pieces except four, which were left in position to cover the advance of my infantry.

In obedience to an order from the lieutenant general commanding, I then advanced my infantry to the assault of the enemy's strong position—a rugged and rocky mountain, heavily timbered and difficult of ascent; a natural fortification, rendered more formidable by deep intrenchments and thick abatis—*Jones'* brigade in advance, followed by *Nicholls'* and *Stewart's*. Gen. *Walker* was directed to follow, but reporting to me that the enemy [Gregg's cavalry division] were advancing upon him from their right, he was ordered to repulse them and follow on as soon as possible.

The opposing force was larger and the time consumed longer than was anticipated, in consequence of which General *Walker* did not arrive in time to participate in the assault that night.

By the time my other brigades had crossed Rock Creek and reached the base of the mountain, it was dark. His skirmishers were driven in and the attack made with great vigor and spirit. It was as successful as could have been expected, considering the superiority of the enemy's force and position. *Steuart's* brigade, on the left, carried a line of breastworks which ran perpendicular

to the enemy's main line, captured a number of prisoners and a stand of colors, and the whole line advanced to within short range, and kept up a heavy fire until late in the night. Brig. Gen. *Jones* and Col. *Higginbotham*, Twenty-fifth Virginia, were wounded in this assault and the command of *Jones'* brigade devolved upon Lieut. Col. *Dungan*.

The defense of Culp Hill is given in the report of Brig. Gen. George S. Greene, the commander of the 3d brigade, 2d division, XII corps:

On the 2d, we took position at about 6 a. m. on the right of the I corps on the crest of the steep and rocky hill [Culp Hill] being thrown back nearly at right angles with the line of the I corps, Rock Creek running past our front at the distance of 200 to 400 yards. Our position and the front were covered with a heavy growth of timber, free from undergrowth, with large ledges of rock projecting above the surface. These rocks and trees offered good cover for marksmen. The surface was very steep on our left, diminishing to a gentle slope on our right. The 2d brigade was on our right, thrown forward at a right angle to conform to the crest of the hill. On the right of this brigade was the 1st (Williams) division, his right resting on an impassable mill-pond on Rock Creek. As soon as we were in position, we began to intrench ourselves, and throw up breastworks of the covering height, of logs, cord-wood, stones and earth. The same was done by the troops on my right.

By 12 o'clock we had a good cover for the men. The value of this defense was shown in our subsequent operations by our small loss compared with that of the enemy during the continuous attacks by a vastly superior force. Our skirmishers were thrown out immediately on taking position, and moved toward the creek in our front, when they came to the enemy's pickets.

We remained in this position, with occasional firing of the pickets until 6.30 p. m., when the 1st (Williams) division and the 1st and 2d brigades of the 2d division were ordered from my right, leaving the intrenchments unoccupied on the withdrawal of the troops.

I received orders to occupy the whole of the intrenchments previously occupied by the XII Army corps with my brigade. This movement was commenced, and the 137th N. Y. regiment, on my right, was moved into the position occupied by the 2d brigade. Before any further movements could be made, we were attacked on the whole of our front by a large force a few minutes before 7 p. m. The enemy made four distinct charges between 7 and 9.30 p. m., which were effectually resisted.

As soon as the attack commenced I sent to Gen. Wadsworth, commanding the division of the I corps on our left, and to Gen.

Howard, commanding the XI corps, posted on the left of the I corps, for assistance, to which they promptly responded by sending to my support about 355 men from the I corps and about 400 men from the XI corps.

These regiments rendered good service, being sent into the trenches to relieve our regiments, as their ammunition was exhausted and their muskets required cleaning. At the close of this night attack, we occupied all the trenches of the 3d brigade.

About 10 o'clock [p. m.] I was informed that [Col. Cobham] with the 2d brigade was returning to his position, and immediately sent a staff officer to advise him that the enemy were in his intrenchments, and to bring him round by the rear to my right.

Early reports:

Having been informed that a large portion of the rest of our army would come up during the night [July 1-2], and that the enemy's position would be attacked on the right and left flanks very early next morning, I gave orders to Gen. *Hays* to move his brigade under cover of night from the town into the field in front of the left of the town, to a place where he would not be exposed to the enemy's fire, and would be in position to advance upon Cemetery Hill when a favorable opportunity should occur. This movement was made, and *Hays* formed his brigade on the right of *Avery* and just behind the extension of the low ridge on which the town is located. The attack did not begin in the morning, as was expected, and in the course of the morning I rode with Gen. *Ewell* to examine a position for the artillery on the left.

The fire from the artillery having opened on the right and left at 4 o'clock, and continued for some time, I was ordered by Gen. *Ewell* to advance upon Cemetery Hill with my two brigades that were in position as soon as Gen. *Johnson's* division, which was on my left, should become engaged at the wooded hill on the left, which it was about to attack, information being given me that the advance would be general, and made also by *Rodes'* division and *Hill's* divisions on my right.

Accordingly, as soon as *Johnson* became warmly engaged, which was a little before dusk, I ordered *Hays* and *Avery* to advance and carry the works on the heights in front. These troops advanced in gallant style to the attack, passing over the ridge in front of them under a heavy artillery fire and then crossing a hollow between that and Cemetery Hill, and moving up this hill in the face of at least two lines of infantry posted behind plank and stone fences; but these they drove back, and, passing over all obstacles, they reached the crest of the hill, and entered the enemy's breastworks crowning it, getting possession of one or two batteries. But no attack was made on the immediate right, as was expected, and not meeting with support from that quarter, these brigades could not hold the position they had attained, be-

cause a very heavy force of the enemy was turned against them from that part of the line which the divisions on the right were to have attacked, and these two brigades had, therefore, to fall back, which they did with comparatively slight loss, considering the nature of the ground over which they had to pass and the immense odds opposed to them, and *Hays'* brigade brought off four stand of captured colors.

Howard reports:

On the morning of July 2, about 3 a. m., the commanding general, who had previously arrived, met me at the cemetery gate, questioned me about the preceding day, and rode with me over the position then held by our troops. The XI corps was disposed with its center near the Baltimore pike—the 1st division, Gen. Ames, on the right; 3d division, Gen. Schurz, in the center, and the 2d division, Gen. Steinwehr, on the left. The batteries of the I and XI corps were united, being put in position with regard to the kind of gun. Colonel Wainwright, chief of artillery I corps, took charge of all batteries to the right of the pike, Major Osborn, of the XI, all batteries in the cemetery grounds to the left of the pike. Very little occurred while the other corps were coming into position until about 4 p. m. Just before this, orders had been issued to the division commanders to make ready for battle, as the enemy were reported advancing on our left. Now the enemy opened from some dozen batteries to our right and front [Benner Hill] bringing a concentrated fire upon our position. The batteries of Wainwright and Osborn replied with great spirit. Artillery projectiles often struck among the men, but in no case did a regiment break, though suffering considerably.

About 6:30 p. m. I sent word to Gen. Meade that the enemy's batteries on our extreme right had been silenced or withdrawn. After the cannonading had ceased, and the enemy's infantry attack upon the left had been repulsed, another attack, said to be by *Rodes'* division, commenced between 7 and 8 p. m., beginning between Gens. Slocum and Wadsworth, and extending along the front of Ames to the town of Gettysburg.

The attack was so sudden and violent that the infantry in front of Ames was giving way. In fact at one moment the enemy had got within the batteries. A request for assistance had already gone to headquarters, so that promptly a brigade of the II corps, under Colonel Carroll, moved to Ames' right, deployed and went into position just in time to check the enemy's advance. At Wiedrich's battery, Gen. Ames, by extraordinary exertions, arrested a panic, and the men with sponge-staffs and bayonets forced the enemy back. This furious onset was met and withstood at every point, and lasted less than an hour.

At 9:30 p. m. the old position was resumed by the regiments of my corps Colonel Carroll remaining between Ames and Wadsworth.

Rodes reports:

On July 2, nothing of importance transpired in my front. The rest of the men generally was only disturbed by the occasional skirmishing and desultory firing of the opposing sharpshooters; but *Daniel's* brigade, which had been early in the morning moved by my order so as to connect with *Pender's* division, on the crest of the ridge before spoken of, was subjected to a galling artillery fire, especially in the afternoon. Late in the afternoon, however, an attack was made upon the enemy's position by some troops of the right wing of the army, which produced some stir among the enemy in my immediate front, and seemed to cause there a diminution of both artillery and infantry.

Orders given during the afternoon, and after the engagement had opened on the right, required me to co-operate with the attacking force as soon as any opportunity of doing so with good effect was offered. Seeing the stir alluded to, I thought that opportunity had come, and immediately sought Gen. *Early*, with a view of making an attack in concert with him. He agreed with me as to the propriety of attacking, and made preparations accordingly. I hastened to inform the officer commanding the troops on my right (part of *Pender's* division) that in accordance with our plan, I would attack just at dark, and proceeded to make my arrangements; but having to draw my troops out of town by the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then to traverse a distance of 1200 or 1400 yards, while Gen. *Early* had to move only half that distance without change of front, the result was that, before I drove the enemy's skirmishers in, Gen. *Early* had attacked and had been compelled to withdraw.

After driving in the enemy's skirmishers, the advance line was halted by Gen. *Ramseur*, who commanded the right brigade, to enable him to report to me certain important facts (for statement of which I refer to his report) he had discovered as to the nature of the ground and of the defenses. These facts, together with *Early's* withdrawal, of which I had been officially informed, and the increased darkness, convinced me that it would be a useless sacrifice of life to go on, and a recall was ordered. But instead of falling back to the original line, I caused the front line to assume a strong position in the plain to the right of the town, along the hollow of an old road bed. This position was much nearer the enemy, was clear of the town, and was one from which I could readily attack without confusion. The second line was placed in the position originally held by the first. Everything was gotten ready to attack at daylight; but a short time after assuming this new position, I was ordered to send without delay all the troops

I could spare without destroying my ability to hold my position, to reinforce Maj. Gen. *Johnson*. As my front line was much more strongly posted than my second and was fully competent to hold the position, and as the reinforcements had to be in position before daylight, I was compelled to send to Gen. *Johnson* the troops of my second line, viz., the brigades of *Daniel* and *O'Neal* (excepting the Fifth Alabama).

Two brigades of *Pender's* division that advanced to protect *Rodes'* right flank, remained with him in the sunken lane during July 3.

Battle of July 3.—After the battle of the 2d, Meade sent the following message to Halleck:

July 2, 1863, 8 p. m.—The enemy attacked me about 4 p. m. this day, and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded. Among the former are Brig. Gens. Paul and Zook, and among the wounded are Gens. Sickles, Barlow, Graham and Warren slightly. We have taken a large number of prisoners. I shall remain in my present position to-morrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defensive character.

At a conference with his corps commanders later in the evening, the sentiment was in favor of a defensive battle. It was with this object in view, therefore, that the disposition of the troops was made. The XII corps was to regain and reoccupy its lines; the XI corps, strengthened by a brigade of the II corps, which joined it to repel *Early's* attack, was left in position; Doubleday's division of the I corps, which had taken the position of *Caldwell's* division on the left of the II corps, was left there and Caldwell was assigned to support the artillery reserve which was in position on the left of Doubleday. The remaining divisions of the I and II corps remained in the positions they had occupied on the morning of the 2d. The V corps formed line from the artillery reserve to Big Round Top; it was protected by stone breastworks, thrown up during the night. Some of the brigades of the VI corps were employed as local reserves and others to protect the flanks of the line. The III corps was posted in rear of the center as a general reserve.

In his report, *Lee* says of July 2:

In this engagement our loss in men and officers was large. Maj. Gens. *Hood* and *Pender*, Brig. Gens. *Jones*, *Semmes*, *G. T. Anderson* and *Barksdale* and Col. *Avery* commanding *Hoke's* brigade, were wounded, the last two mortally.

The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. *Longstreet*, reinforced by *Pickett's* three brigades—which arrived near the battlefield during the afternoon of the 2d—was ordered to attack the next morning, and Gen. *Ewell* was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. The latter during the night reinforced Gen. *Johnson* with two brigades from *Rodes'* and one from *Early's* division.

It would appear from this report that *Lee* intended to make the assault early in the morning, and instructions to that effect seem to have been given *Ewell* that night, as confirmed by the report of *Ewell*.

Engagement on the Confederate Right.—*Ewell* reports:

I was ordered to renew my attack at daylight Friday morning, and as *Johnson's* position was the only one affording hopes of doing this to advantage, he was reinforced by *Smith's* brigade of *Early's* division, and *Daniel's* and *Rodes'* (old) [*O'Neal's*] brigades of *Rodes'* division.

The initiative at this point was not left to the Confederates, for the commander of the XII corps had already decided to recapture his abandoned works.

Slocum says:

Orders were at once issued for an attack at daybreak, for the purpose of regaining that portion of the line which had been lost. The artillery of the XII corps was placed in position during the night and opened the battle at 4 a. m. on the following morning, and during the entire engagement all the batteries rendered most valuable aid to our cause.

The enemy had been reinforced during the night, and were fully prepared to resist our attack. The force opposed to us, it is said, belonged to the corps under Gen. *Ewell*, formerly under Gen. *Jackson*, and they certainly fought with a determination and valor which has ever characterized the troops of this well known corps. We were reinforced during the engagement by *Shaler's* brigade of the VI corps, and by two regiments from Gen. *Wadsworth's*

division of the I corps, and also by Neill's brigade of the VI corps, which was moved across Rock Creek and placed in position to protect our extreme right. All these troops did excellent service.

The engagement continued until 10:30 a. m., and resulted in our regaining possession of our entire line of intrenchments and driving the enemy back of the position originally held by him; in the capture of over 500 prisoners in addition to the large number of wounded left on the field, besides several thousand stand of arms and three stand of colors. Our own loss in killed and wounded was comparatively light, as most of our troops were protected by breastworks.

The portion of the field occupied by the enemy presented abundant evidence of the bravery and determination with which the conflict was waged. The field of battle at this point was not as extended as that on the left of our line, nor was the force engaged as heavy as that brought into action on that part of the line. Yet Gen. Geary states that over 900 of the enemy's dead were buried by our own troops and a large number left unburied, marching orders having been received before the work was completed.

Johnson reports:

Early the next morning [July 3], the *Stonewall* brigade [*Walker*] was ordered to the support of the others, and the assault was renewed with great determination. Shortly after, the enemy moved forward to recapture the line of breastworks which had been taken the night previous, but was repulsed with great slaughter. *Daniel's* and *Rodes'* [*O'Neal's*] brigades of *Rodes'* division having reported to me, two other [Confederate] assaults were made; both failed. The enemy were too securely intrenched and in too great numbers to be dislodged by the force at my command.

In the meantime a demonstration in force was made upon my left and rear. The *Stonewall* and *Smith* brigades were disposed to meet and check it, which was accomplished to my entire satisfaction. No further [Confederate] assault was made; all had been done that it was possible to do.

I held my original position [east of Rock Creek] until 10 o'clock of the night of the 3d, when in accordance with orders, I withdrew to the hill north and west of Gettysburg, where we remained until the following day, in the hope that the enemy would give us battle on ground of our own selection.

My loss in this terrible battle was heavy, including some of the most valuable officers of the command.

That *Longstreet* was also informed of the general plan for the day would appear from the account given by Gen. *E. P. Alexander*, in Vol. III, Battles and Leaders.

I then found Gen. *Longstreet*, learned what I could of the fortunes of the day [July 2] on other parts of the field, and got orders for the morning. They were in brief, that our present position was to be held and the attack renewed as soon as *Pickett* arrived, and he was expected early.

At 3 [a. m.] I began to put the batteries in position.

While he seems to have instructed *Alexander* to dispose of the artillery in preparation for a morning assault, *Longstreet* does not seem to have given any corresponding orders to the infantry. *Hood's* division, a part of which was on the slope of Big Round Top, could be of no use in an offensive operation and should have been withdrawn to some position nearer the center of the field. The explanation of this omission seems to be that while *Longstreet* understood that the attack on the right was to be continued on the morning of the 3d, he did not accept the order in the sense in which *Lee* meant it. In his report *Longstreet* says:

On the following morning our arrangements were made for renewing the attack by my right with a view to pass around the hill occupied by the enemy on his left and to gain it by flank and reverse attack.

On the afternoon of the 2d, it had been ascertained that there were no Union troops in rear of Big Round Top, and *Longstreet* probably intended to send *Pickett* around that hill. To cooperate with *Pickett*, *Hood* was left in position.

In the early morning, *Lee* rode down to the right and explained that he wanted *Longstreet* to continue the attack of the preceding day. *Longstreet* now pointed out the difficulty of withdrawing *Hood* in daylight and the danger of exposing him by withdrawing *McLaws*. *Lee* was therefore compelled to substitute an attack by the center for an attack by the right and center. *Heth's* division had moved down to Seminary Ridge the night before and *Longstreet* was directed to make the attack with the divisions of *Pickett*, *Heth*, *Anderson* and one-half of *Pender's* division. In his report, *Longstreet* says:

A few moments after my orders for the execution of this plan [described above] were given, the commanding general joined me and ordered a column of attack to be formed of *Pickett's*, *Heth's* and part of *Pender's* divisions, the assault to be made directly at the enemy's main position, the Cemetery Hill. The distance to be

passed over under the fire of the enemy's batteries and in plain view, seemed too great to insure great results, particularly as two-thirds of the troops to be engaged in the assault had been in a severe battle two days previous, *Pickett's* division alone being fresh.

Orders were given to Maj. Gen. *Pickett* to form his line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position, Gen. *Pickett's* line to be the guide and to attack the line of the enemy's defenses, and Gen. *Pettigrew*, in command of *Heth's* division, moving on the same line as Gen. *Pickett*, was to assault the salient at the same moment. *Pickett's* division was arranged, two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and *Wilcox's* brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it.

Heth's division, under command of Brig. Gen. *Pettigrew*, was arranged in two lines, and these supported by part of Maj. Gen. *Pender's* division, under Maj. Gen. *Trimble*. All of the batteries of the First and Third corps, and some of those of the Second, were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left. Col. *Walton*, chief of artillery of the First corps, and Col. *Alexander* had posted our batteries and agreed with the artillery officers of the other corps upon the signal for the batteries to open.

About 2 p. m. Gen. *Pickett*, who had been charged with the duty of arranging the lines behind our batteries, reported that the troops were in order and on the most sheltered ground. Col. *Walton* was ordered to open the batteries. The signal guns were fired, and all the batteries opened very handsomely and apparently with effective fire. The guns on the hill at the enemy's left were soon silenced. Those at the Cemetery Hill combated us, however, very obstinately. Many of them were driven off, but fresh ones were brought up to replace them. Col. *Alexander* was ordered to a point where he could best observe the effect of our fire, and to give notice of the most opportune moment for our attack.

Some time after our batteries opened fire, I rode to Maj. (*James*) *Dearing's* batteries. It appeared that the enemy put in fresh batteries about as rapidly as others were driven off. I concluded, therefore, that we must attack very soon, if we hoped to accomplish anything before night. I gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition chests, and to be prepared to follow up the advance of the infantry. Upon riding over to Col. *Alexander's* position, I found that he had advised Gen. *Pickett* that the time had arrived for the attack, and I gave the order to Gen. *Pickett* to advance to the assault. I found then that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not reopen. The order for this attack, which I could not favor under better auspices, would have been revoked had I felt that I had that privilege.

The advance was made in very handsome style, all the troops keeping their lines accurately, and taking the fire of the batteries with great coolness and deliberation. About half way between our position and that of the enemy, a ravine partially sheltered our troops from the enemy's fire, where a short halt was made for rest. The advance was resumed after a moment's pause, all still in good order. The enemy's batteries soon opened upon our lines with canister, and the left seemed to stagger under it, but the advance was resumed, and with some degree of steadiness. *Pickett's* troops did not appear to be checked by the batteries, and only halted to deliver a fire when close under musket-range. Maj. Gen. *Anderson's* division was ordered forward to support and assist the wavering columns of *Pettigrew* and *Trimble*.

Pickett's troops, after delivering fire, advanced to the charge, and entered the enemy's lines, capturing some of his batteries, and gained his works. About the same moment, the troops that had before hesitated, broke their ranks and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the enemy's fire in retiring than while they were attacking. This gave the enemy time to throw his entire force upon *Pickett*, with a strong prospect of being able to break up his lines or destroy him before *Anderson's* division could reach him, which would, in its turn, have greatly exposed *Anderson*. He was therefore ordered to halt.

In a few moments the enemy marching against both flanks and the front of *Pickett's* division, overpowered it and drove it back, capturing about half of those of it who were not killed or wounded. Gen. *Wright*, of *Anderson's* division, with all of the officers, was ordered to rally and collect the scattered troops behind *Anderson's* division, and many of my staff officers were sent to assist in the same service. Expecting an attack from the enemy, I rode to the front of our batteries, to reconnoiter and superintend their operations.

The enemy threw forward forces at different times and from different points, but they were only feelers, and retired as soon as our batteries opened upon them. These little advances and checks were kept up till night, when the enemy retired to his stronghold, and my line was withdrawn to the Gettysburg [Emmitsburg] road on the right, the left uniting with Lieut. Gen. A. P. *Hill's* right. After night, I received orders to make all the needful arrangements for our retreat.

Longstreet does not do justice to the troops of *Hill's* corps that took part in this attack. *Pettigrew*, who commanded *Heth's* brigades, was killed in the retreat before he made a report; and *Trimble*, who commanded *Pender's* two brigades, was badly wounded in the attack.

Davis reports:

On the evening of the 2d, this division, under command of Brig. Gen. *J. J. Pettigrew* (Maj. Gen. *Heth* having been wounded in the engagement of the 1st), moved to the front, and was formed in line of battle, with *Archer's* brigade on the right, commanded by Col. *B. D. Fry* (Brig. Gen. *Archer* having been wounded and captured on July 1); Col. *Brockenbrough's* brigade on the left; *Pettigrew's*, commanded by Col. *James K. Marshal* of the 52d North Carolina on the right center, and *Davis'* on the left center, immediately in rear of our artillery, which was in position on the crest of a high ridge running nearly parallel to the enemy's line, which was on a similar elevation and nearly one mile distant, the intervening space excepting the crests of the hills, being fields, intersected by strong post and rail fences. In this position we bivouacked for the night.

Early on the morning of the 3d, the enemy threw some shells at the artillery in our front, from which a few casualties occurred in one of the brigades. About 9 a. m. the division was moved to the left about a quarter of a mile, and in the same order of battle was formed in the rear of Maj. *Pegram's* battalion of artillery, which was posted on the crest of a high hill, the ground between us and the enemy being like that of our first position.

About 1 p. m. the artillery along our entire line opened on the enemy, and was promptly replied to. For two hours the fire was heavy and incessant. Being immediately in the rear of our batteries, and having had no time to prepare means of protection, we suffered some losses. In *Davis'* brigade two men were killed and twenty-one wounded. The order had been given that when the artillery in our front ceased firing, the division would attack the enemy's batteries, keeping dressed to the right, and moving in line with Maj. Gen. *Pickett's* division, which was on our right, and march obliquely to the left.

The artillery ceased firing at 3 o'clock, and the order to move forward was given and promptly obeyed. The division moved off in line, and, passing the wooded crest of the hill, descended to the open fields that lay between us and the enemy. Not a gun was fired at us until we reached a strong post and rail fence about three-quarters of a mile from the enemy's position, when we were met by a heavy fire of grape, canister and shell, which told sadly upon our ranks. Under this destructive fire, which commanded our front and left with fatal effect, the troops displayed great coolness, were well in hand, and moved steadily forward, regularly closing up the gaps made in their ranks. Our advance across the fields was interrupted by other fences of a similar character, in crossing which the alignment became more or less deranged. This was in each case promptly rectified, and though its ranks were growing thinner at every step, this division moved steadily on in

line with the troops on the right. When within musket-range, we encountered a heavy fire of small-arms, from which we suffered severely; but this did not for a moment check the advance.

The right of the division, owing to the conformation of the ridge on which the enemy was posted, having a shorter distance to pass over to reach his first line of defense, encountered him first in close conflict; but the whole division dashed up to his first line of defense—a stone wall—behind which the opposing infantry was strongly posted. Here we were subjected to a most galling fire of musketry and artillery, that so reduced the already thinned ranks that any further effort to carry the position was hopeless, and there was nothing left but to retire to the position originally held, which was done in more or less confusion.

About 4 p. m. the division reached the line held in the morning.

The report of *Archer's* brigade is:

In the engagement of the 3d, the brigade was on the right of our division in the following order: 1st Tennessee on the right; on its left, 13th Alabama; next 14th Tennessee; on its left, 7th Tennessee, and on the left, 5th Alabama Battalion. There was a space of a few hundred yards between the right of *Archer's* brigade and the left of Gen. *Pickett's* division when we advanced, but owing to the position of the lines (they not being an exact continuation of each other), as we advanced the right of our brigade and the left of Gen. *Pickett's* division gradually approached each other, so that by the time we had advanced a little over half of the way, the right of *Archer's* touched and connected with *Pickett's* left.

The command was then passed down the line by the officers, "Guide right;" and we advanced our right, guiding by Gen. *Pickett's* left. The enemy held their fire until we were in fine range, and opened upon us a terrible and well-directed fire. Within 180 or 200 yards of his works, we came to a lane [Emmitsburg road] inclosed by two stout post and plank fences. This was a very great obstruction to us, but the men rushed over as rapidly as they could, and advanced directly upon the enemy's works, the first line of which was composed of rough stones. The enemy abandoned this, but just in rear was massed a heavy force. By the time we had reached this work, our lines all along, as far as I could see, had become very much weakened; indeed the line both right and left, as far as I could observe, seemed to melt away until there was but little of it left. Those who remained at the works saw that it was a hopeless case, and fell back. *Archer's* brigade remained at the works fighting as long as any other troops either on their right or left, so far as I could observe.

Every flag in the brigade excepting one was captured at or within the works of the enemy. The 1st Tennessee had three color-bearers shot down, the last of whom was at the works and the

flag captured; the 13th Alabama lost three in the same way, the last of whom was shot down at the works; the 14th Tennessee had four shot down, the last of whom was at the enemy's works; the 7th Tennessee lost three color-bearers, the last of whom was at the enemy's works, and the flag was only saved by Captain (*A. D.*) *Norris* tearing it away from the staff and bringing it out beneath his coat; the 5th Alabama Battalion also lost their flag.

The report of *Pender's* division is:

During the morning of the 3d, Gen. *Lane* received an order from Lieut. Gen. *Hill* to report in person with the two brigades forming his second line to the right of Lieut. Gen. *Longstreet*, as a support to *Pettigrew*. Gen. *Longstreet* ordered him to form in rear of the right of *Heth's* division, commanded by Gen. *Pettigrew*.


Having executed this order, Gen. *Lane* was relieved of the command by Maj. Gen. *I. R. Trimble*, who acted under the same orders given to Gen. *Lane*.

The two brigades, thus formed as a support to *Pettigrew*, with *Lowrance* to the right, after suffering no little from the two hours' exposure to the heavy artillery fire which preceded the attack on the 3d, advanced in close supporting distance of *Pettigrew's* line, Gen. *Trimble*, with portions of his own and Gen. *Pender's* staff, being with and taking immediate command of the movement. The line moved forward through the woods into the open field about one mile, in full view of the fortified position of the enemy, exposed to a murderous artillery and infantry fire in front, a severe artillery fire from the right, and an enfilade fire of musketry from the left. The line moved forward handsomely and firmly. The division in front gaining ground to the right, uncovered the left of *Lane's* brigade, which caused it to advance more rapidly than the rest of the line, which was checked by an order from Gen. *Trimble*.

When within a few hundred yards of the enemy's works, the line in front being entirely gone, the division moved rapidly up, connecting with the troops on the right, still stubbornly contesting the ground with the enemy, reserving their fire until within easy range, and then opening with telling effect, driving the artillerists from their guns, completely silencing them, and breaking the line of infantry supports formed on the crest of the hill. All the guns in the immediate front of the division were silenced, and the infantry had fallen behind their second and third lines of defense, when the division, advancing in an oblique direction, the extreme right of which had reached the works, was compelled to fall back, the troops on the right having already gone, exposing the line to a very deadly fire from that direction immediately on the flank, and, a large column of infantry appearing on the left, that flank also became exposed. The two extreme left regiments of *Lane's*

brigade, under Cols. *Avery* and (*J. D.*) *Barry*, advanced some minutes after the whole line had given way, and fell back, under direct orders.

In the advance, the Confederate line, which started on a front of about a mile gradually closed in on the center until the front was contracted to an eighth of a mile when it reached the Union line. The final situation is shown on the following diagram:



The main attack fell on Webb's brigade, which had only three regiments that day, two along a low stone wall in front and one in reserve. Cushing's battery was on Webb's front. Webb reports:

About 1 p. m. the enemy opened with more than twenty batteries upon our line. By 2:45 o'clock he had silenced the Rhode Island battery and all the guns but one of Cushing's battery, and had plainly shown by his concentration of fire on this and the 3d brigade that an important assault was to be expected.

I had sent, at 2 p. m., Capt. Banes, assistant adjutant general of the brigade, for two batteries to replace Cushing's and Brown's. Just before the assault, Capt. Wheeler's (Cowan's) battery, 1st New York Artillery (1st New York Independent Battery), had gotten in position on the left, in the place occupied by the Rhode Island battery, which had retired with a loss of all its officers but one.

At 3 o'clock the enemy's line of battle left the woods in our front; moved in perfect order across the Emmitsburg road; formed in the hollow in our immediate front several lines of battle, under a fire of spherical case from Wheeler's (Cowan's) battery and Cushing's guns, and advanced for the assault.

The 71st Penn. was advanced to the wall on the right of the 69th Penn. Three of Cushing's guns were run down to the fence, carrying with them their canister. The 72d Penn. was held in reserve under the crest of the hill. The enemy advanced steadily to the fence, driving out a portion of the 71st Penn. Gen. *Armistead* passed over the fence with probably over 100 of his com-

mand and with several battle flags. The 72d Penn. was ordered up to hold the crest, and advanced to within forty paces of the enemy's line. Col. Smith, commanding the 71st Penn., threw two companies of his command behind the stone wall on the right of Cushing's battery, fifty paces retired from the point of attack. This disposition of his troops was most important. Col. Smith showed true military intelligence on the field. The 69th Penn. and most of the 71st Penn., even after the enemy were in their rear, held their position. The 72d Penn. fought steadily and persistently, but the enemy would probably have succeeded in piercing our lines had not Col. Hall advanced with several of his regiments to my support. Defeated, routed, the enemy fled in disorder. Gen. *Armistead* was left, mortally wounded, within my lines, and forty-two of the the enemy who crossed the fence lay dead.

While advancing to the attack, the left flank of *Hill's* troops was attacked by the 8th Ohio, Carroll's brigade, which was posted to the right of Smyth's brigade. Its commander says:

This artillery duel was followed by an immediate advance of two divisions of the enemy's infantry, which advanced at the first in three long lines of battle, but ployed into close column by division as they advanced, excepting, perhaps, a regiment on each flank. The column directed itself upon our battery to my left, and the line on the left flank of the column directly upon my position. I advanced my reserve to the picket front, and as the rebel line came within about 100 yards, we poured in a well-directed fire, which broke the rebel line, and it soon fled in the wildest confusion.

Being relieved from this direction, I changed front forward on the left company, thus presenting our front to the left flank of the advancing rebel column. Our fire was poured into their flank with terrible effect for a few minutes before the 2d brigade [Smyth's] at the battery opened, but almost instantly on the fire from the front, together with the concentrated fire from our batteries, the whole mass gave way, some fleeing to the front, some to the rear, and some through our lines, until the whole plain was covered with unarmed rebels, waving coats, hats and handkerchiefs in token of a wish to surrender.

The right flank of *Pickett's* division was attacked by Stannard's brigade of Doubleday's division, I corps, which was to the left of Hall's brigade. Stannard reports:

As soon as the change of the point of attack became evident, I ordered a flank attack upon the enemy's column. Forming in the open meadow in front of our lines, the 13th [Vt.] changed front forward on first company; the 16th [Vt.] after deploying,

performed the same, and formed on the left of the 13th [Vt.] at right angles to the main line of our army, bringing them in line of battle upon the flank of the charging division of the enemy, and opened a destructive fire at short range, which the enemy sustained but a very few moments before the larger portion of them surrendered and marched in—not as conquerors, but as captives. I then ordered the two regiments into their former position. The order was not filled when I saw another rebel column charging immediately upon our left [*Wilcox's* and *Perry's* brigades]. Col. Veazey, of the 16th [Vt.], was at once ordered to attack it in its turn upon the flank. This was done as successfully as before. The rebel forces already decimated by the fire of the 14th [Vt.], Col. Nichols, were scooped almost *en masse* into our lines. The 16th [Vt.] took in this charge the regimental colors of the 2d Florida and 8th Virginia regiments, and the battle flag of another regiment. The 16th [Vt.] was supported in this new and advanced position by four companies of the 14th [Vt.], under command of Lieut. Col. Rose.

Twenty Confederate regimental colors were captured or picked up by regiments of the II corps near the point where the attack of *Pickett*, *Pettigrew* and *Trimble* was repulsed.

Pickett's right flank was to be supported by the brigades of *Wilcox* and *Perry*, but as they moved straight to the front while *Pickett* obliques to his left, they advanced directly on the position occupied by the reserve artillery of the Union army.

Wilcox reports:

The advance had not been made more than twenty or thirty minutes, before three staff officers in quick succession (one from the major general commanding the division) gave me orders to advance to the support of *Pickett's* division. My brigade, about 1,200 in number, then moved forward in the following order from right to left: 9th, 10th, 11th, 8th, and 14th Ala. regiments. As they advanced, they changed direction slightly to the left, so as to cover in part the ground over which *Pickett's* division had moved. As they came in view on the turnpike, all of the enemy's terrible artillery that could bear on them was concentrated upon them from both flanks and directly in front, and more than on the evening previous. Not a man of the division that I was ordered to support could I see; but as my orders were to go to their support, on my men went down the slope until they came near the hill upon which were the enemy's batteries and intrenchments.

Here they were exposed to a close and terrible fire of artillery. Two lines of the enemy's infantry were seen moving by the flank toward the rear of my left. I ordered my men to hold their ground

until I could get artillery to fire upon them. I then rode back rapidly to our artillery, but could find none near that had ammunition. After some little delay, not getting any artillery to fire upon the enemy's infantry that were on my left flank, and seeing none of the troops that I was ordered to support, and knowing that my small force could do nothing save to make a useless sacrifice of themselves, I ordered them back. The enemy did not pursue. My men, as on the day before, had to retire under a heavy artillery fire. My line was reformed on the ground it occupied before it advanced.

Col. *Long* commanding *Perry's* brigade reports:

Soon after Gen. *Pickett's* troops retired behind our position, Gen. *Wilcox* began to advance, and, in accordance with previous orders to conform to his movements, I moved forward also, under a heavy fire from artillery, but without encountering any infantry until coming to the skirt of woods at the foot of the heights. Just before entering the woods, a heavy body of infantry advanced upon my left flank.

The noise of artillery and small-arms was so deafening that it was impossible to make the voice heard above the din, and the men were by this time so badly scattered in the bushes and among the rocks that it was impossible to make any movement to meet or check the enemy's advance. To remain in this position, unsupported by either infantry or artillery, with infantry on both flanks and in front and artillery playing upon us with grape and canister, was certain annihilation. To advance was only to hasten that result, and, therefore, I ordered a retreat, which, however, was not in time to save a large number of the 2d Florida, together with their colors, from being cut off and captured by the flanking force on the left. Owing to the noise and scattered condition of the men, it was impossible to have the order to retreat properly extended, and I am afraid that many men, while firing from behind rocks and trees, did not hear the order, and remained there until captured.

The flank attack mentioned, was that of Stannard's brigade, quoted above.

The assault of the divisions of *Pickett*, *Heth* and *Pender* was prepared by the fire of 75 guns of *Longstreet's* artillery posted on the divide between Plum and Pitzer runs, and by 63 guns of *A. P. Hill's* corps posted along Seminary Ridge; the left of *Longstreet's* line of guns was opposite the northern end of Spangler's woods and midway between the woods and the Emmitsburg road. In advancing to the attack, the divisions of *Heth* and *Pender* passed to the north of *Longstreet's* guns while those of *Pickett* and *Anderson* marched through the line of guns.

The Union guns bearing on the field of attack were 77; of these 26 were on the front of the II corps and 41 on the front of the Reserve Artillery. The other guns were on Little Round Top and on the front of the XI corps. Some of the batteries on the front of the II corps were replaced by others from the Reserve Artillery after the bombardment and before the infantry attack.

After the repulse, the Confederate troops rallied behind the line of guns and were not pursued. During the attack, *Lee* and *Longstreet* were near the northern side of Spangler's woods and supervised the rallying of their troops.

Towards evening a reconnaissance was made by a brigade of the V corps, supported by two regiments of the VI corps, to see whether the Confederates had evacuated the woods along the west branch of Plum Run. These troops reached and crossed the stream, capturing a number of prisoners of *Hood's* division, which was retiring.

In m.
Cavalry Operations July 1, 2, and 3.—On July 1, Buford's cavalry guarded all the roads leading into Gettysburg until the arrival of the I and XI corps, and on the Mummasburg, Middletown and Heidlersburg roads his patrols encountered *Jenkins'* cavalry and some troops of *W. E. Jones'* brigade which were attached to *Ewell's* corps. Just before the Union infantry fell back on Cemetery Hill, Buford united his division in the valley west of Cemetery Hill and it encamped along Plum Run that night; *Jenkins'* brigade was now the only cavalry on the east flank of the armies. *Jenkins* took possession of Wolf Hill and guarded the left flank of *Ewell's* corps; on Wolf Hill that same afternoon he was attacked by a brigade of the XII corps.

Gregg's cavalry division marched from Manchester to Hanover Junction, thirteen miles east of Hanover, and from that point the 2d brigade was directed to return to Manchester. Kilpatrick's cavalry division made a reconnaissance from Hanover through Abbottstown to Berlin in search of *Stuart*, and then encamped for the night at Abbottstown on the York pike.

Stuart reports:

Reaching Dover, Pa., on the morning of July 1, I was unable to find our forces. The most I could learn was that Gen. *Early*

had marched his division in the direction of Shippensburg, which the best information I could get seemed to indicate as the point of concentration of our troops. After as little rest as was compatible with the exhausted condition of the command, we pushed on for Carlisle where we hoped to find a portion of the army. I arrived before that village, by way of Dillsburg, in the afternoon. Our rations were entirely out. I desired to levy a contribution on the inhabitants for rations, but was informed before reaching it that it was held by a considerable force of militia (infantry and artillery), who were concealed in the buildings, with the view to entrap me upon my entrance into the town. They were frustrated in their intention, and although very peaceable in external aspect, I soon found the information I had received was correct. I disliked to subject the town to the consequences of attack; at the same time it was essential to us to procure rations. I therefore directed (*Fitz*) *Lee* to send in a flag of truce, demanding unconditional surrender or bombardment. This was refused. I placed artillery in position commanding the town, took possession of the main avenues to the place, and repeated the demand. It was again refused, and I was forced to the alternative of shelling the place.

Although the houses were used by their sharpshooters while firing on our men, not a building was fired excepting the United States cavalry barracks, which were burned by my order, the place having resisted my advance instead of peaceable surrender, as in the case of Gen. *Ewell*. Gen. *Fitz Lee's* brigade was charged with the duty of investing the place, the remaining brigades following at considerable intervals from Dover. Maj. Gen. W. F. Smith was in command of the forces in Carlisle. The only obstacle to the enforcement of my threat was the scarcity of artillery ammunition.

The whereabouts of our army was still a mystery; but during the night I received a dispatch from Gen. *Lee* (in answer to one sent by Maj. *Venable* from Dover, on *Early's* trail), that the army was at Gettysburg, and had been engaged this day (July 1) with the enemy's advance. I instantly dispatched to *Hampton* to move ten miles that night on the road to Gettysburg, and gave orders to the other brigades, with a view of reaching Gettysburg early the next day, and started myself that night.

Robertson's and *W. E. Jones's* brigades of *Stuart's* cavalry reached Greencastle, Pa.

July 2.—About noon Buford's cavalry division left the field for Taneytown and there was no cavalry of either army on the south flank during the remainder of that day. *Jenkins's* cavalry brigade was posted to cover *Johnson's* skirmish line guarding the

Hanover road. About noon Gregg's cavalry division reached the vicinity of the battlefield by the Hanover road and deployed a skirmish line in front of that of *Walker's* brigade which guarded *Johnson's* left. Toward evening the skirmish lines became engaged and *Walker* discovered that there were two brigades of cavalry on his flank. Therefore, when the other brigades of *Johnson's* division advanced to attack Culp Hill, *Walker* remained in position and joined the other brigades that night only after the fighting was over. Gregg also withdrew that night to the Baltimore pike, between Rock Creek and Two Taverns.

Kilpatrick's division marched from Abbottstown towards Gettysburg and joined Gregg about 2 p. m.; in accordance with instructions received from Pleasonton to give warning of any turning movement around the right flank of the army, Kilpatrick then proceeded to reconnoiter towards Hunterstown. Custer's brigade encountered *Hampton's* near that place and a short engagement occurred. During the night Kilpatrick withdrew and took station at Two Taverns on the Baltimore pike on the right of Gregg. Merritt's brigade of the 1st division moved from Mechanicstown to Emmitsburg.

Stuart reports:

My advance reached Gettysburg July 2, just in time to thwart a move of the enemy's cavalry upon our rear by way of Hunters-town, after a fierce engagement, in which *Hampton's* brigade performed gallant service, a series of charges compelling the enemy to leave the field and abandon his purpose. I took my position that day on the York and Heidlersburg roads, on the left wing of the *Army of Northern Virginia*.

The brigades of *Robertson*, *Jones* and *Imboden* all reached Chambersburg this day, where *Imboden* relieved *Pickett* of the care of the army trains.

July 3.—The absence of cavalry on the left flank of the Union army on the afternoon of July 2 had been seriously felt, and orders were issued to Kilpatrick at Two Taverns and to Merritt's brigade of the 1st division at Emmitsburg, to take station on that flank and to take advantage of any favorable condition to attack. Kilpatrick, with Farnsworth's brigade, reached that flank about 1 p. m. and Merritt at 3 p. m. Custer's brigade, by

some misunderstanding, took station with Gregg's division along the Hanover road near the junction with the Low Dutch road.

Cavalry Engagement on the East Flank.—On the afternoon of July 3, a cavalry engagement took place in a pentagonal field between the York and Hanover roads, about three miles due east of the town square of Gettysburg. The field is limited on the north by a road connecting the York and Low Dutch roads, on the east by the Low Dutch road, on the south by the Hanover road and on the west by Young's Branch. The field slopes from north to south and was intersected by a number of fences. The Confederate cavalry and its artillery deployed in the northwest corner and the Union cavalry and artillery in the southeast corner. The two lines were about a mile apart. In this engagement *Stuart* employed the brigades of *Hampton*, *Fitz Lee*, *W. H. F. Lee* and *Jenkins*; Gregg employed only the brigades of *McIntosh* and *Custer*, and kept the brigade of *J. Irvin Gregg* in reserve.

Stuart says:

On the morning of July 3, pursuant to instructions from the commanding general (the ground along our line of battle being totally impracticable for cavalry operations), I moved forward to a position to the left of Gen. *Ewell's* left, and in advance of it, where a commanding ridge completely controlled a wide plain of cultivated fields stretching toward Hanover on the left, and reaching to the base of the mountain spurs, among which the enemy held position. My command was increased by the addition of *Jenkin's* brigade, who here in the presence of the enemy allowed themselves to be supplied with but ten rounds of ammunition, although armed with the most approved Enfield musket. I moved this command and *W. H. F. Lee's* secretly through the woods to a position, and hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy's rear, but *Hampton* and *Fitz Lee's* brigades, which had been ordered to follow me, unfortunately debouched into the open ground, disclosing the movement, and causing a corresponding movement of a large force of the enemy's cavalry.

Having been informed that Gens. *Hampton* and *Lee* were up, I sent for them to come forward, so that I could show them the situation at a glance from the elevated ground I held, and arrange for further operations. My message was so long in finding Gen. *Hampton* that he never reached me, and Gen. *Lee* remained, as it was deemed inadvisable at the time the message was delivered for both to leave their commands.

Before Gen. *Hampton* had reached where I was, the enemy had deployed a heavy line of sharpshooters, and were advancing toward our position, which was very strong. Our artillery had however left the crest, which it was essential for it to occupy on account of being of too short range to compete with the longer range guns of the enemy, but I sent orders for its return. *Jenkins'* [brigade] was chiefly employed dismounted, and fought with decided effect until the ten rounds were expended, and then retreated, under circumstances of difficulty and exposure which entailed the loss of valuable men.

The left, where *Hampton's* and *Lee's* brigades were, by this time became heavily engaged as dismounted skirmishers. My plan was to employ the enemy in front with sharpshooters, and move a command of cavalry upon their left flank from the position lately held by me, but the falling back of *Jenkins'* men (that officer was wounded the day previous, before reporting to me and his brigade was now commanded by Col. (*M. J.*) *Ferguson*, (16th Va. cav.) caused a like movement of those on the left, and the enemy, sending forward a squadron or two, were about to cut off and capture a portion of our dismounted sharpshooters.

To prevent this, I ordered forward the nearest cavalry regiment (one of *W. H. F. Lee's*), quickly to charge this force of cavalry. It was gallantly done, and about the same time a portion of Gen. *Fitz Lee's* command charged on the left, the 1st Va. cavalry being most conspicuous. In these charges, the impetuosity of those gallant fellows, after two weeks of hard marching and hard fighting on short rations, was not only extraordinary, but irresistible. The enemy's masses vanished before them like grain before the scythe, and that regiment elicited the admiration of every beholder, and eclipsed the many laurels already won by its gallant veterans. Their impetuosity carried them too far, and the charge being very much prolonged, their horses, already jaded, by hard marching, failed under it. Their movement was too rapid to be stopped by couriers, and the enemy perceiving it, were turning upon them with fresh horses. The 1st N. Car. Cav. and *Jeff Davis Legion* were sent to their support, and gradually this hand-to-hand fighting involved the greater portion of the command till the enemy were driven from the field, which was now raked by their artillery, posted about three-quarters of a mile off, our officers and men behaving with the greatest heroism throughout. Our own artillery commanding the same ground, no more hand-to-hand fighting occurred, but the wounded were removed and the prisoners (a large number) taken to the rear.

The enemy's loss was unmistakably heavy; numbers not known. Many of his killed and wounded fell into our hands.

That brave and distinguished officer, Brig. Gen. *Hampton*, was seriously wounded twice in this engagement.

Notwithstanding the favorable results obtained, I would have preferred a different method of attack, as already indicated; but I soon saw that entanglement by the force of circumstances narrated was unavoidable, and determined to make the best fight possible. Gen. *Fitz Lee* was always in the right place, and contributed his usual conspicuous share to the success of the day. Both he and the gallant 1st Va. begged me (after the hot encounter) to allow them to take the enemy's battery, but I doubted the practicability of the ground for such a purpose.

During this day's operations, I held such a position as not only to render *Ewell's* left entirely secure, where the firing of my command, mistaken for that of the enemy, caused some apprehension, but commanded a view of the routes leading to the enemy's rear. Had the enemy's main body been dislodged, as was confidently hoped and expected, I was in precisely the right position to discover it and improve the opportunity. I watched keenly and anxiously the indications in his rear for that purpose, while in the attack which I intended (which was forestalled by our troops being exposed to view), his cavalry would have separated from the main body, and gave promise of solid results and advantages.

After dark, I directed a withdrawal to the York road, as our position was so far advanced as to make it hazardous at night, on account of the proximity of the enemy's infantry.

D. McM. Gregg says:

On the morning of July 3, I was again ordered to take a position on the right of our line, and make a demonstration against the enemy. The 1st and 3d brigades were again posted on the right of the infantry, but about three-fourths of a mile nearer the Baltimore and Gettysburg turnpike. This position was taken because I learned that the 1st [2d] brigade of the 3d division was occupying my position of the day before.

At 12 a. m. I received a copy of a dispatch from the commander of the XI corps to the major general commanding the Army of the Potomac, that large columns of the enemy's cavalry were moving toward the right of our line. At the same time I received an order from Maj. Gen. Pleasonton, through an aide-de-camp, to send the 1st [2d] brigade, 3d division, to join Gen. Kilpatrick on the left. The 1st brigade [McIntosh] of my division was sent to relieve the brigade [Custer] of the 3d division. This change having been made, a strong line of skirmishers displayed by the enemy [*Jenkins*] was evidence that the enemy's cavalry had gained our right and were about to attack, with the view of gaining the rear of our line of battle. The importance of successfully resisting an attack at this point, which, if succeeded in by the enemy, would have been productive of the most serious consequences, determined me to retain the brigade of the 3d division until the enemy were driven back. Gen. Custer, commanding

the brigade, fully satisfied of the intended attack, was well pleased to remain with his brigade. The 1st N. J. cavalry (McIntosh) was posted as mounted skirmishers to the right and front in a wood, the 3d Pa. cavalry (McIntosh) deployed as dismounted skirmishers to the left and front in open fields, and the 1st Md. (McIntosh) on the Hanover turnpike in position to protect the right of our line.

The very superior force of dismounted skirmishers of the enemy advanced on our left and front [*Jenkins*] required the line to be reinforced by one of Gen. Custer's regiments. At this time the skirmishing became very brisk on both sides, and an artillery fire was* begun by the enemy and ourselves. During the skirmish of the dismounted men, the enemy brought on the field a column for a charge [1st Va.]. The charge of this column was met by the 7th Mich. [Custer] but not successfully. The advantage gained in this charge was soon wrested from the enemy by the gallant charge of the 1st Mich. of the same brigade. This regiment drove the enemy back to his starting point. Other charges were made by the enemy's columns but in every instance were they driven back. Defeated at every point, the enemy withdrew to his left, and on passing the wood in which the 1st N. J. was posted, that regiment gallantly and successfully charged the flank of his column. Heavy skirmishing was still maintained by the 3d Pa. with the enemy, and was continued until nightfall. During the engagement a portion of this regiment made a very handsome and successful charge upon one of the enemy's regiments. The enemy retired his column behind his artillery, and at dark withdrew from his former position. At this time I was at liberty to relieve the 1st [2d] brigade of the 3d division which was directed to join its division.

The batteries commanded by Capt. A. M. Randol and Lieut. A. C. M. Pennington rendered most effective service. The fire of the artillery during this engagement was the most accurate I have ever seen.

The casualties in McIntosh's brigade were 35 and in Custer's 219.

Cavalry Engagement on the South Flank.—The appearance of the Union cavalry on the south flank caused *Law*, who now commanded *Hood's* division, to withdraw *G. T. Anderson's* brigade and a regiment of *Robertson's* brigade to form a thin line connecting the Confederate forces on the slope of Big Round Top with Willoughby Run. The two Union brigades deployed west of Plum Run along a cross-road which connects the Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads, and is parallel to and a half-mile from the new line taken by *G. T. Anderson's* brigade; Farnsworth was on the right, and Merritt on the left.

In front of Farnsworth was a wooded hill which was taken possession of by his battery supported by his dismounted men. At the foot of the northern slope of this hill ran a thin Confederate skirmish line. To the north of the hill was an open field, about three-quarters of a mile square, limited on the north by a stone wall in the woods along the west branch of Plum Run, on the east by the wooded slopes of Big Round Top, and on the west by Snyder Ridge along which were posted four Confederate batteries. The field itself was intersected by fences, and the woods on the north and east were occupied by Confederate infantry.

About 5:30 p. m., while Merritt was engaged in a dismounted fight with *Anderson's* brigade, Kilpatrick thought he saw an opportunity for making a diversion by a mounted charge through the field into the woods at the farther end. To this duty he assigned two regiments. One was repulsed by the Confederate line at the south end of the field; the other, led by Farnsworth, broke through the first line, but was turned back by the stone wall at the northern end of the field. It then charged the brigades of *Robertson* and *Law* across Plum Run on the slope of Round Top. Being repulsed, the regiment made its escape through the gaps on either side of the wooded hill. In this charge Farnsworth was killed on the slope of Big Round Top.

Cavalry Engagement near Fairfield.—In moving from Emmitsburg July 3, Merritt sent one regiment toward Fairfield, to attack the Confederate trains believed to be in that vicinity. That morning the brigades of *Robertson* and *W. E. Jones* had marched from Chambersburg to Cashtown.

W. E. Jones reports:

Near this point an order from Gen. *Lee* required a force of cavalry to be sent at once to the vicinity of Fairfield, to form a line to the right and rear of our line of battle. In the absence of Gen. *Robertson*, I determined to move my command at once into position. About two miles from Fairfield we encountered the 6th U. S. regular cavalry en route to capture our cavalry division train, which must have fallen an easy prey but for our timely arrival.

We met in a lane, both sides of which were of post and rail fences, too strong to be broken without the axe. No estimate could be made of the opposing force; but knowing a vigorous

assault must put even a small force on a perfect equality with a large one until a wider field could be prepared, I at once ordered the 7th regiment, which was in front, to charge. Before the enemy could be reached he succeeded in throwing carbineers through gates right and left, who poured into our flanks a galling fire. The leading men hesitated; the regiment halted and retreated. The 6th Va. Cav. was next ordered to charge, and did its work nobly. It passed the skirmishers, assailing and routing one of the best U. S. regiments, just flushed with victory.

The Union regiment numbered about 400 and its casualties were 232, of whom 184 including the commanding officer were captured. The Confederate casualties were 60.

The column which was charged in the lane consisted of four troops, two others were reconnoitering in the vicinity, and four were in the skirmish line.

The Retreat.—On the night of July 3 the entire Confederate army was withdrawn to Seminary and Snyder ridges, and orders were issued and instructions given for the retreat to the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling Waters. *Lee* says:

The severe loss sustained by the army and the reduction of its ammunition, rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy inadvisable, and it was therefore determined to withdraw.

The trains with such of the wounded as could bear removal, were ordered to Williamsport on July 4, part moving through Cashtown and Greencastle, escorted by Gen *Imboden*, and the remainder by the Fairfield road.

The army retained its position until dark, when it was put in motion for the Potomac by the last-named route.

A heavy rain continued throughout the night, and so much impeded its progress that *Ewell's* corps, which brought up the rear, did not leave Gettysburg until late in the forenoon of the following day. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and after an arduous march, we arrived at Hagerstown in the afternoon of the 6th and the morning of July 7.

The great length of our trains made it difficult to guard them effectually in passing through the mountains, and a number of wagons and ambulances were captured. They succeeded in reaching Williamsport on the 6th, but were unable to cross the Potomac on account of the high stage of water. Here they were attacked by a strong force of cavalry and artillery, which was gallantly repulsed by Gen. *Imboden*, whose command had been strengthened by several batteries and two regiments of infantry, which had been detached at Winchester to guard prisoners, and were returning to the army.

While the enemy was being held in check, Gen. *Stuart* arrived with the cavalry, which had performed valuable service in guarding the flanks of the army during the retrograde movement, and after a short engagement, drove him from the field. The rains that had prevailed almost without intermission since our entrance into Maryland, and greatly interfered with our movements, had made the Potomac unfordable, and the pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed by the enemy. The wounded and prisoners were sent over the river as rapidly as possible in a few ferry-boats, while the trains awaited the subsiding of the waters and the construction of a new pontoon bridge.

On July 8, the enemy's cavalry advanced toward Hagerstown, but was repulsed by Gen. *Stuart*, and pursued as far as Boonsboro.

With this exception, nothing but occasional skirmishing occurred until the 12th, when the main body of the enemy arrived. The army then took a position previously selected, covering the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, where it remained for two days, with the enemy immediately in front, manifesting no disposition to attack, but throwing up intrenchments along his whole line.

By the 13th, the river at Williamsport, though still deep, was fordable, and a good bridge was completed at Falling Waters, new boats having been constructed and some of the old recovered. As further delay would enable the enemy to obtain reinforcements, and as it was found difficult to procure a sufficient supply of flour for the troops, the working of the mills being interrupted by high water, it was determined to await an attack no longer.

Orders were accordingly given to cross the Potomac that night, *Ewell's* corps by the ford at Williamsport, and those of *Longstreet* and *Hill* on the bridge.

The cavalry were directed to relieve the infantry skirmishers, and bring up the rear.

The movement was much retarded by a severe rain storm and the darkness of the night. *Ewell's* corps, having the advantage of a turnpike road, marched with less difficulty and crossed the river by 8 o'clock the following morning. The condition of the road to the bridge and the time consumed in the passage of the artillery, ammunition wagons and ambulances, which could not ford the river, so much delayed the progress of *Longstreet* and *Hill* that it was daylight before their troops began to cross. *Heth's* division was halted about a mile and a half from the bridge [on the Maryland side] to protect the passage of the column. No interruption was offered by the enemy until about 11 a. m., when his cavalry supported by artillery appeared in front of Gen. *Heth*.

A small number in advance of the main body was mistaken for our own cavalry retreating, no notice having been given of the withdrawal of the latter, and was suffered to approach our lines. They were immediately destroyed or captured, with the exception of two or three, but Brig. Gen. *Pettigrew*, an officer of great merit and promise, was mortally wounded in the encounter. He survived his removal to Virginia only a few days.

The bridge being clear, Gen. *Heth* began to withdraw. The enemy advanced, but his effort to break our lines was repulsed and the passage of the river was completed by 1 p. m. Owing to the extent of Gen. *Heth's* line, some of his men most remote from the bridge were cut off before they could reach it, but the greater part of those taken by the enemy during the movement (supposed to amount in all to about 500) consisted of men from various commands who lingered behind overcome by previous labors and hardships and the fatigue of a most trying night march. There was no loss of matériel excepting a few broken wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to draw through the deep mud. Other horses were sent back for them, but the rear of the column had passed before their arrival.

The position taken up by the Confederate army on July 12 was on a ridge which crosses the National road just west of Hagerstown and extends in the general direction of Downsville. *Longstreet* was on the right, *Hill* in the center and *Ewell* on the left. It covered Williamsport and Falling Waters where the army was to recross the Potomac.

Meade reports:

On the morning of the 4th, reconnaissances developed that the enemy had drawn back his left flank, but maintained his position in front of our left, apparently assuming a new line parallel to the mountains.

On the morning of the 5th, it was ascertained the enemy was in full retreat by the Fairfield and Cashtown roads. The VI corps was immediately sent in pursuit on the Fairfield road and the cavalry on the Cashtown road and by the Emmitsburg and Monterey passes.

July 5 and 6 were employed in succoring the wounded and burying the dead. Maj. Gen. Sedgwick, commanding the VI corps, having pushed the pursuit of the enemy as far as the Fairfield Pass in the mountains and reporting that the pass was a very strong one in which a small force of the enemy could hold in check and delay for a considerable time any pursuing force, I determined to follow the enemy by a flank movement, and accordingly leaving McIntosh's brigade of cavalry and Neill's brigade of infantry to continue harassing the enemy, put the army in motion for

Middletown, Md. Orders were immediately sent to Maj. Gen. French at Frederick to reoccupy Harpers Ferry and send a force to occupy Turner's Pass in South Mountain. I subsequently ascertained that Maj. Gen. French had not only anticipated these orders in part but had pushed a cavalry force to Williamsport and Falling Waters, where they destroyed the enemy's pontoon bridge and captured its guard. Buford was at the same time sent to Williamsport and Hagerstown.

The duty above assigned to the cavalry was most successfully accomplished, the enemy being greatly harassed, his trains destroyed, and many captures of guns and prisoners made.

After halting a day at Middletown to procure necessary supplies and bring up the trains, the army moved through the South Mountain and by July 12 was in front of the enemy, who occupied a strong position on the heights of Marsh Run, in advance of Williamsport. In taking this position, several skirmishes and affairs had been had with the enemy, principally by the cavalry and the XI and VI corps.

The 13th was occupied in reconnaissances of the enemy's position and preparations for attack, but on advancing on the morning of the 14th it was ascertained he had retired the night previous by a bridge at Falling Waters and the ford at Williamsport. The cavalry in pursuit overtook the rear-guard at Falling Waters capturing two guns and numerous prisoners.

On July 10, when the Army of the Potomac was at Antietam Creek, it was reinforced by French's division of four brigades, which had formerly belonged to the Middle Department and was at Harpers Ferry when Meade took command of the army. This division was assigned to the III corps of which French assumed command. On July 12 a division of militia troops, which had marched from Harrisburg, also joined the army.

When the Army of the Potomac deployed along the Hagerstown-Sharpsburg road on the 12th, the I and XI corps formed the right wing, the V and VI corps the center, the II and XII corps the left wing, and the III corps the reserve.

Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac.

Corps	Right Wing		Center		Left Wing		Reserve
	I	XI	V	VI	XII	II	III
July 5	Gettysburg	Gettysburg	Marsh Creek	Fairfield	Littlestown	Two Taverns	Gettysburg
6	Emmitsburg	Emmitsburg	Marsh Creek	Emmitsburg	Littlestown	Two Taverns	Gettysburg
7	Hamburg	Middletown	Utica	Hamburg	Walkersville	Taneytown	Mechanics-town
8	Turner Gap	Turner Gap	Middle-town	Middletown	Jefferson	Frederick	Frederick
9	Turner Gap	Turner Gap	Boonsboro	Boonsboro	Rohrersville	Rohrersville	Fox Gap
10	Beaver Creek	Beaver Creek	Antietam Creek	Beaver Creek	Bakersville	Tilghmantown	Antietam Creek
11	Beaver Creek	Beaver Creek	Beaver Creek	Beaver Creek	Fair Play	Lappans	Antietam Creek
12	Funkstown	Funkstown	Antietam Creek	Funkstown	Fair Play	Lappans	Antietam Creek

Cavalry Operations During the Retreat.—The orders issued by *Lee* for *Stuart's* cavalry were:

Gen. *Stuart* will designate a cavalry command, not exceeding two squadrons, to precede and follow the army in its line of march, the commander of the advance reporting to the commander of the leading corps, the commander of the rear to the commander of the rear corps. He will direct one or two brigades, as he may think proper, to proceed to Cashtown this afternoon, and hold that place until the rear of the army has passed Fairfield, and occupy the gorge in the mountains; after crossing which, to proceed in the direction of Greencastle, guarding the right and rear of the army on its march to Hagerstown and Williamsport. Gen. *Stuart* with the rest of the cavalry will this evening take the route to Emmitsburg and proceed thence toward Cavetown and Boonsboro, guarding the left and rear of the army.

It will be observed that no provision was made for Monterey Gap on the Fairfield road and no orders were issued for *Robertson's* two brigades at Fairfield. *Stuart* says in his report:

I had at the instance of the commanding general, instructed Brig. Gen. *Robertson*, whose two brigades (his own and *Jones'*) were now on the right at Fairfield, Pa., that it was essentially necessary for him to hold the Jack Mountain passes. These included two prominent roads—the one north and the other south of Jack Mountain, which is a sort of peak in the Blue Ridge chain.

Imboden, who conducted the trains by the Cashtown road, received his instructions from *Lee* in person that night.

July 4, 1863.

Brig. Gen. *J. D. Imboden*, Commanding, etc.

General:—In pursuance of verbal directions given you last night, I desire you to take charge of the train belonging to this army, which I have directed to be assembled in the vicinity of Cashtown this afternoon.

I advise you to start the train at least by 5 p. m. today, and endeavor to push it through to Greencastle by tomorrow morning by the road turning off at Greenwood. Thence you can follow the direct road to Williamsport, where the train must be put across the Potomac at once, and advance beyond Falling Waters, whence it can proceed more leisurely to Winchester. It will be necessary to escort it beyond Martinsburg, at least as far as Bunker Hill. I have directed two batteries to report to you this afternoon to accompany the train, so that you may have sufficient artillery to guard the front and rear, and distribute along

at intervals, in order to repel any attack that may be made along the line by parties of the enemy. I advise that in turning off at Greenwood you have your scouts out on the Chambersburg road until the rear of your train has passed it, and that you also keep scouts out on your left towards Waynesborough. From Greencastle you had better send a scouting party through Hagerstown, and hold that place until the train shall have crossed the river. At the river you can post your artillery to hold the ford, keeping out your scouts toward Hagerstown, Boonsboro, etc., until further orders. After the train has reached a place of safety, you can return to the Maryland side, taking position in front of Hagerstown, so as to keep open communications. I need not caution you as to preserving quiet and order in your train, secrecy of your movements, promptness and energy, and increasing vigilance on the part of yourself and officers. I enclose a letter to the commanding officer at Winchester, which I wish you would forward to him immediately upon crossing the river, unless you can find opportunity to send it securely before.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

P. S.—I desire you to turn back everybody you may meet on the road coming to join this army, to Falling Waters.

(Inclosure)

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,

July 4, 1863.

Commanding Officer at Winchester:

Sir:—I wish you to convey to the commanding officers of the regiments of *Ewell's* corps [*Early's* regiments left at Winchester] instructions from me to proceed to Falling Waters, where they will take position, and guard the pontoon bridge at that place, and also the ford at Williamsport, holding there all persons belonging to this army, and collecting all stragglers from it. Any sick, of course, will be forwarded to Winchester. The senior officer present will take command. Should it be necessary that a part of that force remain in Winchester, you have my authority for retaining it there. Upon the arrival of the sick and wounded at Winchester, they will be forwarded to Staunton as rapidly as possible, as also any surplus articles not needed for the army in the field.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

It had apparently been planned to assign *Iverson's* brigade as a guard for *Ewell's* trains going through Monterey Gap, but by some oversight he was not notified until the trains were well

under way. They therefore started through the gap on the afternoon of July 4 with no adequate escort, and the gap was practically unguarded as *Robertson* was still near Fairfield.

On the morning of July 4, Kilpatrick was ordered to move to Emmitsburg with his two brigades and there take command of Huey's brigade of Gregg's division, which was ordered to the same place from Westminster, and with the three brigades to move through Monterey Gap and attack the Confederate trains. Buford was ordered that morning to move from Westminster to Frederick for the same purpose and his 3d brigade was ordered from Gettysburg to join him there. From Frederick he was to move to Williamsport.

July 4.—On the afternoon of July 4th, one long Confederate train of wagons was moving through Cashtown, and another through Fairfield, en route for the Potomac. The cavalry brigades of *Hampton* and *Fitz Lee*, under the latter officer, were at Cashtown to guard the rear of that train, while *Imboden* with his brigade guarded the front and flanks; the other train was practically unguarded. *Stuart*, with the brigades of *W. H. F. Lee* and *Jenkins* was circling around the Confederate army to reach the Emmitsburg road south of Marsh Run. Kilpatrick ran into and broke the Confederate train in Monterey Pass that night and captured about forty of *Ewell's* wagons. These he took to Cavetown.

July 5.—*Stuart* reached Emmitsburg on the morning of the 5th and learned that Kilpatrick had gone through there the evening before to Monterey Pass. Assuming that Kilpatrick would be stopped by *Robertson*, he made his way through the mountains toward Cavetown and reached that vicinity in the evening and found Kilpatrick in his front. After a short engagement, Kilpatrick moved on to Boonsboro. When the report was received of the attack on the trains, the brigades of *Robertson* and *Jones* were pushed to the front, followed by *Iverson's*.

July 6.—The morning of the 6th found Buford's division at Frederick; Kilpatrick with three brigades at Boonsboro; and *Stuart* with four brigades at Leitersburg on the Hagerstown—

Gettysburg road. Buford started that morning for Williamsport via Boonsboro. Kilpatrick conferred with Buford and it was decided that Kilpatrick should move to Hagerstown, thus protecting Buford's rear, and if not seriously engaged, he was to move on Williamsport from Hagerstown. Of *Stuart's* command, two brigades, followed by *Iverson's* infantry brigade, moved on Hagerstown from Leitersburg, while *Stuart* with his other two brigades moved southward and then on Hagerstown by the Cavetown road.

Kilpatrick reached Hagerstown, and having driven out the Confederates, left a brigade there while he proceeded to Williamsport with his other two. A little later, *Stuart's* four brigades with *Iverson* reached Hagerstown and drove out the Union troops and started for Williamsport. *Imboden* had reached that town with his wagon train the preceding day and was there reinforced by two regiments of *Early's* division, which had been detached at Winchester. Having no means to cross the river but two small ferry-boats, *Imboden* had been obliged to take up a defensive position to guard his trains. This position Buford and Custer's brigade of Kilpatrick's division attacked late in the afternoon, but they were unable to carry it before dark, at which time *Stuart* reached Williamsport from Hagerstown and *Fitz Lee* with his two brigades from Greencastle. That night Buford and Kilpatrick encamped at Lappans, or Jones' Cross Roads, the junction of the Williamsport-Boonsboro and Hagerstown-Sharpsburg roads.

July 7.—The next day Buford and Kilpatrick retired to Boonsboro, as *Longstreet's* corps had reached Hagerstown the preceding evening and was moving southward.

J. I. Gregg's brigade followed *Imboden's* train as far as Greencastle but was prevented from making an attack by *Fitz Lee's* brigades. McIntosh's brigade of infantry, followed the Confederate army through Monterey Gap.

When the Union army took up its position in front of the Confederate line, Kilpatrick's division was on the right flank, Buford's division on the left flank, and Gregg's division in reserve at Boonsboro.

As the right flank of the Confederate army was protected by the Potomac River, *Stuart's* cavalry was united on the left flank of the army.

Itinerary of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac.

	BUFORD			KILPATRICK		D. McM. GREGG		
	Gamble	Devin	Merritt	Custer	Farnsworth	Huey	McIntosh	J. I. Gregg
3	Westminster	Westminster	Gettysburg	Gettysburg	Gettysburg	Westminster	Gettysburg	Gettysburg
4	On road to Frederick			On road to Monterey Pass via Emmitsburg			Gettysburg	Hunterstown
5	Frederick	Frederick	Frederick	Boonsboro via Smithburg			Emmitsburg	Greenwood
6	Moved to Williamsport and after engagement to Lappans			Moved to Hagerstown and after engagement to Lappans			Fairfield	Marion
7	The six brigades moved to Boonsboro						Waynesborough	Chambersburg
8	Skirmishing on Boonsboro—Funkstown road							
9	Skirmishing on Boonsboro—Funkstown road							
10	Funkstown	Funkstown	Funkstown	Funkstown	Funkstown	Lappans	Leitersburg	On the road to Middletown
11	Bakersville	Funkstown	Funkstown	Hagerstown	Hagerstown	Lappans	Leitersburg	Boonsboro
12	Bakersville	Funkstown	Funkstown	Hagerstown	Hagerstown	Lappans	Boonsboro	Boonsboro

While *Imboden's* long train of wagons was passing through Greencastle, it was attacked by some of Milroy's cavalry which captured or destroyed about sixty wagons. This cavalry had retreated from Winchester to Hancock and had been rallied west of McConnellsburg.

APPENDIX A

Strength of the Armies.—It is impossible to ascertain with accuracy the strength of either of the armies in the battle of Gettysburg.

Infantry.—It is generally accepted that the Union infantry, which was the principal arm engaged, exceeded the Confederate infantry by the infantry of the VI corps. As will be seen by the casualty lists given below, only a part of the VI corps was actually engaged in the battle; its presence however had an important influence on the morale of the Union army. In round numbers the Union infantry was probably about 77,000 and the Confederate infantry 63,000. In the encounters between infantry units of the same kind, the numerical advantage was usually with the Confederates, as the average strength of the infantry units was greater.

	Regiment.	Brigade.	Division.	Corps.
Union	320	1,500	4,000	11,000
Confederate	370	1,700	7,000	21,000

Artillery.—Of artillery, each army had, attached to its infantry units, about 4 guns for each 1,000 men. Nearly every battery of each army, both of the corps and reserve artillery, was engaged in the battle. The Union artillery had the greater influence on the course of the battle, as it was more often employed at close range in repelling infantry assaults. Only in Longstreet's attack on the second day did the Confederate artillery make any material impression on the Union infantry, although the Union artillery of the II corps suffered greatly on July 3d.

Cavalry.—The Union cavalry had an important influence on the battle, while the Confederate had none. Buford's division caused the battle to be fought at Gettysburg, and probably prevented Lee from moving by the more advantageous route through Fairfield and Emmitsburg. Gamble's brigade prevented the brigades of Archer and Lane from attacking the I corps on the afternoon of July 1, and thus prolonged the defense of the key-point of the position, Seminary Hill; on the 2d, Gregg's division prevented Walker's brigade from engaging in the attack on Culp Hill and perhaps saved that important point; on the 3d, Gregg prevented Stuart from having any influence on the battle.

The Confederate cavalry was however very effective in covering the movement of the army from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, and in protecting its trains on the retreat.

Casualties July 1, 2, and 3.

Infantry Divisions.	Union.				Grand Total.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	
I Corps.					
Wadsworth	299	1,229	627	2,155	5,948
Robinson	91	616	983	1,690	
Doubleday	265	1,297	541	2,103	
II Corps.					
Caldwell	189	880	208	1,275	4,213
Gibbon	344	1,002	101	1,647	
Hays	238	987	66	1,291	
III Corps.					
Birney	271	1,384	356	2,011	4,103
Humphreys	314	1,562	216	2,092	
V Corps.					
Barnes	167	594	143	904	2,143
Ayres	164	802	63	1,029	
Crawford	26	181	3	210	
VI Corps.					
Wright	1	17	—	18	230
Howe	1	12	2	16	
Wheaton	20	148	28	196	
XI Corps.					
Barlow	122	677	507	1,306	3,728
Steinwehr	107	507	332	946	
Schurz	133	684	659	1,476	
XII Corps.					
Williams	96	406	31	533	1,073
Geary	108	397	35	540	
Cavalry Corps.					
Buford	28	116	274	418	829
Gregg	6	38	12	56	
Kilpatrick	53	181	121	355	
Artillery Brigades.					
I Corps	9	86	11	106	
II “	27	119	3	149	
III “	8	81	17	106	
V “	8	33	2	43	
VI “	4	8	—	12	
XI “	7	53	9	69	
XII “	—	9	—	9	
1st Res. Reg.	13	53	2	68	
1st Res. Vol.	17	71	5	93	
2d “ “	1	5	2	8	
3d “ “	10	24	3	37	
4th “ “	2	34	—	36	

Infantry Divisions.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Grand Total.
<i>Horse Artillery.</i>					
1st.....	2	6	—	8	
2d.....	2	13	—	15	759
<i>Army of the Potomac.</i>					
	3,155	14,529	5,365	23,059	46,108
Confederate.					
<i>Longstreet's Corps.</i>					
McLaws.....	305	1,509	327	2,141	
Pickett.....	228	1,140	1,499	2,863	
Hood.....	339	1,481	442	2,262	7,266
<i>Ewell's Corps.</i>					
Early.....	154	800	226	1,180	
Johnson.....	219	1,229	375	1,823	
Rodes.....	415	1,693	684	2,788	5,791
<i>A. P. Hill's Corps.</i>					
Anderson.....	144	1,107	836	2,085	
Heth.....	411	1,900	517	2,828	
Pender.....	260	1,288	110	1,658	6,571
<i>Cavalry.</i>					
Stuart (5 brigades).....	36	140	64	240	240
<i>Artillery.</i>					
First Corps.....	42	209	22	273	
Second Corps.....	21	100	24	145	
Third Corps.....	22	112	30	164	
Cavalry Division.....	—	—	—	—	582
<i>Army of Northern Virginia.</i>					
	2,592	12,709	5,150	20,451	


An analysis of these tables indicates that the ratio of the total casualties to the total numbers actually engaged, was about the same in the infantry of each army and was about 30%. The casualties in the artillery were also about the same and were about two men per gun. The casualties in the cavalry were small on both sides but proportionally larger in the Army of the Potomac.


Its principal losses were in the 6th U. S. Cavalry, Buford's division, at Fairfield, and in Custer's brigade, Kilpatrick's division, both on July 3.

Of the Union corps, the infantry casualties were much the greatest in the I corps which also had the greatest number in the missing column. Robinson's division, and especially Paul's brigade, which was near the Mummaburg road, had many of its men captured in the retreat on July 1. The II corps had the second greatest number in the killed and wounded columns; together they were nearly equal to those of the I corps. The casualties were noticeably

greater in Webb's division, which was made the objective of the Confederate attack on July 3. The III corps had the third greatest casualty list; its retreat having been covered by other troops, its missing list was not excessive. The XI corps had the fourth greatest casualty list, of which 40% was made up of men captured in the retreat through the town on July 1. The casualties in the V corps were mainly in the 1st and 2d divisions, and occurred on July 2. The casualties in the XII corps were small as compared with those of *Johnson's* division although the latter formed only a part of the Confederate force with which the XII corps was engaged. The losses of the Confederates engaged with the XII corps cannot be accurately ascertained, since *Johnson* was reinforced by three brigades from other divisions on the 3d, all of which were engaged on that day. The losses in the VI corps indicate that, as a corps, it was not seriously engaged in the battle.


The infantry casualties in the three Confederate corps did not differ among themselves so greatly as did those in the seven Union corps. The casualties in the divisions were also much more uniform. *Longstreet's* corps had the greatest casualty list, and *Ewell's* had the smallest. Although engaged for a very short time, *Pickett's* division had the largest casualty list; over half of this list was made up of men who fell into the hands of the enemy. *Heth's* division, which was heavily engaged both on July 1 and 3, had the next greatest casualty list and the largest number in the killed and wounded columns. *Rodes'* division had the third greatest casualty list, which was made up principally of the losses in the brigades of *O'Neil*, *Iverson* and *Daniels*. *Early* had the smallest casualty list; none of his brigades was seriously engaged on more than one day.






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BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG-July 1st, 1863, afternoon.




SCALE OF MILES

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BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG-July 2d, 1863



SCALE OF MILES



BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG-July 3rd, 1863.

